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The 2001 anthrax attacks heightened awareness of the possibility of weaponizing 
biological agents such as Ebola, anthrax, and smallpox and hence, the Bioterrorism Act 
of 2002 to prevent biological attacks and reduce bioterrorism threats and vulnerabilities. 
However, the 2014 Ebola epidemic raised concerns about unpreparedness for 
bioterrorism within the healthcare community and about secondary infections from 
healthcare workers. Using Kingdon’s conceptualization of multiple streams as the 
foundation, the purpose of this case study was to explore the nature of bioterrorism 
threats and the level of preparedness of Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) who 
were involved in the 2014 Ebola epidemic in a New Jersey County for biological attacks 
and avoidance or reduction of secondary infections. Data were collected from 18 
individuals through interviews and from emergency response documents. The data were 
inductively coded and subjected to thematic analysis. The emergent themes indicated that 
although there was an abundance of bioterrorism preparedness policies and programs 
dating back to the 2001 anthrax attacks, the response to the 2014 Ebola epidemic 
revealed inadequate bioterrorism preparedness practices. The study participants identified 
insufficient knowledge of bioagents and lack of regular training as factors that prevented 
enhanced preparedness practices. Participants suggested that improved training 
opportunities, interagency collaborations, and better funding would improve bioterrorism 
preparedness practices. The social change implications of this study include increased 
funding for bioterrorism preparedness to harden EMTs and the creation of public 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
The 2014 Ebola epidemic and the varied responses from local and state 
governments raised public concerns about the capability of healthcare workers (HCWs), 
especially emergency medical technicians (EMTs), to provide emergency services if 
pathogens such as Ebola virus disease (EVD) were weaponized by terrorists. Studies 
showed that the threats of potential bioterrorism attacks are real, and the question was 
when rather than if they will occur (Cenciarelli et al., 2015; Fernandez et al., 2011; 
Hodge, 2002; Rokach et al., 2010; Song et al. 2013). These and other studies pointed to 
the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States; the 2001 inhalational anthrax incidents; the 
increasing number of countries and terrorist groups engaged in active bio-warfare 
programs; the lack of uniformity, and inadequate training in emergency preparedness 
within EMTs population in the United States (Barras & Greub, 2014; Dudley & 
Woodford, 2002; Fernandez et al., 2011; Klein et al., 2016; Poland, Jacobson, Tilburt, & 
Nichol, 2009; Potter et al., 2012). 
EMTs are the first medical responders in disaster situations, including 
bioterrorism attacks. It is, therefore, necessary to examine HCWs’ and EMTs’ level of 
preparedness for bioterrorism in the areas of risk mitigation and response-time strategies 
(Kabir, Naik, Kumar, & Bhas, 2016). When disasters occur, the immediate challenges 
EMTs confront are stabilizing patients and transporting them to designated acute 
healthcare facilities for medical treatments without putting themselves, their families, and 
their immediate communities at further risks. To protect themselves from pathogens 
transmitted through bodily fluid, EMTs knowledge of personal protective equipment 
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(PPE), adequate training, and additional education are necessary (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), 2015). Also, transporting patients to acute healthcare 
facilities poses unique problems and challenges (CDC, 2015). 
In 2000, the CDC initiated comprehensive strategic plans with law enforcement 
and first responders on the need to prepare for possible bioterrorism attacks. The five 
strategic plans were preparedness and prevention; detection and surveillance; diagnosis 
and characterization of biological and chemical agents; response; and communication for 
bioterrorism prevention and readiness (CDC, 2000). Also, in 2002, the United States 
Government (USG) enacted the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act (PHSB&R) of 2002, Subtitle A of Public Law 107–188, and the 
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act (ABPA) of 2002, in order to identify and 
categorize the biological agents and toxins that have the potential to cause public injury if 
weaponized. However, Markenson, Reilly, and DiMaggio (2005) indicated that only a 
small percentage of the 823 participants who returned their questionnaires  had been 
trained in chemical, biological, or radiological terrorism from the health department 
(6.3%–14.9%). The number, however, increased in other areas of emergency response: 
13.5%–22.5% for suspicious case reporting, 15.1%–25.6% for public health emergencies, 
and 17.3%-31.8% for mandatory infectious disease reporting. These dismal results were 
years after the PHSBR and ABP Acts of 2002 and the 2003 Hazardous Site Response Act 




In 2010, a U.S. Congressional Report addressed the bioterrorism threat, and 
President Barack Obama highlighted the threat in a State of Union address (Gottron & 
Shea, 2011). While the Congressional Report acknowledged the Federal Government’s 
preparedness for a possible bioterrorism attack, it questioned the adequacy of existing 
mechanisms among other stakeholders involved in emergency response, including state 
and local governments, and others (Gottron & Shea, 2011). Also, in a 2011 report, the 
National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National 
Security noted the disparities and lack of uniformity and knowledge of chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) among HCWs including 
EMTs. Similarly, other studies (Fernandez et al., 2011; Rickles & Catarious, 2015), 
highlighted HCWs inadequate training on PPE, inconsistent protocols for handling 
infected patients, and lack of uniformity in training and education. Protection from 
pathogens for medical emergency services operators (EMSOs) and EMTs are necessary 
because of the growing threats of bioterrorism from countries and terrorist groups whose 
intentions are to inflict maximum harm, destruction, and death on humans, animals, and 
plants (Burnette, Hess, Kozlovac, & Richmond, 2013; Kadlec, 2013). 
Similarly, following the recommendations from the Federal Emergency 
Management Authority (FEMA), the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management 
(NJOEM) and the Disaster Management Act of 2000, the New Jersey County Office of 
Emergency Management (ECOEM) initiated the All-Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) to 
prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from disasters to guide all emergency 
responders, including EMTs (ECOEM, 2018). In 2015, the HMP was reviewed to 
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identify and reduce vulnerabilities to all hazards, including terrorism and infectious 
diseases (ECOEM, 2018). 
Despite the bioterrorism preparedness plans, the 2014 Ebola epidemic showed 
unpreparedness against Category A biological agents, such as EVD, which has a high 
mortality rate of between 50-90% and requires appropriate responses and preparedness 
from HCWs and EMTs (Aquino & Wu, 2011; Sarah, 2016). The lack of adequate 
preparedness and practices (called bioterrorism hardening) within the HCWs and EMTs 
population pose impediments to effective biodefense (Khan, 2011; Gerstein, 2017; 
Gostin, Waxman, & Foege, 2015; Sylvia & Danita, 2013). 
How prepared are EMTs in the face of the current global bioterrorism threat? 
What are the community-wide implications of a bioterrorism attack for which EMTs 
appear ill-prepared? Incidentally, little research has examined the bioterrorism policy, 
practices, and preparedness for EVD and other cutaneous diseases within the EMTs’ 
population (Barnett et al., 2010; Gerstein, 2017; Lurie, Manolio, Patterson, Collins, & 
Frieden, 2013). By simultaneously examining EMTs’ practices and, preparedness, and 
identifying lapses, and policy implications, and by using the multiple streams theory 
(MST), the result of this study will provide data to help policymakers initiate policy 
changes. The policy changes will, by extension, contribute to improving bioterrorism 
hardening within EMSO and EMT populations. The bioterrorism hardening within 
EMSO and EMT population will have further implications for social change through 
policy formulation for enhanced and up-to-date, community-level bioterrorism 
preparedness awareness programs. The nature and level of HCWs and EMTs 
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involvement in bioterrorism policy implementation will form the theoretical basis for the 
examination of bioterrorism preparedness within the EMT population, as will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
In this chapter, I discussed the background of the study, provided the need for the 
study and the history of bioterrorism preparedness before and after the 2001 terrorist and 
anthrax attacks. The inadequate preparedness and varied responses following the 2014 
Ebola epidemic further heightened the need for the study. And the inadequate 
bioterrorism preparedness makes both the emergency responders and the citizens 
vulnerable to biological attacks and unable to mitigate the effects of bioagents. I then 
cover the following topics: the statement of the problem, purpose of the study, the 
theoretical framework that guided the study, the research questions, nature of the study, 
definitions of major concepts, the assumptions, the scope and delimitations, the 
significance of the study, and the implications for social change. 
Background of the Study 
Global concern for biological terrorism or weaponized pathogens in the modern 
era dates to the 1925 Geneva Protocol that prohibited the use of biological or chemical 
weapons in warfare (Pedraza, 2012). In 1967, the World Health Organization (WHO), in 
recognition of potential biological attacks, issued guidance (updated in 2004) on how to 
prepare for such incidents to minimize the casualty rate (Jansen, Breeveld, Stijnis, & 
Grobusch, 2014). The WHO document (Public Health Response to Biological and 
Chemical Weapons) was issued to guide HCWs such as EMTs and national governments 
on how to respond to incidences of weaponized pathogens on human beings. Again, in 
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1972, WHO got 103 countries including the United States to sign the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (BTWC) to prevent the use of 
biological agents as weapons of warfare (Barras & Greub, 2014). Despite the historical 
global awareness and agreements, the threats posed by bioterrorism persist (Jansen et al., 
2014; Weant, Bailey, Fleishaker, & Justice, 2014). Studies show that some countries and 
terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, have active biowarfare programs and/or have the 
financial capability to procure biological agents (Cenciarelli et al., 2013; Dudley & 
Woodford, 2002; Maras & Miranda, 2016). 
Kadlec (2013), noted that in the event of a bioterrorism attack, the USG’s 
assessment put the casualty rate at 1.2 million. However, the historical study by Jansen et 
al. (2014) found that preparedness for bioterrorism by HCWs minimized the casualty 
level by about 75%. Jansen et al. (2014) undertook a historical overview of pathogens as 
weapons of warfare and terrorism and the initiatives by the international community to 
curtail the weaponization of bioagents by both states and nonstate actors. The high rate of 
casualties has inherent problems and challenges for HCWs, including, EMTs (Maras & 
Miranda, 2016), and hence the need to harden EMSOs and EMTs because of their 
frontline roles when pathogens such as EVD are weaponized. The high rate of deaths 
among HCWs in the four affected countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Nigeria 
during the 2014 Ebola epidemic illustrate the need for bioterrorism preparedness and 
practices among HCWs. For instance, in 2014, 7.9% of Ebola cases in Guineans, ages 15 
and above, were HCWs, which amounted to 42.2 times more than non-HCWs (Grinnell 
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et al., 2015). Similar higher percentage cases among HCWs were reported in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone during the Ebola epidemic, with 490 HCWs’ dead out of 837 
HCWs infected (Maras & Miranda, 2016). This higher percentage rate is an indication of 
the risk HCWs confront when highly infectious disease (HIDs) strike, as they mobilize to 
minimize the risk in the community, care for the patients, and/or transport them to AHFs. 
In 2001, Bacillus cereus anthracis or anthrax, a Category 1 agent, was released in 
the United States resulting in the death of five patients and many more hospitalized 
(Poland et al., 2009). The anthrax attack of 2001 and the resultant deaths were wake-up 
calls that further illustrated the inherent danger of a biological attack (Suk et al., 2011). 
Also, the lack of uniformity and uncoordinated approach to the EVD epidemic further 
underscores the need for the study of bioterrorism preparedness of emergency medical 
workers (Shultz, Baingana, & Neria, 2015). 
This study intended to help prepare EMTs for bioterrorism threats and/or attacks 
by examining their level of knowledge of PPE, training, and education for cutaneous 
forms of infectious diseases such as EVD. What EMTs can do or what knowledge they 
need to acquire to adequately show bioterrorism, chemical and nuclear readiness have not 
been adequately investigated (Fernandez et al., 2011). Furthermore, the critical 
emergency roles HCWs and EMTs perform require policy initiatives for adequate 
bioterrorism preparedness and practices such as those proposed by Berger and Moreno 
(2010). Moreover, EMTs’ roles involve not only stabilizing victims of disasters but also 
transporting them to immediate facilities for further treatments and, this process of 
transporting disaster victims to HCFs has its unique challenges (CDC, 2015). The CDC  
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recommends that suspected cases of EVD infections be transported to Ebola assessment 
hospitals and frontline healthcare facilities, while confirmed cases are transported from 
Ebola assessment hospitals and frontline healthcare facilities to Ebola treatment centers 
(CDC, 2014). How EMTs handle these challenges (stabilizing patients and transporting 
them to HCFs) without jeopardizing community-level safety in the event of bioterrorism 
attacks are the focus of this study. 
In 2000, the CDC organized a Strategic Planning Workgroup (SPW) that studied 
the bioterrorism preparedness and response strategies involving first responders 
especially EMT personnel (CDC, 2000). The CDC workgroup noted that critical to 
bioterrorism preparedness are (a) early detection of biological and chemical terrorism; 
and (b) adequate awareness of potentially deployable pathogens among frontline health-
care providers that could lead to serious illnesses and injuries during and after 
bioterrorism attacks. However, the 2015 EVD epidemic revealed inadequate 
preparedness and awareness within the HCW and EMT populations despite many 
regulations and legislation since the 2001 anthrax attacks (Maras & Miranda, 2016; 
Shultz et al., 2015). 
Studies have shown that (a) adequate knowledge of PPE, (b) education, (c) 
citizens’ participation, and awareness, (d) the perception of bioterrorism threats among 
HCWs and (e) their readiness to confront biological attacks are essential elements in 
HCWs and EMTs’ practices and preparedness (Clancy, 2008; Sarah, 2016). Following 
the 2001 incidences of anthrax incidents, the United States. committed vast sums of 
money to biodefense (Cole, 2012). Despite an enormous financial outlay, the level of 
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preparedness for possible bioterrorism appears inadequate as evidenced by the haphazard 
reactions from various state governments to the EVD epidemic (Rickles & Catarious, 
2015). Although, research exists on such pathogens as anthrax and H1HI, as well as 
influenza pandemic preparedness, what past research has not shown is how current 
EMTs’ readiness, practices, and preparedness aligns with the overall community, state, 
and national bioterrorism programs and policies concerning cutaneous forms of 
biological agents such as EVD. This study addressed the gap in the literature. 
Problem Statement 
Despite the over $60 billion spent on biodefense since the anthrax attacks of 2001 
and up to the Ebola outbreaks, and the improvement in biodefense and emergency 
responses, bioterrorism preparedness continued to pose unique challenges for HCWs in 
the United States (Bitlauer, 2017; Bouzianas, 2009, Cole, 2012, Olsen, 2013; Katz, Attal-
Juncqua, & Fischer, 2017). Biological attacks are targeted at humans, animals, and plants 
to inflict maximum fatality, and cause economic, agricultural, and health problems 
(Anderson & Bokor, 2012). In 2014, Zaire Ebola Viral (EBOV), a potentially deployable 
biological agent for bioterrorism, manifested in four West African countries: Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Nigeria. EBOV, one of the five known species of EVD that 
caused thousands of deaths in those West African countries have a high fatality rate of up 
to 90% (Baize, Pennetier, Oestereich et al., 2014; Choi, Hong, Hong, & Lee, 2015). In 
the first 9 months of the Ebola outbreak, about 7,388 or 40% of the patients were 
confirmed dead (Choi et al., 2015). 
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That EVD reached the United States in 2014 was an indication of its potential as a 
national and global health threat, and possible weapon for biological warfare. In the event 
of bioterrorism, HCWs, and their families are at higher risk of infection despite the huge 
expenditure on biodefense since anthrax (CDC, 2016a; NJDOH, 2014). The higher risk 
was evident in the case of the 513 HCWs who died during the EVD epidemic in the West 
African countries out of the 881 infected by November 2015 (CDC, 2016a). EVD, a 
Category A pathogen, transmitted through direct bodily fluid and blood contact with a 
sick patient or deceased victim has a high potential for use in biological terrorism in the 
United States given the successful 2001 anthrax attacks. 
Research has shown that only 6% of healthcare facilities in the United States 
confirmed adequate preparedness to handle Ebola cases (Boscarino & Adams, 2015). 
Also, there is the challenge of managing large-scale disaster as the response of HCWs to 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic demonstrated. These were evident in the varied reactions from 
many states (including New Jersey and Texas) to the EVD epidemic, and they revealed 
apparent unpreparedness and vulnerabilities within the HCWs’ community (Rickles & 
Catarious, 2015). Rickles and Catarious (2015) attributed the unpreparedness and 
vulnerabilities to the lack of uniformity and inadequate training for PPE. These 
vulnerabilities manifested despite the 2011 report of the National Science and 
Technology Council of the consequences of ill-prepared emergency personnel to CBRNE 
attacks. Despite the huge expenditure on biodefense, there was apparent unpreparedness 
and vulnerabilities within the HCW community during the Ebola epidemic. The current 
study examined EMTs’ post-2014 Ebola vulnerabilities, preparedness, and knowledge. 
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These previous studies and reports also raised the need to explore the policy and 
political implications regarding EMSOs and EMTs preparedness or unpreparedness for 
biological attacks in the aftermath of the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Studying EMSOs and 
EMTs bioterrorism preparedness was important because in the event of bioterrorism, 
EMTs are the first medical responders who transport patients to acute healthcare facilities 
despite the challenges involved in the process (English et al., 1999; CDC, 2015). Acute 
healthcare facilities are designated by the CDC for the management of HIDs such as 
EVD. So, protecting EMTs from HIDs and bioagents are critical to mitigating the 
potential effects of bioterrorism on HCWs, and will enhance community-level 
bioterrorism preparedness and protection. 
On one hand, Abatemarco, Beckley, Borjan, and Robson (2007); Galada, Gurian, 
and Hong (2013); Hughes and Gerberding (2002); Patidar, Singh, Jaiswal, Chaudhary, 
and Samadi (2013); and Smith and Hewison (2012) conducted studies on inhaled 
biological agents such as anthrax, policy and collaborative initiatives between federal and 
state governments and agencies, and their readiness for bioterrorism attacks. On the other 
hand,  Rickles & Catarious (2015) studied EVD preparedness among HCWs. However, 
to date, little research has examined the bioterrorism preparedness of EMSOs and EMTs 
regarding their knowledge and use of PPE, training, and education for bioagents such as 
EVD in New Jersey. The lack of adequate knowledge in the use of PPE, bioagent 
training, and education among EMTs are hindrances to HCWs safety and community-
level bioterrorism preparedness and hardening. Also, little research has examined how 
PPE, training, and education may enhance EMTs’ and community-wide bioterrorism 
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preparedness and hardening for EVD in the State of New Jersey. This study helped fill 
the gap in the literature. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine and understand the 
nature and level of bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs in New Jersey, for cutaneous 
forms of biological agents such as EVD, and the attendant policy and political 
implications for inadequate or lack of preparedness. The study sought to identify critical 
factors that New Jersey’s policymakers, and EMSOs management may consider in 
bioterrorism preparedness within EMTs operations for community-wide bioterrorism 
hardening. The study’s findings will contribute to both EMTs’ safety, effective 
bioterrorism response and hardening, and community-level bioterrorism readiness. 
Furthermore, this study identified what factors accounted for the inadequate bioterrorism 
preparedness and response against EVD in 2014: What challenges plagued, and continue 
to plague, EMSOs and EMTs? To achieve these purposes and address the gap in the 
literature, I conducted face-to-face interviews with 18 EMTs operating in four EMSOs in 
the selected  County in New Jersey. I also reviewed scholarly works on emergency 
preparedness and practices among healthcare workers. 
Research Questions 
The following two research questions guided the study: 
1. Are EMSOs and EMTs in New Jersey prepared for a cutaneous form of biological 
attack such as EVD? 




The theoretical framework used for this dissertation was Kingdon’s (1984) 
multiple stream theory (MST). MST’s three streams are these: problem stream, policy 
stream, and political stream. MST originated from the garbage can model (GCM) 
propagated by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972). The GCM had four streams: problems, 
solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. Kingdon, in 1984 narrowed the four 
streams into three streams and came up with the MST. The major tenets of MST are that 
the three streams operate independently and at opportune times they must co-exist for 
policy changes to occur (Alcantara & Roy, 2014; Kattikireddi, Hilton, Bonnell, & Bond, 
2014). 
The theory addresses policy changes that occur when the streams converge 
through a window of opportunity, although the streams operate independently. According 
to Sabatier and Weible (2014), “the problem stream consists of various conditions that 
policymakers and citizens want addressed,” policy streams are projected solutions 
seeking acceptance; and the political stream “consists of three elements: the national 
mood, pressure groups campaigns, and administrative or legislative turnover” (p. 32-34). 
A detailed explanation is discussed in Chapter 2. 
MST, for this study, rested on the assumption that, by identifying the 
vulnerabilities of EMSOs and EMTs (problem) and proffering different possible 
perspectives for EMTs hardening (policy), policymakers can be pressured to enact laws 
or policies that will bring about EMSOs and EMTs bioterrorism readiness initiatives 
(politics). The make-up of the political streams for this study consisted of policymakers at 
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the state, county, and city levels, and interest groups. MST was primarily designed for 
analyzing the decision-making process of the federal government, but it has proven a 
useful tool for analyzing policy changes within state governments and federal agencies 
(Larkin, 2012). Kingdon used the framework to discuss how the federal government in a 
policy-making arena advanced policy changes in the context of the interplay of the three 
streams. MST has also been applied to study local problems. Walhart (2013), in a study, 
further advanced the argument for multiple streams application in agencies decision-
making processes. Walhart (2013) analyzed how MST was applied to improve patients’ 
outcome through problem identification, making the problem a policy issue before 
policymakers, and influencing the development of new healthcare initiatives. 
The theory is germane to this study given the national and global agitation for 
terrorism and CBRNE preparedness after the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Therefore, the 
window of opportunity was available to be exploited to create appropriate bioterrorism 
preparedness policies. The theory also helped the study in examining and proffering 
strategies for bioterrorism prevention, protection, mitigation and response of EMTs in 
New Jersey. Therefore, MST is a useful analytical tool for the examination of the 
operations of EMSOs, the experiences, and vulnerabilities of EMTs, and identification of 
factors that could help harden them in their responses to biological attacks. 
Nature of the Study 
The study used the qualitative research design approach to examine the 
bioterrorism preparedness and practices of selected emergency and protective services 
(ERP) in the selected  County in New Jersey. The target population for data collection 
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was EMTs who have varied experiences in emergency medical responses in their 
respective organizations. The data were collected through a face-to-face interview of 
EMTs selected using the purposeful, snowball sampling technique and the data were 
analyzed using a thematic approach. Data were also collected from policy documents. 
Qualitative research was suitable for this study because of its flexibility and probing 
technique, and the potential for helping discover new leads (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-
Swift, 2014). The qualitative case study was, therefore, ideal for examining the current 
level of bioterrorism preparedness, protection, and response (PPR) practices (bioterrorism 
hardening) and discovering how they may be improved upon given the challenges 
bioterrorism PPR pose to EMTs’ emergency response capability, and uniformity. By 
undertaking this study and interviewing the study’s participants (EMTs) involved in the 
medical health emergency operations and responses, the study sought to provide an 
understanding of the extent of PPE knowledge and uniformity in operations within the 
EMTs’ population for bioterrorism hardening. 
A case study approach was chosen because it makes room for an exploratory 
study and in-depth description of the phenomenon using data from various sources, 
thematically analyzed (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The mode of data collection was a 
purposeful sampling technique through snowball/chain referral because of its 
effectiveness in getting information from those who should know (Patton, 2002). 
Definition of key Concepts 
Bioterrorism: For the purposes of this study, bioterrorism is defined as the 
intentional act by either a country or terrorist groups (also known as nonstate actors) 
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often inspired by ideological, national, religious, and political beliefs to inflict harm, 
death, and create terror, societal disruption and/or economic loss (Jansen et al., 2014). 
Bioterrorism is not the conventional use of explosives but pathogens such as anthrax, 
EVD, smallpox, influenza virus on humans, animals or plants to instill fear, harm, illness 
and death (Wurtz, Grobusch, & Raoult, 2014). The 2001 anthrax incidents in the United 
States illustrates how devastating biological agents can be if weaponized and the need to 
invest in preparedness initiatives (Gursky & Bice, 2013). Both anthrax and EVD fall 
within the CDC, Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) Category 1 or Tier 1 
classification because of their fatality rates (CDC-FSAP, 2014). 
Emergency medical technicians (EMTs): EMTs are the pre-hospital emergency 
medical services providers responsible for attending to patients during disaster situations 
and transporting them to hospitals (Chen & Yu, 2016; Lin, 2013). EMTs provide basic 
non-invasive treatment to minimize health risk or harm to the patients, stabilize the 
patients, and transport them to AHFs (CDC, 2015). They are the direct implementers of 
government bioterrorism preparedness policies, and, therefore, are most at risk in times 
of biological attacks as front-line-healthcare workers (CDC, 2000). EMTs fall within 
what is referred to as emergency and protective services (EPSs) (Sanders, 2013). Other 
groups within the EPSs are emergency medical responders (EMRs); advanced emergency 
medical technicians (AEMTs), and paramedics (Garner, Baker, & Hagelgans, 2016; 
National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMTs), 2017). 
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1. EMRs are first responders with knowledge of life-saving skills. EMRs include 
firefighters, EMTs and law enforcement officers with basic knowledge of life-
saving techniques (Kelly & Hassett-Walker, 2016). 
2.  AEMTs have a little more knowledge than EMTs. They perform all the activities 
that EMRs and EMTs do and a little more. They provide minimal and basic but 
limited advanced medical and pharmacological treatments (National Registry of 
Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMTs), 2017). 
3 Paramedics, on the other hand, have higher skills and provide invasive medical 
and pharmacological treatment. Paramedics also receive more advanced training 
of about 1200 hours more than EMTs, to acquire enough knowledge to provide 
intravenous treatments (Bureau for Labor Statistics, 2019; Waldrop, Clemency, 
Maguin, & Lindstrom, 2014). 
Category A Pathogens: These are pathogens or biological agents that have been 
classified by the CDC-FSAP as having the capabilities to cause the most severe harms to 
humans, animals, and plants if used as weapons for biological attacks (CDC-FSAP, 
2014). Ebola virus falls into this Category A or what the FSAP also called Tier 1. Other 
pathogens in this Categories include Marburg Virus, Bacillus cereus Biovar anthracis 
(anthrax), Botulinum neurotoxins, and Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of 
Clostridium among others (CDC-FSAP, 2014). Other categories are B and C. Our focus 




Bioterrorism hardening: Bioterrorism hardening for this study is the preemptive 
preparations for protecting the emergency workers such as EMTs who will be deployed 
to disaster areas (Kabir, Naik, Kumar, & Bhas, 2016). In other cases, it may involve the 
entire population. For instance, in 2003, the President Bush Administration began a pilot 
program to harden 500,000 HCWs through vaccination against the potential use of 
smallpox as a biological weapon (Allison, 2003). Bioterrorism hardening is all exercises, 
actions, training, precautionary measures that are put in place to prevent or minimize the 
impact of biological attacks on targets (Abrol, 2016; Henderson, 2014). One of the 
actions needed is getting EMTs educated on potential bioagents. For instance, Rokach et 
al. (2010) discovered in a quantitative study of 76 nurses and physicians, the relationship 
between the willingness to treat patients during biological attacks and medical knowledge 
of the pathogen. 
Hardening also involves protecting vulnerable targets such as malls, churches, 
schools and theaters. Target hardening is best illustrated by the measures the aviation 
industry especially in the US, have put in place to secure airspace and airplanes (Hasting 
& Chan, 2013). Some of these measures include the introduction of Air Marshalls, the 
creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the x-ray scanning 
technologies (Hasting & Chan, 2013). 
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD): Ebola virus disease is a biological agent that 
terrorists can weaponize. It is a pathogen that can be transmitted through bodily fluid 
contact with a patient or a dead victim (Passi, Sharma, Dutta, Dudeja, & Sharma, 2015). 
EVD, a highly infectious disease (HID) is classified as a Category A pathogen because of 
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its high rate of fatality of between 50% and 90% (Maras & Miranda, 2016). Other 
Category 1 pathogens agents include Anthrax (bacillus cereus anthracis), Marburg virus, 
variola major virus (smallpox), varilola minor virus (alastrim), and botulinum 
neurotoxins (Cenciarelli et al., 2015). Other species of EVD are Sudan ebolavirus; 
Bunchbugyo ebolavirus; Restron ebolavirus; and Tai Forest ebolavirus and their 
symptoms include muscle pains, fatigue, vomiting, diarrhea, fever, weakness and malaise 
(Choi, Hong, Hong, & Lee, 2015). 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): PPE are special equipment, respiratory 
and clothing protective tools designed to minimize the exposure to hazardous materials 
and agents in the work environment (United States Department of Labor – Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, USDOL-OSHA, 2004). Protective equipment includes 
gloves, masks eye protection and face shields. In 2008, the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), enacted Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR), Part 1910.120 (Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard 
– HAZWOPER) to ensure the availability of PPE for emergency responders (CDC – 
NIOSH, 2008). The selection of a PPE depends on the hazard, and the impact the hazard 
will have on the victims (CDC – NIOSH, 2008; USDOL-OSHA, 2004). 
Assumptions 
This study made the assumptions that EMTs are the first medical responders in 
emergency or disaster situations that may not include typical first responders such as 
firefighters. For instance, in some organizations, some first responders have dual roles 
such as EMTs and fire-fighters. This clarification is important because first responders is 
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a loose term applied to all emergency workers, including the medical and military 
personnel, police, fire-fighters, mobile intensive care nurses, EMTs, EMRs, advanced 
emergency medical technicians, and paramedics, and disaster rescue volunteers (Garner, 
Baker, & Hagelgans, 2016). Second, the study assumed that the participants would 
provide data as truthfully as possible and grant access to their respective organizational 
policies to make this study more reliable. However, this was not the case as participants 
were reluctant to provide all needed data due to organizational policies and fear of 
divulging confidential information. Finally, the study assumed that all EMTs joined the 
emergency services at different times, received various training, and therefore, had an 
adequate understanding of the bioterrorism preparedness and practices in their respective 
workplaces. Although all participants acquired minimum training for certification, there 
appear to be disparities in the level of their training, knowledge of PPE, and lack of 
uniformity in training (NSTC, 2011). 
Scope and Delimitations 
The qualitative approach aligns very well with understanding how multiple stream 
theory (MST) can be used to examine the potential threat of bioterrorism in New Jersey 
and the emergency responses from EMTs, who are first medical responders, in the event 
of possible biological attacks. Data were derived from interviews and government 
documents. The scope of the study’s participants was limited to EMTs in a particular 
County to the exclusions of other medical emergency responders in the area such as 
paramedic and mobile intensive care nurses. The research focused on the County EMTs’ 
bioterrorism preparedness because of the county’s large population and the organizations’ 
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proximity to potential terrorist’s targets such as the Newark train station and the Newark 
International Airport. However, the study’s findings may have the problem of 
extrapolation to other counties because of local policies and practices that may differ 
from county to county and city to city. 
However, this limitation would still not prevent the study findings from possible 
applicability to other counties. The study’s findings may be applied to understand the 
bioterrorism preparedness of other HCWs, especially mobile intensive care nurses and 
other first responders because they are among the first medical responders to disaster 
areas. For instance, the police and firefighters are among the first to provide first aid 
treatments to victims when disasters occur (Abatemarto et al., 2007). 
Limitations 
The overarching intent of this study was to examine and understand the 
bioterrorism preparedness of EMTs. The aim was to explore the factors that can be put in 
place for bioterrorism hardening of EMTs and extrapolate the findings to the other 
emergency responders and HCWs. 
The first limitation of this study is that it focused specifically on EMTs in one 
county to the exclusion of EMTs in other counties who may have more informed views 
of bioterrorism preparedness and hardening for Category A pathogens such as EVD. An 
example is the County of Camden, which witnessed the anthrax attacks in 2001. 
The second limitation was access to information such as the organizations’ 
emergency response manuals. Access to information such as emergency response 
protocols are essential to the understanding of bioterrorism preparedness and indeed, all-
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hazard emergency response practices. I was under the impression that the study 
participants would be eager to share information for better bioterrorism response 
practices and policies. 
The third limitation was that the study’s participants were EMT populations 
outside the hospital because of the challenges they encounter as the first line of medical 
defense against HIDs. The study could have gained from the experience of EMTs who 
operate hospital-based emergency response services. Also, the study would have 
included advanced emergency medical technicians who have greater knowledge in 
providing basic medical treatment to patients. 
Finally, I held the uninformed judgment that EMTs only transport patients to 
hospitals with no authority or knowledge to offer basic medical treatment to patients. 
When conducting the research, I was open-minded and never allowed my assumptions to 
affect follow-up questions or data transcription. However, I established a trusting 
relationship with the participants which created a good interview atmosphere for the 
participants to provide accurate and detailed information. 
The Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is that it helped bridge the gap in the literature by 
(a) identifying factors that may contribute to bioterrorism hardening; (b) examining 
factors that pose challenges in hardening EMSOs and EMTs; and (c) exploring how 
policymakers can facilitate EMSOs and EMTs bioterrorism preparedness for cutaneous 
biological agents such as EVD. The study examined the policy and political implications 
of inadequately hardened EMSOs and EMTs. This research, therefore, contributed to the 
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field of bioterrorism hardening by proffering a template for emergency response practices 
by EMTs in the event of biological attacks or release of pathogens. The varied responses 
during the 2014 Ebola epidemic demonstrated the need for a new approach to bioagent 
preparedness policy among HCWs. The research findings provided needed data for 
policy changes in bioterrorism preparedness and emergency response practices in the  
County used for the study and possibly to other counties in New Jersey. 
The CDC recommended the availability of appropriate AHFs, training of HCWs 
and first responders, and policy guidelines for bioterrorism preparedness (CDC, 2015). 
However, many AHFs and HCWs, including EMSOs and EMTs, appear not to conform 
to the CDC’s guidelines for bioterrorism preparedness (NSTC, 2011; Rickles & 
Catarious, 2015). Although some states’ agencies have developed collaborative initiatives 
for bioterrorism hardening in response to the CDC’s recommendations (Smith & 
Hewison, 2012), little research has been conducted to examine the EMSOs’ and EMTs’ 
bioterrorism preparedness, protection, and response for EVD in New Jersey. By 
simultaneously examining EMTs practices and preparedness, by identifying lapses and 
policy implications, the results of this study provided urgently needed data for policy 
changes that would improve the bioterrorism preparedness and practices of EMSOs and 
EMTs. 
Significance to Theory 
The study contributed to the advancement of the theoretical knowledge in 
bioterrorism hardening among HCWs for HIDs or biological agents because of the 
inherent threat they pose as possible weapons for biological attacks (Aghaei & Bagheri-
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Nesami, 2013; Jensen et al., 2014). Previous studies (Abro, 2016; Clancy, 2008; Gursky 
& Bice, 2013; Hunter, Yang, Crawley, Biesiadecki, & Aragon, 2013; Katz, Attal-
Juncqua, & Fischer, 2017) have addressed government initiatives and HCWs 
preparedness for inhaled biological agents such as anthrax, use of PPE and their 
willingness to respond to bioterrorism attacks. The qualitative case study will help 
advance the theoretical knowledge of bioterrorism through policy formulation, training 
and education of EMTs in acquiring adequate knowledge of various infectious pathogens, 
their characteristics, prevention strategies, and uniformity in bioterrorism response 
practices. 
Significance to Social Change 
HCWs, especially EMTs in their roles as emergency responders, have limited 
time to make decisions about caring for their patients while protecting themselves 
from harm, infection and possibly infecting their colleagues (Ahmad et al., 2016). It is, 
therefore, critically important that EMTs have bioterrorism preparedness readiness, 
training, and PPE knowledge to protect themselves. This study is expected to bring about 
attitudinal change, increased awareness and knowledge of biological agents among EMTs 
and the public. The recognition of biological agents would increase stricter application of 
precautionary measures when responding to emergencies, especially in this age of the 
proliferation of biological agents. 
 The collateral social benefit is that EMTs’ bioterrorism response readiness will 
protect the community from possible contamination and risk through secondary infection. 
The study will bring about improvement to EMSOs and EMTs bioterrorism preparedness 
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and practices while accounting for local needs and challenges. These improvements in 
bioterrorism preparedness and practices have implications for social change through 
policy formulation for enhanced community-level bioterrorism preparedness programs in 
the local communities and the county as a whole. 
Summary and Transition 
Studies have shown that HCWs knowledge of PPE, training, and education are 
critical to an effective bioterrorism preparedness (Abatemarco et al., 2007; Clancy, 2008; 
Kabir, Naik, Kumar, & Bhas, 2016; Smith & Hewison, 2012). Critical to this 
preparedness plan is uniformity across the levels of government in disaster response 
plans, and EMTs’ awareness and knowledge of the potential bioagents. Following the 
varied responses from various governments in the United States during the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic, there was the need to examine bioterrorism preparedness of HCWs (Maras & 
Miranda, 2016). 
I used Kingdon’ MST to explore the nature of bioterrorism threats given that 
terrorist groups are exploring the means to weaponize biological agents and the failed 
response to the 2014 Ebola epidemic further exposed the vulnerabilities of HCWs to such 
threats. The study noted that despite the huge financial commitments to bioterrorism 
preparedness after the 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks, bioterrorism preparedness 
among HCWs continued to pose challenges. Also, few studies have addressed these 
challenges in bioterrorism hardening and the continued threats from possible biological 
attacks. The qualitative study’s findings were expected to help fill the gap in the literature 
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by providing an understanding of the nature of the bioterrorism preparedness for 
cutaneous diseases such as EVD. 
I examined the problems and challenges confronting EMTs, identified the factors 
for bioterrorism hardening, and explored how policymakers could help facilitate the 
bioterrorism hardening processes using the theoretical framework of MST. In addressing 
these challenges and preparedness, the study sought to answer the research questions: 
How prepared are EMTs for cutaneous diseases, and what are the policy implications? 
The study’s findings also sought to help increase understanding of the growing field of 
bioterrorism preparedness. The findings, if implemented, may help policymakers 
formulate policies and programs that would not only increase safety practices among 
EMTs, but increase bioterrorism response readiness, and community-wide preparedness 
in New Jersey. The findings can be extrapolated to other counties in New Jersey, and 
nationally because when EVD struck, it was a national rather than New Jersey and Texas 
problems. The study would help institute uniformity in EMTs’ policies and practices, 
increase EMTs’ knowledge of pathogens and their characteristics, and mitigate secondary 
infections. 
In chapter 2, the literature review helped this study identify the challenges of 
bioterrorism preparedness and policy actions that have been explored in the past. The 
review of the literature also assisted in narrowing the study problem. To achieve this 
goal, Kingdon’s MST facilitated the study’s understanding of the problem, the policy 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Bioterrorism preparedness and practices continued to pose unique challenges for 
HCWs in the United States as was evident in the varied responses to the 2014 EVD 
epidemic despite the policies and programs, and funding since the 2001 anthrax attacks 
for biodefence initiatives (Cole, 2012; Wurtz, Grobusch, & Raoult, 2014). For instance, 
in response to the 2014 – 2015 Ebola outbreaks, the United States Congress allocated 
about $5.4 billion for preparedness and response both internationally and locally (Katz, 
Attal-Juncqua, & Fischer, 2017). However, the varied responses from various state 
governments during the Ebola epidemic raised public concerns about the preparedness of 
HCWs for cutaneous forms of biological agents such as EVD, anthrax, and smallpox if 
weaponized by terrorists (Gonsalves & Staley, 2014; Shultz, Baingana, & Neria, 2015). 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine EMTs’ bioterrorism 
response practices and challenges and to identify factors that may influence policy 
makers in formulating policies geared towards biodefense preparedness and practices 
(bioterrorism hardening) for EMTs in New Jersey. This study was significant because 
HCWs are often at higher risk of contracting any epidemic disease not known at the time 
of the epidemic (Walker & Whitty, 2015). The higher risks within HCWs have often 
resulted in more deaths within the HCW population relative to the general population, as 
was evident in the 2014 EVD crisis in the West African sub-region (Fasina, Adenubi, 
Ogundare, Shittu, Bwala, & Fasina, 2015). Also, EMTs exposure to any pathogen may 
jeopardize community-wide public healthcare safety. Therefore, this study would help 
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mitigate the risk of secondary infection among the EMT population and reduce potential 
community-wide infection. Mitigating the secondary risk requires preparedness. 
Preparedness or countering bioterrorism if efficiently planned and executed can reduce 
casualty rates to 75% based on a simulation conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies (Jansen, Breeveld, Stijnis, & Grobusch, 2014). 
In this chapter, I emphasize the relationship that the study’s theoretical framework 
had with the research problem and questions. The theoretical framework for this study 
was Kingdon’s MST. MST illustrates the inter-connectivity of problems, competing 
solutions for these problems, and the politics involved in making policy decisions. The 
basic tenets of this theory are the idea that, as the existing problems gain the attention of 
policymakers, competing solutions begin to emerge, policymakers acknowledge the 
problem, and agree with the proposed solution which they turn into policy (Cairney & 
Jones, 2016). 
There is an abundance of literature on bioterrorism preparedness policies and 
plans since the anthrax attacks (Gursky & Bice, 2013; Lall et al., 2017; Smith & 
Hewison, 2012). The literature reviewed showed the level of involvement of emergency 
medical workers and HCWs in general in bioterrorism mitigation, and the impact of past 
and current bioterrorism preparedness plans. However, the 2014 Ebola outbreaks and the 
responses to the confirmed cases in the United States showed that all the years of 
bioterrorism preparedness plans, programs and policies were inadequate (Stratton, 2014). 
Stratton (2014), while acknowledging the failure of political leadership, laid the ultimate 
blame on the healthcare community for the unpreparedness. The study, however, failed to 
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acknowledge the pivotal roles that government policies and preparedness plans play in 
establishing emergency response protocols and building critical public confidence 
(Rosoff, Siko, John, & Burns, 2013). 
Organization of the Review 
The review of the literature began with an examination of the theoretical basis for 
the study. This study explored the need for further research on EMTs bioterrorism 
preparedness as threats from lone-wolf terrorists and terrorist groups, and bioterrorism 
intensify. The subsequent sections of this chapter illustrated the literature review 
strategies, the theoretical framework for the study, and the segments covered in the 
literature review. The review of the literature section included the in-depth examination 
of the history of bioterrorism; pathogens, bioterrorism, and HCWs’ preparedness 
understanding of bioterrorism preparedness, history of emergency preparedness, policies, 
and legislation in the United States, participants’ knowledge of cutaneous diseases, the 
importance of bioterrorism preparedness, EMTs’ training, readiness and hardening, threat 
assessment, vulnerability assessment, and bioterrorism preparedness in New Jersey. 
Finally, the chapter reviewed the main issues covered in the literature. The essence of the 
review of the literature was to understand how the existing literature aligned with this 
study, identify the gap in the literature, and help address the literature gap. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The literature review focused on scholarly works on the questions of potential 
weaponization of pathogens for terrorist attacks, the origin of bioterrorism, understanding 
the meaning of bioterrorism preparedness, the preparedness of EMTs for bioterrorism, 
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and policies about bioterrorism preparedness and response in post-2001 anthrax attacks 
and post-Ebola epidemic. The major source of the literature review was from the Walden 
University library databases: Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, Sage Premier, 
ProQuest Central, ProQuest, Political Science Complete, Google Scholars, Thoreau: 
search multiple database, peer-reviewed journals retrieved from websites. Other sources 
of the literature review included government agencies’ documents and policies from the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH), and  a county Office of 
Emergency Management. 
The keywords used in sourcing the study materials were biological agents, 
threats; disaster preparedness, vulnerabilities, disaster; target hardening, terrorist 
signaling; bioterrorism, response, preparedness; bioterrorism preparedness, qualitative 
case study research; Ebola, Healthcare Workers, fatality; Ebola, Response, United 
States; emergency medical technicians; bioterrorism and Ebola virus disease; 
bioterrorism, pathogens, policy; qualitative, healthcare workers; bioterrorism, 
preparedness response, policy; John Kingdon, multiple stream framework, problem 
broker, policy and bioterrorism. The literature review showed the abundance of literature 
on inhalational pathogens such as anthrax following the 2001 anthrax attacks, the 
subsequent bioterrorism preparedness initiatives, and the safe handling of pathogens in 
laboratories. There was also an abundance of literature on nurses and physicians’ 
bioterrorism training and preparedness in a hospital environment. However, there is the 
scarcity of research on the protocols and practices involved in transporting patients to 
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acute care facilities and the risks EMTs confront and the challenges in responding to 
disaster victims. 
 The key search terms that resulted precisely in relevant and current articles from 
Google Scholar and Thoreau: Search multiple databases include multiple stream theory; 
bioterrorism, preparedness, Europe initiatives; bioterrorism, anthrax, United States; 
anthrax, history, United States; policy; multiple stream theory, bioterrorism; 
bioterrorism, Ebola, vulnerability; bioterrorism, policies, EMTs; infectious disease, 
bioterrorism, United States; The Ebola Virus and the threat of bioterrorism; 
Bioterrorism, qualitative research, healthcare workers, training, uniformity. Other 
keywords that were useful in the iterative search for current and relevant articles include: 
Bioterrorism; Bioterrorism, preparedness, policy; anthrax, United States; bioterrorism, 
vulnerability, risk; bioterrorism, preparedness, response, policy; Emergency response, 
Hurricane Sandy; Ebola, healthcare workers, fatality; Bioterrorism preparedness and 
response act of 2002; Infectious disease, threat assessment, bioterrorism; bioagents, 
diseases, bioterrorism; bioterrorism, Acts 2002; bioterrorism, Ebola, preparedness; and 
bioterrorism, emergency, responses. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical foundation for this study was John Kingdon’s multiple stream 
theory (Kingdon, 1984). MST emerged out of Kingdon’s inquisition to understand how 
problems get solved through policies in the contest of competing solutions, and the 
factors that influence decision-making at the national level.  Knaggård (2015) viewed 
MST as a useful tool for agenda-setting but noted that often studies using the theory laid 
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less emphasis on the problem stream of the theory. MST origin was traced to the work 
(garbage can model – GCM) of Cohen et al. (1972) as Brunner (2008) observed. GCM 
has four streams: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities (Brunner, 
2008). Kingdon narrowed these streams to three: Problem, policy, and politics. 
However, for MST to be a useful analysis for policy changes, there must be an 
awareness of the existence of a problem usually after a disaster or an incident such as the 
threat of bioterrorism and the question of EMTs’ preparedness to respond to possible bio-
attacks (Hayle, 2015; Hoeijmakers, De Leeuw, kenis, & De Vries, 2007; Katikireddi, 
Hilton, Bonell, & Bond, 2014). The next step will be to seek for solutions to the problem 
(policy stream). Finally, a window of opportunity such as a political change must exist 
for both the problem and policy streams to converge and bring about desired policy 
changes (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Put differently, the problem stream refers to the 
policy problems that need attention, the policy stream relates to the many policy solutions 
from many sources including policymakers, experts and pressure groups, while the 
politics stream pertains to the happenings within the government circle including change 
in political leadership and pressures from public opinion that create the window of 
opportunities for policy changes (Howlett, McConnell, & Perl, 2015). 
The utility of the MST lies in the interconnectivity of a problem (problem stream), 
competing solutions proposed by interest groups (policy stream), and existing events or 
the public dispositions to the events (political stream) and the policymakers’ 
understanding of their constituents’ dispositions (Hayle, 2015). The theory addresses 
policy changes that occur when the streams, though operating independently, converge 
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through a window of opportunity. The basic tenets of MST are as follows: The presence 
of issues that the public and policymakers want addressed (problem stream); the various 
existing programs and competing solutions seeking acceptance (policy stream); and the 
three elements: the national mood, pressure groups campaigns, and administrative or 
legislative turnover that compete in the political stream (Sabatier and Weible, 2014). The 
theory provides the theoretical foundation for analyzing the context and interplay of the 
three streams in which policymakers make policies. 
Many studies have used MST to address societal problems and policymakers have 
used it to develop policies to solve problems. Avery (2004), used the theory to illustrate 
how mismatching the streams can have larger policy implications. The study showed how 
policy entrepreneurs mismatched the problem and a policy solution to a wrong political 
stream following anthrax 2001 attacks. Avery (2004) argued that the mismatch arose by 
labeling bioterrorism a security issue rather than a public health concern. The result of the 
mismatch, Avery (2004) noted was that the United States lost a window of opportunity to 
bring about health policy reforms that would have addressed health problems related to 
the anthrax bio-attacks. Could a similar mismatch be responsible for the poor handling of 
the Ebola epidemic in the US? 
 In another study, Brunner (2008) applied the theory in the case study of 
Germany’s 2007 adoption of the low-carbon economy proposed by the European Union 
(EU). The EU adopted the Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005. The ratification 
of the ETS occurred despite the oppositions from interest groups within EU. One of such 
interest groups was the chemical producers. In any event, the new policy emerged 
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because there was an awareness that a problem existed that needed a solution; 
suggestions on how to go solving the problem followed; and the window of opportunity 
presented when German Chancellor became the EU President (Brunner, 2008). Germany 
was forced to follow the wind of change sweeping the world for carbon reduction 
measures. Brunner (2008) demonstrated the utility of MST, although, the study 
recommended using it in combination with other approaches. MST was also applied to 
examine local problem issues. Supporting the application of the theory to local problems, 
Walhart (2013) advanced the argument for MST application in agencies’ decision-
making processes. Walhart (2013) analyzed how MST was applied to improve patients’ 
outcome through problem identification, making the problem a policy issue before 
policymakers, and influencing the development of new healthcare initiatives. 
MST is also a useful theoretical framework because of its adaptability to many 
public policy issues areas and changes within subnational governments and federal 
agencies and not only for analyzing national government policy issues (Cairney & Jones, 
2016; Larkin, 2012). Kingdon used the framework to discuss how the federal government 
in a policy-making arena may advance policy changes in the context of the interplay of 
the three streams. In this study, MST helped this qualitative case study identify 
bioterrorism preparedness challenges or problems, threats, vulnerabilities, key players in 
bioterrorism preparedness, emergency medical responses and policy making, and who or 
what posed impediments to identifying factors necessary for bioterrorism hardening. 
MST, for this study, rested on the assumption that, by identifying the 
vulnerabilities of EMSOs and EMTs (problem) and proffering different possible 
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perspectives for EMTs hardening (policy), policymakers can be pressured to enact laws 
or policies that will bring about EMSOs and EMTs bioterrorism readiness initiatives 
(politics). The make-up of the political streams for this study consists of policymakers at 
the state, county, and city levels, and management of EMSOs. 
The importance of the theory to the current study was in its ability to help 
examine and understand the “objective condition” that opened policy windows for 
solutions to solving the inadequate bioagent preparedness among HCWs (Hayle, 2015). 
MST was, therefore, a useful tool in the examination of the bioterrorism preparedness 
and practices among EMTs in New Jersey, especially in a post-Ebola epidemic. The 
existing literature demonstrated the need to examine bioterrorism preparedness among 
HCWs after the Ebola epidemic. The MST as a theoretical framework was a useful tool 
to examine the challenges of bioterrorism preparedness and emergency response practices 
(BT/ERPs) for cutaneous disease such as Ebola. As a result, the interview and research 
questions were framed to get adequate information from the research participants to 
reflect on the current practices and identify areas of improvement for the safety of EMTs 
and the community. Finally, MST was a useful analytical tool for examining problems, 
exploring available policies/solutions, and the politics involved in making policies 
choices.  Overall, the theoretical framework, the research questions and the methods of 
inquiry assisted the study in examining and understanding the threats posed by 
bioterrorism, the vulnerabilities, and the need for bioterrorism hardening. 
Literature Review 
A Historical Overview 
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This section began with a description of the history of bioterrorism, and 
emergency service operations in the United States. Bioterrorism has existed for centuries 
dating back to the 14th century BC (Barras & Greub, 2014). Bioterrorism, the intentional 
introduction of infectious diseases or biological agents into food, water or air (Maras & 
Miranda, 2016) or for biological warfare (use of cadavers and contagions, and pollution 
of wells for enemy armies) could be traced to 600 B.C through to the 20th century 
(Taylor, 2015). In the 14th Century, during the Roman civilization and as the wars raged, 
water supplies were poisoned with dead rodents; and in the 1700s, British soldiers used 
blankets infested with smallpox to attack French soldiers (Patidar, Singh, Jaiswal, 
Chaudhary, & Samadi, 2013). 
It was suspected that infectious diseases were deployed in the World War I and 
that prompted the 1925 Geneva Protocol to curtail the use of bioagents as weapons for 
warfare (Cenciarelli et al., 2013). Commonly used bioagents are anthrax and smallpox, 
and they were deployed during World War I and World War II (Barras & Greub, 2014; 
Berger & Moreno, 2010). Other historical incidents, attacks or warfare that utilized 
bioagents included Anthrax and Bubonic plague deployments of 1937 by Japan’s Unit 
731, the 1984 Rajneeshee Religious Salmonella typhimurium attack, 1995 Aum 
Shinrikyo Cult sarin gas of 1995, and the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States 
(Tambunam, Parikesit, &, Saputro, 2014). And the threats of, and actual biological 
attacks have progressively increased since 1970 (Greub & Grobusch, 2014). 
Pathogens are threats to both HCWs and the community because they are easier to 
procure and can be transmitted from a human to another human covertly (Maras and 
37 
 
Miranda, 2016). Hence, EMTs capability to identify when biological attacks happen is 
critical to their understanding of how to contain the pathogens and avoid further risk to 
themselves and the community (Cenciarelli et al., 2013). 
In 1976, another highly infectious disease (HID) Ebola viral hemorrhagic fever 
(VHF) or Ebola virus disease (EVD or Ebola), and a potentially deployable bioagent with 
a fatality rate of between 50% and 90% first manifested in Sudan (Maras & Miranda, 
2016; Passi et al., 2015; Taylor, 2015). In 2014, the disease manifested in West African 
and the United States (CDC, 2016b). And some studies (Caro et al. 2015; Cenciarelli et 
al. 2015; Maras & Maranda, 2016) have noted the potentials of Ebola as a biological 
agent and the difficulty in identifying its’ manifestation as was the case with the Liberian 
(Tim Duncan) who was treated in a Texas hospital. The responses to Mr. Duncan’s case 
further heightened the public concerns of the state of preparedness in the United States 
for an epidemic or release of biological agent despite the PAHPR Act of 2013 (Monroe, 
2014). 
Pathogens, Bioterrorism, and HCWs’ Preparedness 
Pathogens are threats to both HCWs and the community because they are easier to 
procure and can be transmitted from a human to another human covertly (Maras & 
Miranda, 2016). Hence, HCWs’ and EMTs’ capability to identify when biological attacks 
happen is critical to them understanding how to contain the pathogens from further 
risking themselves and the community (Cenciarelli et al., 2013). Multiple studies 
(Burnette, Hess, Kozlovac, & Richmond, 2013; Hasan, 2014; Klein et al., 2016; 
MacIntyre, 2015; Menrath, Tomuzia, Frentzel, Braeunig, & Appel, 2014; Oladimeji et 
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al., 2015; Rickles & Catarious, 2015) agree on the bio-threats from terrorist groups and 
the lack of adequate training, education, and uniformity among EMTs and HCWs. 
MacIntyre (2015) recognized the increasing threats posed by the scientific developments 
and the accessibilities of terrorist groups and state-sponsors of terrorism to potential 
bioagents especially dual-use research of concern (DURU). Another issue of concern was 
EMTs’ knowledge of potential bioagents and insider threats from research biologists. 
MacIntyre (2015) further argued that these issues are compounded by the lack of 
adequate training and policies and recommended bioterrorism response strategies against 
unnatural pathogens. In another study, Menrath et al. (2014) noted the high probability of 
bioterrorism but acknowledged the lack of clear assessment of the threats posed by 
bioagents. Menrath et al. (2014) used the semi-quantitative risk evaluation approach. The 
authors measured the risk using probability - impact analysis factors including access to 
the bioagents, production probability, and historic use. The usefulness of the study was 
the usage of ranking to develop an effective bioterrorism response strategy. However, the 
study unlike the study by MacIntyre (2015) did not recognize the difficulty in evaluating 
emerging or new infectious diseases. 
Similarly, the study by Oladimeji et al. (2015) went beyond the theoretical 
preparedness for an emerging disease to use the 2014 Ebola incidence to assess the 
preparedness, practices, and knowledge of HCWs for such potential bioagents. The cross-
sectional design study in Nigeria used stratified sampling technique and conducted a 
semi-structured interview process to assess the occupational health hazards HCWs face in 
their daily activities. The study assessed respondents’ knowledge of Ebola and their 
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precautionary measures to avoid personal risks and community-wide infections during 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The study found discrepancies among HCWs knowledge of 
Ebola and inadequate and ineffective response practices. The study’s finding suggested 
that higher knowledge of Ebola and better practices were located among medical doctors. 
This qualitative case study focused on EMTs, a sub-group of HCWs, who are not as well 
educated as medical doctors, and the study was conducted post-Ebola epidemic. 
Although the qualitative research study by Hasan (2014) aligned largely with the 
study by Oladimeji et al. (2015) they, however, deferred from each other because Hasan 
(2014) emphasized more on both state and nonstate actors developing hybrid biological 
agents such as black pox (a hybrid of smallpox and Ebola). The study pointed to the on-
going hybrid development of bioagents in countries such as Syria, Iran, and North Korea 
who are in coalition with terrorist groups in the Middle East region. The usefulness of the 
study by Hasan (2014) to this case study was essentially on its recommendations for pre- 
and post-bioterrorism preparedness responses and practices, and training of medical staff 
including emergency workers given the existence of active bioweapon programs by state 
and nonstate actors. 
Murali, Ordóñez, and Dessouky (2012) noted that a major preparedness response 
strategy and practice is the question of distributing strategic national stockpile to address 
huge demands in the event of a large-scale biological attack. Such preparedness included 
training medical personals such as EMTs. Another preparedness response strategy would 
involve a partnership between public environmental health and emergency preparedness 
and response (EPR) programs in collaboration with local communities of which 
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emergency medical workers are major components (Gamboa-Maldonado, Marshak, 
Sinclair, Montgomery, & Dyjack, 2012). Although Gamboa-Maldonado et al. (2012) 
focused on environmental health and EPR strategies for emergency workers, the findings 
could be used in response to biological attacks if EMTs have adequate knowledge of 
bioagents and are well trained. The study found that environmental health professionals 
are not trained in disaster emergency and bioterrorism responses. 
The study by Potter et al. (2012) mirrored the study by Murali, et al. (2012) but 
focused on strategic national stockpile distribution preparedness and strategies among 
states in response to potential disaster situations such as epidemics. The study used the 
CDC recommended strategic national stockpile scores to assess states’ preparedness for 
influenza and stockpile distribution within a reasonable time frame. The CDC study 
found disparities in training, exercising and distribution of medical and pharmaceutical 
supplies among states. Potter et al. (2012) recommended increased funding towards 
improving the scores of the low-scoring states to improve the national preparedness for 
strategic national stockpile distribution. The study is important because it reflected the 
disparities in the States’ Ebola responses when the disease emerged in the US. EMTs, 
though charged with emergency medical response responsibilities lacked adequate and 
uniform training and education (Klein et al., 2016; Rickles & Catarious, 2015). 
In an earlier study, Keranen (2011) found that the reemergence of formally 
eradicated potential bioagents such as smallpox was a source of concern and indicated the 
need for preparedness and planning. The reason Keranen (2011) adduced for the potential 
reemergence of the bioagents are the available stockpiles in various laboratories. 
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However, the importance of the research is in its acknowledgment of diverse views on 
the possibility of bioterrorism attacks: high and low probabilities. Despite the 
polarization, Keranen (2011) noted the overwhelming view among policymakers and the 
general population that the chances for biological attacks were higher than lower, and, 
therefore, the urgent need for bioterrorism preparedness policies and practices. 
Klein et al. (2016) survey design analyzed 403 completed and returned 
questionnaires on the use of a triage system to assess mass casualty incident in 
emergencies response among emergency medical providers. Triage knowledge 
(protocols, transportation of patients, and life-saving interventions) among EMS 
personnel is essential for the mitigation of risk in emergencies. Although the study found 
the importance of triage experience for medical emergency response, it recommended a 
follow-up qualitative research on what influences EMS initial triage decisions. The 
strength of the Klein et al. (2016) was in using triage assessment to get HCWs and EMTs 
ready for mass casualty incident and transporting patients to healthcare facilities. Second, 
a similar assessment strategy may be used to evaluate bioterrorism preparedness of 
EMTs. 
Understanding Bioterrorism Preparedness 
Preparedness or public health emergency preparedness and response (PHEPR) 
presupposes getting ready for the unknown happening, preventing the occurrence of 
emergency situations, and planning to respond appropriately to mitigate the effect of the 
emergency (Hedman, Knutsson, Ansell, Radstrom, & Rasmusson, 2013; Nemane, 2012; 
Revere et al., 2011; Washington State Department of Health, 2016). Bioterrorism, on the 
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other hand, is the intentional release of pathogens by state actors and nonstate actors 
using micro-organism (pathogens) to create terror, cause injuries and death (Streatfield, 
Kushnir, & Yusibov, 2015; Tambunan, et al., 2014). For bioterrorism to happen, there 
must be what Cenciarelli et al. (2013) referred to as two actors or activities: pathogens in 
the forms of bacteria, viruses or toxins, and means of dissemination. 
Bioterrorism preparedness requires unique knowledge acquisition on bioterrorism 
management; is a continuous process and the knowledge needs to be updated 
intermittently. Hedman et al. (2013) while describing bioterrorism preparedness focused 
on a different area of bioterrorism: agroterrorism. A subset of bioterrorism, agro-
terrorism is the use of bioagents to attack animals and plants. The study’s approach to 
bioterrorism preparedness against agro-terrorism was a diagnostic preparedness response 
strategy against overt and covert bio-attacks. 
In a study on building community resilience in a large urban county, Plough et al. 
(2013) noted that after 9/11 and the subsequent post-2001 anthrax incidents, emergency 
preparedness took center stage in public healthcare practice. Some of the elements of the 
emergency preparedness initiatives of the CDC PHEPR included building preparedness 
capabilities for emergency responses and responders and HCWs having knowledge of 
potential bioagents and their respective characteristics. The strength of Plough et al.’s 
study rested on its focus on community resilience through community cohesion, trust, and 
acquiring and transferring knowledge, similar to the study conducted by Gamboa-
Maldonado et al. (2012). Though both studies (Gamboa-Maldonado et al., 2012; Plough 
et al., 2013) did not particularly address bioterrorism preparedness in-depth, they were 
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significant in providing an understanding of the way forward for EMTs and HCWs’ 
bioterrorism preparedness and knowledge acquisition because EMTs operate in local 
communities. 
Improving preparedness capabilities and bioterrorism responses are major 
concerns within the public health system because HCWs and emergency responders 
appear unprepared for disasters or bioterrorism response (Whetzel, Walker-Cillo, Chan, 
& Trivett, 2013). An important population of HCWs for bioterrorism preparedness and 
responses is EMTs because they are often the first emergency workers in mitigating the 
impact of disaster including bioterrorism. 
Therefore, this study examined bioterrorism policies and practices of EMTs in the 
selected County to understand how it would contribute to improving bioterrorism 
preparedness, responses, and practices in New Jersey. The study also has implications for 
EMTs safety and community-wide protection in the event of biological attacks by 
terrorists. There is was equally the need to update EMTs’ knowledge of PPE, potential 
bioagents regularly, and characteristics of bioagents to be able to prevent or mitigate the 
impact of the bioterrorism and loss of lives among EMTs’ population and the wider 
community. 
The literature review further demonstrated the importance of bioterrorism 
preparedness policies, and the need to harden EMTs through uniformity in training, 
education, and response strategies and practices. EMTs’ hardening would have the added 
implications for community-wide bioterrorism preparedness in New Jersey. Studies 
indicated that EMTs face numerous challenges in disaster responses including lack of 
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uniformity in training, inadequate training, poor knowledge of potential pathogens’ 
characteristics, and inadequate response strategies or practices (Gilmore, et al., 2007; 
Taschner, Nannini, Laccetti, & Greene, 2016). 
Taschner et al. (2016), used a qualitative case study approach and snowball 
technique and interviewed 12 participants on emergency responders’ preparedness in the 
hospital environment. Taschner et al. (2016) used the systems framework for catastrophic 
disaster response to analyze the problems inherent in medical emergency responses in 
hospitals and the need for standardized training. The study recommended further research 
on standardized training for HCWs and emergency response because emergency response 
practices are dynamic. The evident failure of the emergency preparedness plans during 
the Ebola epidemic supports the findings and recommendations of Taschner et al. (2016). 
The strength of the Taschner et al. (2016) was in its recommendation for continued 
training for emergency responders. Unfortunately, the study did not include bioterrorism 
preparedness and response in the study. Taschner et al. (2016) demonstrated the literature 
gap in the field of bioterrorism hardening among HCWs and especially EMTs. 
After the 2001 anthrax attacks and 2014 Ebola epidemic, many studies examined 
bioterrorism preparedness among HCWs and government preparedness policies, and 
found lapses and unpreparedness (Khan, 2011; Smith & Hewison, 2012; Staiti, Katz, & 
Hoadley, 2003; Steed, Howe, Pruitt, & Sherrill, 2004; Taylor, 2015). Khan (2011) 
informed that HCWs and the United States governments were ill-prepared for the 2001 
anthrax attacks. The American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) and the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHCRQ) further noted that public health care 
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providers were largely unprepared for bioterrorist attacks and disasters (Abraham et al., 
2012). Abraham et al. (2012) conducted five tabletop scenarios to assess the level of 
bioterrorism preparedness among HCWs including EMTs, and how they can benefit from 
practically simulated scenarios on preparedness, threats, and potential biological attacks. 
The study (Abraham et al., 2012) was a departure from most studies on 
bioterrorism preparedness because the participants’ pool of HCWs were from different 
healthcare backgrounds and were mixed in each tabletop scenario. The problem with this 
study was that the result might not have accurately reflected preparedness in each HCWs’ 
group such as EMTs. This assumption was because each group of HCWs, depending on 
the services they provide, operate differently and at different stages of the healthcare or 
disaster responses. For instance, EMTs largely function in a pre-hospital environment, 
unlike other HCWs who function in a hospital environment. 
Interestingly, the study by Markenson, Reilly, and DiMaggio (2005) examined the 
effects of inadequate training of EMS providers for bioterrorism, chemical, and 
radiological terrorism. Markenson et al. (2005) observed that EMTs and paramedics 
received few and inadequate CBRN training (6.5%) compare to other disaster response 
areas. Studies conducted by the National Science and Technology Council Committee 
(2011) and Rickles and Catarious (2015) supported the findings by Markenson et al. 
(2005). Although other areas of disaster response training performed better, they were 
nonetheless inadequate despite the 2001 anthrax attacks and the significant resources 
committed to biodefense (Cole, 2012; Markenson et al, 2005). Similarly, in 2007, 
Abatemarto et al. (2007) researched with 18 certified EMTs that showed lack of 
46 
 
preparedness protocol among EMTs in New Jersey during the anthrax attacks of 2001. 
The study noted that the lack of bioterrorism preparedness put the EMTs in high-risks of 
exposure in the event of bio-attacks and potentially create a community-wide 
bioterrorism risk. My qualitative case study built on the study by Markenson et al. (2005) 
and following the 2014 Ebola epidemic with a focus on EMTs’ bioterrorism preparedness 
practices including uniformity in training, education, response protocols, and knowledge 
of potential bioagents and their characteristics. 
The inadequate CBRN training for operators of EMS has not changed despite the 
2001 anthrax attacks as Markenson et al. (2005)’s longitudinal survey sampling study 
showed. The report of AAFP and AHCRQ shared similar conclusions (Abraham et al., 
2012). Similarly, following the 2014 Ebola epidemic, Maras and Miranda (2016) 
examined the epidemiology of Ebola, and its possible weaponization, and further noted 
the lack of preparedness for large-scale Ebola attack or outbreak and inadequate training 
of HCWs for bioattacks or infectious diseases. Though Markenson et al. (2005) and 
Abraham et al. (2012) helped our understanding of the state of HCWs bioterrorism 
preparedness; they did not conduct small studies on cutaneous forms of pathogens that 
have potentials for weaponization unlike Maras and Miranda (2016). On the other hand, 
Gamboa-Maldonado et al. (2012), examined how environmental health and emergency 
preparedness response (EPR) can help build the enabling environment for community 
disaster responses. Gamboa-Maldonado et al. (2012) demonstrated the important roles 
local communities and emergency responders play in disaster management and 
recommended doing so in collaboration with other levels of government. The qualitative 
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study was conducted with semi-structured interviews approach and non-probability 
sampling methods that involved 14 study participants. The study found that little 
attention had focused on the training needs for bioterrorism responses and practices. The 
study’s findings were particularly relevant to my study because it supported the need to 
further examine and understand the training needs of EMTs in bioterrorism response and 
identify factors for instituting best emergency response practices. 
Rokach et al. (2010) conducted a qualitative inquiry that examined the 
relationship between the HCWs having accurate and up to date knowledge of a disease 
(anthrax) and their willingness to respond to disaster situations. The inquiry concluded 
that HCWs with less knowledge of an infection disease are more likely to doubt their 
ability and therefore less willingness to respond to bioterrorism. Despite the finding of 
the research, the study had one critical limitation: It focused on non-contagious disease. 
Nonetheless, the study was significant to my qualitative case study by its 
recommendation for further studies that would examine how PPE can enhance HCWs’ 
willingness to treat biological attack victims. 
Though Fernandez et al. (2011)’s quantitative survey study highlighted the 
training of EMS operators, the research focused on terrorism and disaster preparedness 
with little attention to biological, chemical and nuclear preparedness. The study noted 
that insufficient funding for terrorism and emergency preparedness and lack of 
uniformity in education were key issues militating against adequate preparedness among 
EMS workers despite the finding that there was a positive relationship between training 
and emergency responses. Fernandez et al. (2011) concluded by recommending 
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performing real-world disaster assessment of the impact of training on disaster response 
performance and preparedness. However, the study was limited by the high number of 
respondents who provided insufficient responses because of the method of data 
collection: mail-in survey technique. In another research, Henderson (2014) discovered 
that training on counterterrorism measures among first responders focused on chemical 
weapons and explosive devices with little examination of biological weapons and the 
control of outbreaks of infectious diseases. 
In conclusion, Abraham et al. (2012); Cole (2012); Fernandez et al. (2011); 
Gamboa-Maldonado et al. (2012); Henderson (2014); Maras and Miranda (2016); 
Markenson et al. (2005); Rokach et al. (2010); and Taschner (2016) contributed to 
knowledge by highlighting the need to further examine and understand how HCWs 
especially EMTs can be further hardened for potential biological attacks. These 
recommendations were significant given the varied, incoherent, and inadequate Ebola 
epidemic response from the various level of governments in the United States (Maras and 
Miranda, 2016; Stratton, 2014). 
History of Emergency Preparedness, Policies, and Legislations in the United States 
Threats of potential biological attacks from some nations and terrorist agents have 
increased since the 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks (Gamboa-Maldonado et al., 2012; 
Khan, 2011; May, Jochim, & Sapotichne, 2011). Cenciarelli et al. (2013) and Maras and 
Miranda (2016) conducted studies that underscored the continuous research by terrorist 
groups to acquire bioweapons despite the 1925 and 1972 Conventions and protocols that 
prohibited the use of bioagents. Hence the increased policies, programs, and legislation 
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on bioterrorism preparedness in the United States since the anthrax incidents in 2001 and 
the increased need for collaborations between the levels of governments (Gamboa-
Maldonado et al., 2012). 
The 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks raised public concerns and brought about 
increased terrorist and bioterrorism policies, programs and legislation. In 2002 after the 
anthrax attacks, the Bush Administration enacted the Bioterrorism Act: The U.S. Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Act (U.S. BTA) of 2002 (Cinturati, 2014). The U.S. 
Bioterrorism Act marked a strategic shift towards bioterrorism prevention, preparedness, 
response, mitigation, and recovery. However, before the 2002 BTA, there were other 
Acts created to prevent the use of bioagents in the United States. Examples of the Acts 
enacted for bioterrorism preparedness and response plans included the 1995 Biological 
Weapons Antiterrorism Act (BWA Act) and The Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act (DWMD Act) of 1996. Also, in 1995, the USG promulgated the 
Presidential Decision Directive No. 39 (PDD-39) for bioterrorism preparedness following 
the sarin gas attack in Japan, and the Russian Government manipulation of smallpox for 
potential bioterrorism (Avery, 2004). In 1996, the PDD-39 was followed by the DWMD 
Act, Public Law 104-201 to prepare and train state and local agencies against WMD 
(Seiple, 1997). The DWMD Act recognized the inadequacy of emergency responders for 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents and materials. Despite these Acts, 
the 2001 anthrax incidents occurred with the resultant casualties and injuries: 5 deaths 
and 17 injuries (Bush & Perez, 2012). 
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In 2000, following the rise of infectious diseases such as variola virus, the 
contagious causative agent of smallpox, the CDC Strategic Planning Workgroup (CDC-
SPWG) initiated bioterrorism preparedness strategies. The CDC-SPWG, noted the 
importance of early detection in bioterrorism preparedness as did the study conducted by 
Seiner et al. (2013). The group added that preparedness for bioterrorism depends on the 
federal, state, and local governments with a strong public health system, especially for 
first responders who are most at risk. The CDC-SPWG also recognized the critical roles 
emergency workers perform at the local government level in disaster management, 
mitigation, recovery and response, and their important roles when responding to strange 
illnesses and injuries (CDC, 2000). Seiner et al. (2013) conducted a quantitative study 
that used polymerase chain reaction (PCR), a detection system to identify genetic 
characteristics of bioagents. The study and the findings of the use of PCR (PCR: 
minimized errors in pathogen identification) are significant because they have the 
potentials to help mitigate secondary infections. 
Although the issue of weaponized HIDs had been of concern to successive United 
States governments, it was President Bill Clinton’s Administration that elevated 
bioterrorism preparedness to a national security priority (Fidler, 2003). Grundmann 
(2014) discussed preparedness after the 2001 anthrax attacks among the levels of 
government and the challenges preparedness posed to HCWs in detecting the nature and 
characteristics of pathogens and in responding to biological agent dissemination or 
attacks. Although, public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) for HIDs and other 
hazards pose challenges to HCWs, Khan et al. (2015), however, informed that effective 
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PHEP and response practices are critical to mitigating the community-wide impact of all-
hazards emergencies. Hence, the understanding of the preparedness and response 
readiness of EMTs is important. 
The U.S. BTA of 2002 was in response to the 2001 anthrax attacks, and aimed to 
prevent, prepare and respond to future acts of bioterrorism (Nemane, 2012). Additional 
goals of the 2002 BTA included proper training through the conduct of exercises to 
ascertain the response readiness and capabilities of emergency responders, and the public 
health system (United States Congress, 2002). Are EMTs in New Jersey knowledgeable 
enough, adequately educated and trained to meet these national preparedness 
requirements of the 2002 BT Act? I explored this question which aligned with the 
research questions for this study. 
In 2003, the USG issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-
8) for the DHS to create a national domestic preparedness plan for human-made and 
natural disasters. The results of the HSPD-8 directive were the 2007 National 
Preparedness Guidelines: National Preparedness Vision; National Planning Scenarios; 
Universal Task List, and Target Capabilities List (Fry-Pierce & Lenze, 2011). The Target 
Capabilities List (TCL) contained 37 capabilities for which all levels of government, 
communities and the private sector must collectively engage in for adequate disaster 
response. Although the TCL focused on terrorism and disaster response capabilities, the 
capabilities list can be extrapolated to bioterrorism preparedness and response capabilities 
(Fry-Pierce & Lenze, 2011). Despite these changes in the government bioterrorism 
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program, policies, and preparedness plans, Fry-Pierce and Lenze (2011) noted that there 
was still inadequate preparedness for potential biological attacks. 
Also, in 2004, the U.S. Congress enacted the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 
(P.L.108.276) and earmarked $5.6b for stockpiling drugs to combat bioterrorism 
(Monroe, 2014; Gottron, 2014). Project Bioshield was enacted for bioterrorism 
preparedness countermeasures against bioagents including Bacillus anthracis, Ebola 
virus, and Variola virus. The United States government classified these agents Bacillus 
anthracis (anthrax), Ebola virus (hemorrhagic fever) and Variola virus (smallpox) 
as posing substantial national threats (Gottron, 2014). 
In 2011, the Obama Administration enacted the Presidential Policy Directive-8 
(PPD-8) to strengthen HSPD-8. The PPD-8 that replaced the Bush Administration’s 
HSPD-8 was enacted to identify potential threats and create integrated approaches for 
mitigating terrorism threats (Caudle, 2012). These Presidential Directives further 
reaffirmed the need for preparedness programs and policies. The PPD-8 also developed 
national preparedness capabilities for preventing, protecting against, mitigating the 
effects of, responding to, and recovering from “those threats that pose the greatest risk to 
the security of the Nation” (Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2015). The PPD-8 
also targeted pathogens that have been weaponized in the past and those that have the 
potentials for use as biological weapons. Again, in 2013, the Congress re-authorized the 
Project BioShield procurement program with The Pandemic and All-Hazard 
Preparedness Reauthorization Act PAHPR Act (P.L. 113-5) and allocated $2.8b for the 
2014 – 2018 fiscal years. Despite the BTA of 2002, the Project BioShield of 2004, the 
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HSPD-8, PPD-8, and the PAHPR Act, when EVD struck, the U.S. health emergency 
response systems appeared unprepared and inadequate. 
Biological weapons are pathogens that have potentials for conversion into 
biological agents (Ananthula, Sama, Pamukuntla, & Adepu, 2012; Anderson & Boker, 
2012). They include smallpox, anthrax, Ebola, influenza, and Botulism. These pathogens 
pose greater risks than conventional attacks by explosives because they are often covert 
and difficult to detect before they become fatal (Gunaratne, 2015). The covert mode of 
disseminating pathogens make them both challenging and dangerous for HCWs. Using 
the Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8) as a guide, one approach to mitigating the 
effect of weaponized biological agents is knowing their respective attributes (Patidar et 
al., 2013). Although the threat of bioterrorist attacks has heightened and protection 
against bioagents and detecting the agents are also difficult, but HCWs’ ability to 
recognize, manage diseases associated with bioterrorism events and stay abreast of new 
developments would help mitigate the effects of bioterrorism (Southern Illinois 
University, School of Medicine, 2017). 
How knowledgeable are EMTs of cutaneous biological agents’ characteristics? 
This study explored this question as one of the preparedness practices for bioterrorism 
hardening. Although some studies (Hayman, 2010; Galada et al. 2013) demonstrated that 
hardening HCWs, EMTs, and first responders are the first step towards saving lives and 
reducing casualties in bio-attacks, none examined EMTs’ preparedness against cutaneous 
forms of pathogens in New Jersey. 
The Literature on Knowledge of Cutaneous diseases or HIDs 
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The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, by the terrorist 
group, al Qaeda, and the subsequent anthrax attacks shattered the aura of invincibility and 
(bio)terrorism preparedness and also created global apprehension (Toomey & Singleton, 
2014). The terrorist group’s attacks on the New York World Trade Center, the Pentagon 
in Washington DC, and Pennsylvania and the 2001 anthrax attacks jolted policymakers 
and brought about the 2002 Bioterrorism Act (Cinturati, 2014). Also, the 2001 anthrax 
attacks raised further concerns that other bioterrorist attacks were imminent (Hunger, 
2014). Significantly, the 2001 terrorist attacks showed the extent to which terrorists 
would go to create panic and destabilize the socio-economic well-being of any nation. 
Potential weapons for bioterrorism are highly infectious diseases (HIDs), and they 
include Ebola, anthrax, and smallpox. The European Network for Infectious Diseases 
(EUND) described HIDs as diseases that can be transferred from persons to persons, can 
cause death, and cause serious hazards that would require unique control measures 
(Schilling et al., 2009). 
The terrorist attacks galvanized not only the USG but also world and regional 
leaders and organizations. For example, following the 9/11 and anthrax attacks, the 
European Union (EU) initiated bioterrorism preparedness programs and health security 
framework that focused on prevention, preparedness, and response strategies (Elbe, 
Roemer-Mahler, & Long, 2014). The EU commission’s bioterrorism preparedness 
program was similar to the U.S. Bioterrorism Act and other subsequent U.S. bioterrorism 
programs and policies such as the pharmaceutical stockpiles for antiviral medications 
(Elbe et al., 2014). The EU bio-program viewed bioterrorism readiness as a public health 
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policy issue that required adequate responses to bio-incidents in the following areas: 
prevention, protection, first responders’ readiness, prosecution, surveillance, research, 
recovery (Casale, 2010). Other aspects of the EU bioterrorism preparedness initiatives 
like the U.S. BTA was the EU CBRN Action Plan that sort to put into action the CEN 
Workshop Agreement 15793: 2011, (CWA 15793) also known as the “Laboratory bio-
risk management”, and the development of emergency response templates (Sundqvist et 
al., 2013). Canyon (2009) conducted a ten self-assessment survey of public health 
professionals’ bioterrorism preparedness and competencies in Australia. The research 
showed that clinicians in Australia were ill-prepared for biological attacks which had 
serious implications for HCWs safety, management of biological attacks, and prevention 
of the endangerment of the larger population. Canyon (2009)’s quantitative study and the 
EU initiatives were indications of global apprehension of potential bioterrorism. Despite 
the apprehension, few studies addressed EMTs’ preparedness and community-wide 
readiness for possible biological attacks. 
In another work, Berger and Moreno (2010) conducted a study on healthcare 
professionals’ bioterrorism response based on two possible policy approaches. Berger 
and Moreno discussed the two bioterrorism response approaches namely, coercive model 
and cooperative model. The coercive model includes quarantines, confinements, 
mandatory vaccinations, and other measures public health workers may choose to contain 
the effects of biological attacks. An example of a coercive model is the Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA). The cooperative model involves the use of 
information to educate public health workers and respect for civil right even as public 
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officials attempt to contain the disaster. Berger and Moreno (2010) concluded that 
although the cooperative model is more effective in bioterrorism response, a combination 
of both models would be most appropriate. 
Berger and Moreno (2010) focused on bioterrorism preparedness, prevention, 
response and mitigation from the point to view of policymakers’ bioterrorism policy. The 
study as compelling as it was, did not address how HCWs and EMTs fit into any of the 
approaches or a hybrid of both. In a cross-sectional inventory study that adopted the 
portfolio analysis approach, Shelton et al. (2012) examined 1,593 projects and discovered 
that over 66% of those projects focused on biological threats. The projects involved non-
classified national health security research that was mostly sponsored by the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. The authors contributed to the knowledge 
about the national approach to bioterrorism preparedness which further justified the need 
to explore bioterrorism hardening and preparedness among emergency workers. The 
study also highlighted the need to involve the private sector in national security matters. 
Non-hospital based EMTs are critical aspects of the private sector participation in 
emergency medical response. 
 Smith and Hewison (2012) explored the existential threats of bioterrorism and the 
roles and vulnerabilities of hospital nurses. The study found that despite the U.S. 
bioterrorism preparedness policies, programs, and legislations hospital nurses were 
inadequately trained and prepared. The study noted that the inadequate bioterrorism 
preparedness had implications for bioterrorism mitigation and suggested that bioterrorism 
training should be conducted along with infection control education. Besides the nurses’ 
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roles in the ER department, mobile intensive care nurses often work alongside EMTs in a 
prehospital environment and administer advanced treatment to disaster patients. Although 
Smith and Hewison (2012) focused on hospital nurses, it excluded mobile intensive care 
nurses and EMTs who often are first medical responders to disaster situations. This 
qualitative study addressed this gap in the literature. 
Aghaei and Nesami (2013) similarly conducted research that focused on nurses 
but on nurses’ education and its impact on their bioterrorism response and mitigation. 
Aghaei and Nesami (2013) demonstrated that education was effective in making nurses 
bioterrorism ready: Before bioterrorism education, 67.7% had low-knowledge, and after 
education, 98.5% had good knowledge of bioterrorism. The study also found a similar 
effect of education and training on physicians. Again, Aghaei and Nesami (2013) and 
Smith and Hewison (2012) omitted critical chain in bioterrorism preparedness: EMTs, 
who are the healthcare population most at risk when responding to bioterrorism. Barnett 
et al. (2012) conducted a cross-sectional qualitative study of 8 urban and rural local 
health departments (LHDs) and 2993 LHD workers’ (LHDWs) willingness to respond to 
an all-hazard emergency scenario. Part of the emergency scenario involved bioterrorism. 
The study found that all-hazard preparedness initiatives have different impacts on 
willingness to respond among emergency local and urban HCWs. For instance, the 
research finding suggested that an “effective scenario-based risk awareness assessment” 
has a positive impact on increased knowledge and a higher level of willingness to 
respond. First responders were part of the study, but like the tabletop scenario study by 
Abraham et al. (2012), they were not a good representative of EMTs’ capability and 
58 
 
willingness to respond to anthrax bioterrorism (a bioagent). The study very much 
acknowledged this limitation. Barnett et al. (2012)’s study was, however, significant 
because LHWs showed a higher rate of willingness to respond towards bioterrorism than 
other categories including radiological hazards. 
The significance of these studies (Aghaei & Nesami, 2013; Barnett et al., 2012; 
Smith & Hewison, 2012) was their recommendations for further training of HCWs and 
the inclusion of bioterrorism preparedness into their curriculum. But their respective 
studies included a little or insignificant number of EMTs as study participants, and thus 
making extrapolating their findings to EMTs emergency response practices difficult. 
In another study, Kabir, Naik, Kumar, and Bhas (2016) noted that knowledge of 
bioterrorism preparedness among HCWs is important if the effects of weaponized 
pathogens are to be mitigated among the HCWs in the event of biological attacks. The 
study focused on medical students’ knowledge and awareness of bioterrorism agents. The 
result showed the need to include bioterrorism preparedness in the medical students’ 
curriculum. For example, the medical students had a higher knowledge of bioterrorism 
than biosecurity. This study supports the other studies (Aghaei & Nesami, 2013; 
Hoeppner, Olson & Larson, 2010; Kabir, Naik, Kumar & Bhas, 2016; Smith & Hewison, 
2012) that demonstrated the importance of adding bioterrorism preparedness in the 
curriculum and education of HCWs including nurses, emergency medical workers. 
Hoeppner, Olson, and Larson (2010) created bioterrorism (BT) and emergency response 
(ER) competencies program for HCWs. The longitudinal study found that after six 
months of learning 64.1% had acquired bioterrorism competency and 63.5% were 
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competent after twelve months of BT/ER learning program. Similarly, the quantitative 
study conducted by Kabir et al. (2016) found the need to incorporate bioterrorism 
preparedness in the medical curriculum. 
On the other hand, the study by Wang, Luangkesorn, and Shuman (2012) was 
significant to the current study because it focused on the relationship between 
information received by emergency responders and their commanders and the decisions 
they make when responding to disasters. Decisions made during disasters have critical 
implication on EMTs response effectiveness, safety, and community-wide disaster 
containment. Part of the decisions is determining how and where to transport patients 
(such as acute healthcare facility) after stabilizing them. 
The roles of evacuating and transporting patients are more problematic if it 
involves mass casualty incidents (MCI). To address this scenario, Wang et al. (2012) 
developed an agent-based simulation model to assess patients’ emergency needs before 
taking appropriate actions. The quantitative study contributed to knowledge in modeling 
emergency scenario but limited in its focus on all hazard scenario. However, the study’s 
observation that specialized casualties be treated at so-dedicated hospitals, and its’ 
recommendation that hospitals reserve some beds in reserved units are appropriate for 
bioterrorism attacks victims. Such specialized beds or hospitals for bioterrorism patients 
appeared inadequate in the United States during the Ebola epidemic, and that 
demonstrated unpreparedness for HIDs. 
The varied responses from the states to the Ebola epidemic appeared to reveal 
unclear and inadequate infectious disease response protocols and practices put in place 
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after the 2001 anthrax incidents. For instance, Taylor (2015), noted the failure of the 
disaster responses to anthrax, and the lost opportunity to have used the Ebola epidemic as 
a ‘test run’ and “‘tabletop exercise’ to assess the existing protocols for responding to 
covert bioweapons attacks.” A test run could have reviewed the rigorous decontamination 
process especially with handling PPE and determining whether additional training was 
needed (Taylor, 2015). This study again focused on the hospital environment and nurses 
in the emergency department and excluded a critical part in the emergency response 
chain: Disaster response in a pre-hospital environment by EMTs. Poor knowledge of the 
decontamination process and PPE was evident during the Ebola epidemic and posed a 
community-wide risk. Caro, Puro, Fusco, Capobianchi, and Ippolito (2015) and 
Wiwanitkit (2014) aligned with the studies conducted by Taylor (2015) and Passi et al. 
(2015). Both Caro et al. (2015) and Wiwanitkit (2014) underscored the gap in knowledge 
whenever a new disease emerges or re-emerges and noted the need for continuous 
preparedness measures. 
In a different but related study, Caro et al. (2015) illustrated how the 2009 H1N1 
epidemic was mislabeled the swine flu as instances of lack of preparedness and 
knowledge gap among healthcare officials and workers. The gap in knowledge and 
challenges persisted despite the over twenty years of bioterrorism preparedness policies 
and funding (Caro et al., 2015). Wiwanitkit (2014) viewed the Ebola epidemic as a 
potential global threat that was made more challenging due to the lack of biosafety level 
4 in many developing countries, possible misdiagnosis, and inadequate funding for 
diagnosis and treatment. In a related study, Caro, et al. (2015) noted that since the Ebola 
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began, new standards for managing patients have been developed and updated including 
donning PPE, handling of patients and dead patients, waste management, and medical 
staff safety in accordance with the infection prevention and control (IPC) protocols. The 
study was conducted in a hospital in Italy after a 50-year-old patient was infected, treated 
and released. However, EMTs who are critical to the mitigation of epidemics or 
biological agents were not part of the studies. How knowledgeable are EMTs in the 
selected County to these enhanced level 4 biosafety protocols updated during and after 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic? 
The Ebola virus disease is a potential bioagent that poses a challenge to HCWs 
and has national health implications (Lohmus, Janse, Goot, & Rotterdam, 2013). The 
challenges manifested during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Therefore, adequately preparing 
HCWs should be a national priority. No matter the sources of bioagent infection (natural 
or bioterrorism) EMTs should be well-prepared to mitigate the impact. Inadequately 
prepared HCWs and EMTs have community-wide health implications because 
contagious pathogens have incubation periods by which time the symptoms would have 
become potentially deadly in the community (Passi et al., 2015). 
 Passi et al. (2015) observed that part of the challenge in containing Ebola 
included acquiring knowledge of the virus, institutional failings of the health system, and 
lack of experienced HCWs. Particularly, Passi et al. (2015) informed that delay in 
identifying cases of virus or bioagent infection and transporting samples such as blood or 
serum from Ebola patients to the laboratories posed challenges as well. The study, a 
historical account of the disease, brought out another critical dimension to bioterrorism 
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preparedness: The question of managing and transporting tissues or blood samples for 
laboratory testing and analysis. Passi et al. (2015) further suggested the following 
preparedness protocols for EVD: Knowledge of PPE, patients’ transportations or 
handling in hospitals, equipment handling and processing, and environment sanitization 
among others. Although the study focused on scenarios in a hospital setting, the study’s 
preparedness protocols may be extrapolated outside of the hospital to EMTs disaster 
response practices. 
During the anthrax attacks, first responders were challenged by the inadequate 
training and understanding of areas contaminated by the anthrax exposure (Galada et al. 
2013). Galada et al. (2013) further noted that although some bioterrorism preparedness 
programs have been developed since the 2001 anthrax attacks, those programs have not 
been implemented uniformly across the levels of government. The quantitative study 
focused on first responders with the majority drawn from the fire department (55) out of 
70 study participants. EMTs were among the other first responders categorized as others 
(7). The study has some limitations: First, it has a small number of EMTs that could make 
the study not representative of the EMT population. Second, the study addressed only 
inhalation anthrax while excluding dermal and ingestion exposures. Third, other 
biological agents were not considered in the study. This study built upon the Galada et al. 
study because it focused on a dermal exposure bioagent such as Ebola. Also, my study 
was conducted in a post Ebola epidemic period. The findings may help address 
bioterrorism preparedness in the event of biological attacks. 
63 
 
In a study, Waldrop, Clemency, Maguin, and Lindstrom (2014) noted the critical 
roles that Prehospital emergency providers such as EMTs perform and decisions they also 
make when responding to emergency calls that include the end of life patients. These 
critical roles and decisions involve transporting the patients to the hospital emergency 
rooms or in the case of bioterrorism attacks to AHFs (Waldrop et al., 2014; CDC, 2015). 
Although the study by Waldrop et al. focused on the end of life patients, the findings 
demonstrated the importance of education, training, and established protocols and 
practices to emergency responses. 
To achieve the goal of bioterrorism preparedness, the CDC identified five areas 
for strategic bioterrorism readiness: preparedness and prevention; detection and 
surveillance; diagnosis and characterization of biological and chemical agents; response; 
and communication. The start-up point was to categorize these pathogens. The CDC 
classified potential infectious disease that can be weaponized into three categories 
(Categories A, B, and C.) and, also because of ease of dissemination (Das & Kataria, 
2010). The CDC classifications of the viruses illustrated their respective potentials as 
bioagents capable of weaponization; the severity of the pathogens if used for bio-attacks 
(Gunaratne, 2015). Category A virus represents the highest threat to humans, animals, 
and plants both in mobility and mortality (Anderson & Boker, 2012; Gunaratne, 2015). 
The categories and the pathogens in Category A include viral hemorrhagic fever (diseases 
caused by viruses such as Ebola and Marbug), plague, smallpox, and anthrax. Category A 
is so classified because the viruses in this category have the characteristics that give them 
weaponization capabilities. These characteristics include infectiousness and symptoms; 
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dissemination methods; pathogenesis and etiology; availability of prophylaxis, and 
weaponization capability (Gunaratne, 2015). Category B include cholera, ricin, and 
salmonella; Category C: are emerging pathogens including Nipah virus and Hanta virus 
(Kenar & Baysallar, 2010; Patidar et al., 2013). Despite these initiatives by CDC, the 
2001 anthrax attacks occurred with the resultant fatalities and injuries. 
Gunaratne’s comparative qualitative study focused on the uniqueness of Ebola as 
a bioagent in comparison to anthrax and smallpox that have previously been used in 
biowarfare during the World War 1 by Germany (Gunaratne, 2015). However, the 
potential pathogenesis of EVD appear not fully understood, and neither have HCWs 
understood how to respond to potential bio-attacks with EVD. 
Pathogens as potential Bioagents 
Pathogens are disease-causing agents (Méthot, 2015). Ebola, anthrax, and 
Smallpox are among the pathogens that the U.S. Working Group on Civilian Biodefense, 
and other studies listed as most likely to be deployed for bioterrorism by terrorist groups 
or state-sponsored biological attacks (Anderson & Boker, 2012; Cenciarelli et al., 2013; 
Gunaratne, 2015). The reason advanced for this assumption was the possible ease of 
acquiring and putting bioagents into use by terrorist groups and state sponsors of 
terrorism, and the time frame before the disease is identified (Sinha, & Singh, 2016). By 
the time a pathogen is identified, it would have spread to many more victims in the 
community causing panic, socio-economic disruptions, and deaths (Anderson & Boker, 
2012; Cenciarelli et al., 2013). 
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Menrath, Tomuzia, Frentzel, Braeunig, and Appel (2014) provided yet another 
way to measure the likelihood of an agent becoming weaponized. The study noted the 
ranking system of identifying levels of risk measured by the probability of using an agent 
and its impact on a population (probability + impact = risk). The study, however, warned 
that the ranking is for management decisions for enacting policies and legislation and 
enhancing preventive measures and for bioterrorism emergency responses. Menrath et al. 
(2014)’s comparative ranking formula was important to this study because it helped 
assess the pathogens most likely to be deployed especially with the ease of procurement 
and dissemination (Cenciarelli et al., 2013). As Cenciarelli et al., (2013) further noted, 
relative to other forms of terrorist attacks, biological weapons are least expensive to 
procure per area size: Bioweapons – 1$/km, $600/km (chemical), $800/km (nuclear), and 
$2,000/km (conventional armaments) based on a 1996 North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) assessment. In a related historical account of the history of 
bioterrorism, Ózsvári, Kasza, and Lakner, (2015) emphasized that identifying pathogens 
constitute a difficult problem and therefore, more challenging to control because of the 
time involved in identifying the bioagents. Also, the effect of biological attacks from 100 
kg anthrax-spore bomb can inflict casualty rate of about three million whereas, those 
from megaton hydrogen bomb can cause about up to two million casualties (Ózsvári et 
al., 2015). 
In summary, Cenciarelli et al. (2013), Gunaratne (2015) as well as Menrath et al. 
(2014) studies, were significant in helping our understanding of pathogenesis and 
etiology and weaponization of HIDs. The studies also exposed the threats posed by 
66 
 
bioagents and terrorist groups using the pathogens as did the study by Anderson and 
Boker (2012). Biological agents are pathogens (smallpox, anthrax, Ebola, influenza, and 
Botulism among others) that have potentials for conversion into biological weapons; are 
often deployed covertly and, pose serious challenges to HCWs (Ananthula, et al., 2012; 
Anderson & Boker, 2012; Gunaratne, 2015). Similarly, Also, the threat of biological 
attacks and the difficulty of developing mechanisms for detecting bioagents and 
protecting the community from harmful application of biological research especially in 
this age of globalism is real (National Threat Initiative, 2015). 
The 2011 Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8) was one approach used to 
mitigate the effect of weaponized biological agents through HCWs knowledge of 
bioagents’ attributes (Patidar et al., 2013). Other approaches included instituting 
standardized training and uniformity in emergency responses among HCWs especially 
after the 2001 anthrax attacks and the 2014 Ebola epidemic (Hunger, 2014; Taylor, 
2015). Review of the literature showed the abundance of studies on bioterrorism threats, 
policies on bioterrorism preparedness, evidence of failed policies and emergency medical 
responses, and literature gap on Ebola and/or hybrid Ebola pox as potential bioagents 
(Caro et al., 2015; Eva 2012; Passi et al., 2015; Taylor, 2015; Wiwanitkit, 2014). 
All the studies significantly demonstrated the need for preparedness by national 
agencies and HCWs for possible bioterrorist attacks and contributed to knowledge by 
providing the need for studies on HCWs’ preparedness response and practices for 




Bacillus anthracis, popularly known as anthrax (cutaneous, inhalation and 
gastrointestinal) is highly resistant to environmental changes and can be easily acquired 
and used as bioagents (Cenciarelli et al., 2013). The study by Li et al. (2017) on the 
anthrax incidences in China indicated a 98% prevalence rate of the cutaneous form of 
anthrax within the Chinese farmers and herdsmen population. Anderson and Bokor 
(2012) further noted that anthrax was classified as a Category A pathogen because its’ 
cutaneous form has a high mortality rate and requires unique preparedness response from 
HCWs including EMTs. Li et al. (2017) and Anderson and Boker (2012) studies were 
significant to my study because they agreed on the high rate of cutaneous forms of 
anthrax (95% of all anthrax cases) acquired through direct contact with the spores or the 
bacilli. These studies (Anderson & Bokor, 2012; Li et al., 2017)) also revealed the 
potential human and economic implications of cutaneous anthrax if weaponized and 
without a corresponding understanding of its characteristics and effective response from 
HCWs including EMTs. The 2001 anthrax incidents occurred in five states including 
New Jersey and caused five deaths and 17 injuries (Barras & Greub, 2014; Hayman, 
2010). 
Anthrax can naturally occur or be humanly inspired such as the 2001 attacks from 
a biological laboratory (Adalja, 2012; Bush & Perez, 2012; Méthot, 2015; Schweitzer, 
2016). Clinical cases of anthrax incidents or attacks can be cutaneous, inhalational, or 
gastrointestinal (Weant, Bailey, Fleishaker, & Justice, 2014). Besides the 2001 incidents, 
in 2011, a third inhalational anthrax incident was reported to a Minnesota community 
laboratory, and the Minnesota Department of Health Public Health Laboratory (Sprenkle 
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et al., 2014). The first inhalational anthrax incidents occurred in 1976 (Marston et al., 
2011; Sprenkle et al., 2014). However, the 2011 incident appeared to have occurred 
naturally rather than a bio-attack, unlike the 2001 cutaneous anthrax incidents (Sprenkle 
et al., 2014). Minnesota Department of Health Public Health Laboratory investigated the 
incident by isolating the Bacillus species from the patient’s blood cultures, and the result 
showed the presence of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) in the blood specimen (Sprenkle et 
al., 2014). The patient contracted the incident while traveling through the States of North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana, and further investigation by the CDC 
revealed no further exposure to other humans (Griffith et al., 2014). The CDC finding 
was an indication that anthrax can naturally occur or can be human inspired and 
identifying the sources of  incidents involving bioagents (zoonotic or enzootic) is also a 
challenge to HCWs (Griffith et al., 2014). 
The CDC identified zoonotic diseases as the infectious diseases caused by viruses 
and bacteria and are usually passed between humans and animals (CDC, 2016c). The 
CDC further informed that six out of ten cases of infectious diseases in humans come 
from animals, and three out of every four new cases are from animals to humans. 
Similarly, Leach and Scoones (2013) conducted a qualitative case study of two zoonotic 
diseases (H1N1 and Ebola) and noted that 60% of the emerging HIDs (zoonotic) that 
affect humans originated from animals. The humans once infected become vectors or 
carriers of the disease. Leach and Scoones (2013) agreed with Grundmann (2014) that the 
challenges among healthcare professionals are in understanding the nature of the 
pathogen and how to respond to them to avoid further risks to the population. Leach and 
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Scoones (2013) used the heuristic approach of modeling in exploring the two cases: 
H1N1 and Ebola. These modelings were mathematical and process-based models that use 
data to demonstrate HIDs’ epidemiological and ecological relationships; pattern-based 
models drew inferences of these relations from empirical data, and participatory 
modeling combined anthropological, ethnographic and participatory approaches. Leach 
and Scoones (2013) study is important because it established an empirical connection of 
how the environment plays critical roles in infectious diseases outbreak. During 
outbreaks choosing a model may pose a challenge because of the urgent need to response 
and the political pressure. However, Leach and Scoones (2013) recommended a multi-
modeling approach to understanding the complex and dynamic realities of zoonotic 
diseases which included Ebola and Ebola-pox. 
The 2001 anthrax attacks revealed a couple of things that were evident over the 
years, and the deficiencies also manifested during the Ebola epidemic: Deficiencies in 
government responses and inadequate preparedness and training for possible bioterrorism 
(Khan, 2011; Taylor, 2015). These deficiencies led to the 2006 Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA).  PAHPA was created to develop national 
pandemics, disasters, and terrorism response and preparedness plans by the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The result of the PAHPA initiative was The 
National Health Security Strategy of the United States of America (NHSS). The 
significance of the NHSS is measured through its main objectives of building community 
resilience and strengthening and sustaining health and emergency responses practices 
(Shelton et al., 2012). To address some of the deficiencies, Khan (2011) suggested 
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bioterrorism preparedness in the future that includes the improvement of coordination 
between the public health system and EMS and the private sector, and preparedness 
programs that are verifiable. How has the public health program been able to enhance 
bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs for cutaneous form of disease such as Ebola? 
Smallpox 
Smallpox, another deadly and highly cutaneous virus has the potential for use as a 
biological weapon (Anderson & Bokor, 2012; Weant et al., 2014). Viruses also cause 
smallpox as is the case with Ebola. The virus in an infected person exhibits the following 
symptoms: high fevers, abdominal pain, vomiting, headaches, prostration, and myalgia 
after which rashes begin to appear (Chopra et al., 2014; Petersen et al., 2015). 
Transmitted from humans into the population, smallpox infection has a fatality rate of 30 
percent; has 12 – 14 days of the incubation period and is a major source of bioagent 
especially the variola major form that is more lethal than the variola minor. (Weant et al., 
2014). Weant et al. (2014) conducted a study that focused on smallpox, viral hemorrhagic 
fevers, and botulism toxin as potential bioagents with high fatalities rates. Smallpox like 
Ebola is transmitted from person to person and as such posed threats to EMTs and the 
general population. Weant et al. informed that emergency workers need to be aware of 
these threats, and have adequate knowledge of all Category A agents, emergency 
protocols and practices to mitigate secondary infections. 
Ebola  
Ebola was first identified in 1976 in Sudan with a high mortality rate of 50 
percent (Taylor, 2015). Although there have been about 29 outbreaks of the epidemic, the 
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2014 outbreaks were more devastating and resulted in about 28,183 cases and 11,306 
deaths by September 2015 and huge economic losses (Maras & Miranda, 2016; Coltart, 
Johnson, & Whitty, 2015; WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014). As deadly as the virus is, 
Ebola is rendered ineffective if certain measures are taken. Ebola is rendered ineffective 
at a boiling point of 5 minutes or heating level of 60°C for 30 to 60 minutes but can be a 
portent for a human to human transmittal in room temperature for many days (Taylor, 
2015). The symptoms of Ebola include a severe headache, high fever, general body 
weaknesses, muscle, stomach and joint pains, sore throat, and lack of appetite. The ability 
of Ebola surviving for days is what makes the disease dangerous, and potential biological 
agent. 
The 2014 EVD created global concerns and apprehension that terrorist groups 
may capitalize on the human to human transmission to weaponize the virus (Teckman, 
2013; Gire et al., 2014). The concern was that terrorist groups might acquire the virus and 
turn it into a biological agent. As a Category A pathogen, Ebola has the attributes and 
capabilities of posing a high risk to national health security because of the ease of 
transmitting the virus from person to person, causing social and economic disruption, 
high mortality, and requiring special preparedness actions from public healthcare system 
(Maras & Miranda, 2016). 
Although the EVD epidemic has ended, the immediate concern was examining 
and understanding the bioterrorism preparedness for EVD and other potential pathogens 
vis-a-vis risk mitigation, rapid response initiatives, adequate facilities, equipment, and 
trained HCWs (Kabir et al., 2016; Maras & Miranda, 2016). Global efforts that appeared 
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to have prevented the virus from causing more deaths included the CDC initiatives of 
collaborating with the World Health Organization (WHO) and sending about 1200 
healthcare workers to the West African region (Frieden & Damon, 2015). Also, updated 
Ebola management protocols were developed and used during the epidemic (Caro et al., 
2015). Although the spread of the virus has been controlled, little study has investigated 
the extent to which terrorist groups may have shown interest in acquiring the virus for 
terrorism purposes. Also, little research has been conducted on the post-Ebola 
bioterrorism preparedness and response strategies among HCWs and EMTs. Maras and 
Miranda (2016), noted the attempt by a group, Shoko Asahara, in the 1990s that went to 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) to inquire about Ebola and possibly 
procure a sample. Furthermore, there is no conclusive evidence that terrorists did or did 
not acquire and preserve the virus for development and, future bio-attacks given their 
previous attempts at acquiring it. What countries, public healthcare officials, and HCWs 
can do is to harden themselves through training, and education of HCWs, creating 
institutional support and adequate response strategies and developing vaccine and 
therapeutics (Choi, Hong, Hong, & Lee, 2015; Smith & Hewison, 2012). 
Additionally, a study by Kar, Pradhan, and Pattnaik (2012) pointed to an 
emerging disease - Ebola pox (or black pox, a combination of Ebola and smallpox) as a 
possible biological weapon. Kar et al. (2012) overview of Indian bioterrorism 
preparedness was significant because it revealed the need to prepare for known HIDs and 
emerging HIDs that are also resistant to the changes in the environment including 
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humidity, cold and heat. The Ebola pox that manifested in Pakistan killed ten people, and 
thus demonstrated its lethality as a potential new HID (Kar et al., 2012). 
The study conducted by Taylor (2015) focused on the preparedness policies and 
practices following the 2014 Ebola incidents in the United States. In noting the high 
Ebola fatality rate of 90%, the study highlighted the factors that can help minimize the 
fatality rate of Ebola. These factors included the state of the existing healthcare, the 
general health of the population, the nutritional health of the population, the affected 
patients’ immunology, and the response capabilities of the healthcare system (Taylor, 
2015). The study is significant to my study in the assessment of the capabilities of the 
healthcare system especially EMTs’ capabilities to respond to bioterrorism incidents. 
Taylor (2015) specifically noted the varied and incoherent responses to the Ebola 
incidents including the appointment of a non-medical and non-immunologist that handled 
the epidemic in the United States. The study highlighted the possible weaponization of 
the pathogen by terrorists and infect unsuspecting victims who are the focus of this study. 
If terrorists become Ebola vectors, how prepared are EMTs to handle the situation and 
transport patients to AHFs (and between hospitals) without risking themselves, and the 
wider community? Taylor (2015), like a previous study (Abraham et al.,) on the anthrax 
incidents noted the missed opportunities to use the Ebola epidemic as a ‘test run’ in 
assessing the U.S. preparedness for bioterrorism. 
The need to harden HCWs including EMTs against weaponized EVD and other 
cutaneous diseases in the United States is because the U.S. cities appear high targets for 
terrorism (including homegrown terrorism), often because of language diversity, 
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residential instability and urbanization (Brooks, 2011; LaFree & Bersani, 2014). 
Bioterrorism hardening is also critical because of the many incidents of Ebola in the East 
African region that is politically unstable and conducive for terrorism, and globalization 
(Teckman, 2013). Many terrorist groups operate in the East African region (Maras & 
Miranda, 2016; Teckman, 2013). There is, therefore, the concern that infected persons 
may be used as human weapons or human vectors to infect unsuspecting population in 
crowded areas such as the airport as terrorists have done and continue to do with body 
explosives for terrorist attacks (Taylor, 2015; Teckman, 2013). 
Importance of Bioterrorism Preparedness 
Disaster preparedness is critical to mitigating the impact of disasters, minimizing 
threats, and reducing vulnerabilities and risk to HCWs and the population when faced 
with hazardous situations (Pandey, 2019; Spain, Clements, DeRanieri, & Holt, 2012). 
September 11, 2001, terrorism brought about the Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD-5) which in 2004 initiated the National Response Plan and the National 
Incident Management System  (Barakey, 2013). The National Incident Management 
System outlined the need for collaboration and cooperation among all levels of 
government to prepare, prevent and respond to bioterrorism and public health 
emergencies (Barakey, 2013; Nemane, 2012; Spain et al., 2012). Examples of federal 
agencies and state governments collaboration in disaster response included Hurricane 
Katrina (New Orleans) and Hurricane Sandy (New Jersey) with clear failures and lessons 
learned for future emergency preparedness response (Dittmar, 2013; Powell, Hanfling, & 
Gostin, 2012). The failures of the responses to the Hurricane Katrina led to the change in 
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the implementation of the National Response Plan to include the community and later 
renamed National Response Framework (Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
2016). The 2002 Bioterrorism Act through the National Response Framework initiated 
incident management strategies that included the all levels of government, the private 
sectors, and the non-government organizations (NGOs), and the community for incidents 
and emergency preparedness and response (DHS, 2016; Nemane, 2012). The legislation 
and policies were indications of the importance the federal government attached to 
disaster preparedness and responses. 
In many states, such as New Jersey, of the about 465 private and public 
emergency operators, most are privately run EMSOs (New Jersey Department of Health, 
2017). Furthermore, disasters and the response to disasters require some level of 
resources: human, material and financial depending on the nature of the disaster as the 
United States government did over the years (Monroe, 2014; United States Congress, 
2004). The functions of many HCWs and EMTs are closely related and equipping them 
with adequate and effective training is critical to disaster mitigation and preparedness 
(Williams, Nocera & Casteel, 2008; Passi et al., 2015). 
A quantitative study conducted by Williams et al. (2008) found that the 
effectiveness of disaster response training for out-of-hospital HCWs was mixed and 
called for future studies that are more rigorous. However, other studies concluded that 
training of healthcare providers and increased disaster management knowledge and skills 
especially emergency responders increased their willingness to respond, and attitudinal 
and behavioral intention rates (Arbon et al. 2013; Clancy, 2008; Kar, Pradhan, & 
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Pattnaik, 2012; Rokach et al., 2010). The study conducted by Rokach et al. (2010) 
focused on Physicians and nurses’ willingness to respond to bioterrorism attacks. The 
study found that physicians and nurses’ knowledge of the anthrax disease had a positive 
relationship with their willingness to respond to anthrax attacks. The study, unlike my 
study, was not on contagious disease such as Ebola. The study (Rokach et al., 2010) 
admitted the limitation of non-applicability on contagious disease and recommended 
future studies. 
In 1999, the CDC initiated a Public Health Preparedness and Response for 
Bioterrorism program (Duncan, Ginter, Rucks, Wingate, & McCormick, 2007). The 
program funded local and public health preparedness and responses for bioterrorism, 
infectious diseases and other emergencies responses (Duncan et al., 2007). In 2004, after 
five years of the program, the CDC reviewed the program’s effectiveness in bioterrorism 
and disaster management and response and requested further funding (Duncan et al., 
2007). The review also led to the development of strategic areas for disaster 
preparedness: prevention, detection and reporting, investigation, control, recovery and 
improvement (Duncan et al., 2007). The CDC’s five areas of preparedness mirror those 
of the World Health Organization (WHO): surveillance, healthcare response, public 
health intervention, communication, and command (Craig, Kasai, Li, Otsu, & Khut, 
2010). The attention of the WHO to bioterrorism demonstrates the worldwide 
apprehension of weaponized bioagents and the need to have response strategies. The 
apprehension is heightened by the expected increase for ambulatory healthcare in the case 
of large-scale infectious disease depending on the nature of the disease (Craig et al., 
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2010). Craig et al. (2010) observed that early and adequate response by healthcare 
workers would not only save lives but prevent a community-wide spread of the disease. 
The review of the literature on bioterrorism preparedness demonstrated that although 
training, education, and uniformity in emergency response practices are critical for 
effective bioterrorism response and practices, they are rarities among EMTs. 
EMTs’ Training, Readiness, and Hardening 
The question of how EMTs prepare for biological attacks is of great importance to 
mitigating HCWs’ risk, and critical for community-wide bioterrorism response and 
disaster mitigation. The answer can be found in EMTs’ understanding and identification 
of the factors that are critical to bioterrorism hardenings such as knowledge of emergency 
response protocols, and knowledge of characteristics of different potential bioagents 
(Eddy & Sase, 2015). Response strategies will require emergency responders’ knowledge 
of what to do to adequately confront bioterrorism situations. Such knowledge will 
involve knowledge of existing preparedness and response protocols acquired through 
training and regular exercise (Edwards, Price, Gordon, & Gadgil, 2005; Crane, 2010; 
Abrol, 2016). 
In a 2010 study, Olson, Scheller, Larson, Lindeke, and Edwardson, (2010) 
demonstrated that bioterrorism and emergency readiness (BT/ER) training increased 
emergency response performance. In a follow-up study Olson, Scheller, and Wey, (2014), 
did a stimulated quantitative survey of 17993 (out of 20151 potential participants) to 
determine the relationship between the duration of BT/ER training to bioterrorism 
response performance. The research found that those with forty-five or more hours 
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training performed better compared to those with less than forty-five hours of training. 
The study was important because it established the need to not only train HCWs and 
EMTs on bioterrorism but to note the duration of the BT/ER training especially after the 
2014 Ebola epidemic and to examine their knowledge of bioagents. 
The study conducted by Abrol (2016) was significant to my study because of its 
finding that an estimated 17 countries have active bioweapons programs and are also 
sponsors of terrorism. The study used India which experienced H1N1 influenza epidemic 
in 2015 as a case study. Lessons learned from the study on India bioterrorism 
preparedness could be utilized by other countries including the United States. As Abrol 
(2016) noted, the effects of biological attacks depended on the preparedness strategies in 
place to mitigate the attacks. The study recommended training and development of 
communication infrastructure for first responders at the community level for effectively 
combating bioterrorism attacks. Abrol (2016) also suggested integrated international 
cooperation for sharing knowledge, information exchange, and possible bioterrorists 
extraditions. 
However, Malet and Korbitz (2015) informed that emergency responders have 
often not adhered to the regulations and best practices recommended by regulatory 
agencies such as the CDC or the Homeland Security Department (DHS). The study also 
noted the inadequate knowledge of agents, symptoms of biological agents, and sources of 
contaminations despite exercises among public health officials including public 
emergency responders. Malet and Korbitz (2015) further observed that information 
received by public health officials are not always shared with other emergency 
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responders that operate outside the domain of public health daily regulation. The study 
recommended changing this attitude for effective bioterrorism preparedness. The findings 
and suggestions are particularly important because EMTs’ bioterrorism preparedness 
should align with the DHS and CDC-recommended protocols and best practices. 
EMTs knowledge of PPE 
The 2014 incidents of EVD in the United States elicited varied responses from 
some of the states where the virus manifested: New Jersey, Texas, and Georgia. Olliaro, 
Horby, and Torreele (2015) questioned why the United States lacked adequate health 
tools for protecting against EVD and other emerging infectious diseases. However, the 
study focused on developing an affordable and efficient reach to diagnostics, medicines, 
and vaccines for biological agents that would enhance collective public health security 
rather than on HCWs preparedness for bioterrorism response (Olliaro et al., 2015). This 
study was significant because evaluating HCWs emergency healthcare preparedness 
helps address the question of secondary infection through the first responders and HCWs 
especially EMTs. 
Critical aspects of bioterrorism preparedness are the identification of factors that 
would help avoid secondary infection through HCWs. The Pandemic and all-Hazards 
Preparedness Reauthorization Act (PAHPRA) of 2013 was enacted to address the issue of 
secondary infection through HCWs (Eddy & Sase, 2015). PAHPRA also mandated 
hospitals to continually review the workplace hazards and to minimize risks through a 
hazard vulnerability analysis assessment  process (Eddy & Sase, 2015). The objective of 
the PAHPRA was to improve hospitals emergency preparedness practices and their 
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capabilities to meet challenges posed by infectious diseases such as Ebola. For the 
hospital workers, vulnerability analysis assessment is a required process for bioterrorism 
hardening against infectious diseases. Also important is the knowledge of PPE, the ability 
to accurately diagnosis infectious diseases, and knowledge of the zoonotic nature and 
sources of the disease (Eddy & Sase, 2015). However, Decker, Sevransky, Barrett, 
Davey, and Chertow (2014) noted the challenge of caring for Ebola patients while 
donning the PPE because they are likely to affect job performance. Hence, the need for 
EMTs to have a clear understanding of how to don PPE and work with them. But Decker 
et al. (2014) informed that with carefully planned protocols and training, patients could 
receive needed care without the secondary infection of HCWs and EMTs. 
Eddy and Sase (2015), further noted that bioterrorism preparedness policies and 
programs should protect hospitals against all viral hemorrhagic fever (VHFs) such as 
Ebola. However, the study found that hospitals did not adhere to preparedness programs 
by performing the vulnerability analysis assessment. The finding by Eddy and Sase 
(2015) supports the need to examine the current protocols in the operations of other 
healthcare population outside of the hospital environment, such as the EMTs. If the 
protocols exist, how knowledgeable are EMTs of the processes and how have the 
protocols helped in their emergency response and practices? 
Threat Assessment 
The threats of biological attacks are evident in the proliferation of terrorist groups, 
state-sponsored terrorist activities including their active bioagent programs, and increased 
use of biological agents (Abrol, 2016; Grundmann, 2014; Kadlec, 2013). This qualitative 
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case study focused on the threats, vulnerabilities, and existing capabilities to withstand 
the threats if they occur. Major emergency response capability strategies are the 
willingness of EMTs to respond to terrorist and biological attacks and their knowledge of 
response strategies acquired through training (Clancy, 2008; Rokach et al., 2010; Taylor 
2015). 
Tambunan, Parikesit, and Saputro (2014) informed that there are two critical 
issues in a biological threat assessment: the expected impact of the attack on the target 
(create fear and disrupt socio-economic activities), and the potentials of the attacks 
occurring and being successful. Both criteria depended on the capabilities of the 
attackers, and values and vulnerabilities of the targets respectively (Tambunan et al., 
2014). Historically, past biological incidents and military activities met these criteria. The 
past incidents and military activities included Japan’s Unit 731 during the World Wars 1 
and 2, Rajneeshee Religious Cult incident of 1984, Aum Shinrikyo Cult in 1995, 2001 
letters with Anthrax, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in Saudi Arabia in 
2012 (Tambunan et al., 2014). 
The issue of bioterrorism continues to pose a global concern. The concerns were 
borne out of the progress in the development of life science and the intention of terrorists 
to exploit infectious diseases for biological attacks (Maras & Miranda, 2016; Suk et al., 
2011). Suk et al. (2011) categorized research on viruses or infectious diseases into dual 
uses (dual-use research of concern – DURC): Positive and negative uses. Maras and 
Miranda (2016) observed that terrorists could turn themselves into “human Ebola 
munition.” However, the focus of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for 
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Biosecurity (NSAABB), is on the simultaneous uses of research on infectious diseases. 
Infectious diseases have potentials to help increase knowledge as well as for misuse by 
other groups such as terrorists. Although Suk et al. (2011) found that the biological 
agents that require high technologies are less likely to be deployed, it noted the 
importance of preparing for their eventual use for biological attacks. So, while there is the 
need for freedom of research on infectious diseases, there was also the threat or question 
of the research process been deployed for terrorism as the 2001 anthrax attacks showed 
(MacIntyre, 2015). 
The United States government understood the threats of not only terrorist attacks 
but also of potential bioterrorist attacks. Consequently, it allocated a huge amount of fund 
into the bioterrorism programs (Monroe, 2014). Following the 2001 anthrax incidents, the 
United States government in the 2002 and 2003 fiscal years provided a total of $2.5 
billion towards the initiatives to get local, state, federal governments, hospitals, and 
EMSOs prepared for bioterrorism (United States House of Representatives Committee on 
Science Report, 2004). Furthermore, in 2004 the U.S. HR Committee on Science 
conducted a hearing to discuss the threats posed by bioterrorism, the vulnerabilities, and 
the preparedness of the various levels of governments and emergency medical services 
providers (United States House of Representatives Committee on Science Report, 2004). 
The result of the 2004 Congressional Hearing was the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 
(Monroe, 2014; Gottron, 2014). Other events related to biological incidents in addition to 
the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks prompted the Committee meeting. The other events 
included the severe acute respiratory syndrome in China and globally in 2003. 
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Before the 2001 bioterrorism-related attacks, inhalational anthrax occurred in the 
United States in 1976 (Jernigan et al., 2001). Anthrax has been used by countries since 
the early 20th Century during and after the First and Second World Wars by countries 
including Japan, United States, United Kingdom, and Russia (Schmid & Kaufmann, 
2001). So, the technological knowledge is there, and terrorist groups are believed to be 
developing biological agents for the purposes of deploying them for terrorist activities 
(Abrol, 2016; Maras & Miranda, 2016). 
The 2001 anthrax incidents affected 22 people (five deaths and 17 sicknesses) 
who tested positive to Bacillus anthracis powder (Schweitzer, 2016; Thompson, 2016). 
The fatality of the anthrax attacks demonstrated the nature and range of anthrax as a 
potential covert bioterrorism agent. Other bioagents including smallpox and Ebola have 
similarly devastating effects as the thousands of deaths following the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic illustrated (Maras & Miranda, 2016). The pathogens often spread through 
physical contacts, cause not only high fatality but also cause panic in the population and 
economic dislocation in the society (Anderson & Boker, 2012; Barrow et al., 2015; 
Gunaratne, 2015; Pinto, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014). 
Smallpox, although eliminated since the 1980s, the virus is still stockpiled in 
many laboratories for scientific purposes in the United States and Russia, and additional 
concerns of more stockpiles in sophisticated laboratories elsewhere, insider threats and 
easy access to information online (Henderson, 2014).Given these concerns, there is no 
guarantee that smallpox, SARS coronavirus and transmissible influenza virus AH5N1 
currently under study in laboratories cannot be released by someone or group of persons 
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with access to them for biological attacks (Lipsitch & Bloom, 2012). The 2001 anthrax 
attacks in the United States are examples of an intentional release of a biological weapon 
for terrorist purposes from a laboratory. The public concerns over potential bioterrorist 
attacks are not far-fetched given the growth of home-grown terrorists and lone wolf 
terrorists inspired by foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State 
(Navarro & Villaverde, 2014; Ramakrishna, 2014). Previous studies (Weant et al. 2014) 
have noted that the challenges of bioterrorism preparedness for HCWs include 
recognizing covert biological agents, learning and adapting to preparedness plans, 
response, and practices. 
Ebola and the new emerging hybrid – Ebola pox are among the deadliest 
cutaneous infectious diseases (Kar et al., 2012; Khan, 2011; Taylor, 2015). Ebola, one of 
the deadliest forms of the Viral hemorrhagic fevers is caused by ribonucleic acid (RNA) 
viruses namely, Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, Flaviviridae, Filoviridae, and 
Rhabdoviridae; with a fatality rate of between 50% to 90% (Passi et al. 2015). Of the five 
species of Ebola, the Zaire Ebola virus  has the highest fatality rate of 90%; tends to 
reoccur and fall into the Category A as the CDC and the WHO classified the pathogens 
(Passi et al. 2015). 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Terrorists are likely to deploy biological weapons because they are cheap and 
easy to procure; ease to disseminate; have the potential to cause panic, maximize fatality 
in the population, and dislocate the targets’ economy (Cenciarelli et al. 2013). The United 
States is a potential target for terrorist attacks, whether chemical, biological, radiological, 
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nuclear or explosives (CBRNE) at sources of water supply and pharmaceuticals 
distribution (Cinturati, 2014). The U.S. vulnerability was also demonstrated in the 
weaknesses identified in the handling of the Ebola outbreak in 2014 (Olliaro, Horby, & 
Torreele, 2015). Also, HCWs are most vulnerable to a secondary infection of HIDs due 
to lack of or non-adherence to protocols and inadequate protective equipment (Maras & 
Miranda, 2016). 
The United States is also a good target for bioterrorism because of the many 
infrastructures and other targets that have the potential to cause substantial huge 
economic cost and human losses, and iconic targets such as the Statue of Liberty and 
Pentagon (Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, & Klein, 2015). The 2001 terrorist attacks 
resulted in a significant loss of lives and destroyed the aura of invincibility or security in 
the United States (Toomey & Singleton, 2014). Gruenewald et al. (2015) in a study 
discussed how Clarke and Newman (2006) applied eight basic principles namely, 
exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, near, and easy” (acronym: 
E.V.I.L D.O.N. E) to assess the vulnerability and attractiveness of targets to terrorist 
attacks. The United States has many targets that meet these targets using the theory of 
situational crime prevention (SCP) as Clarke and Newman (2006) applied them 
(Gruenewald et al., 2015). Though, a quantitative study on eco-terrorism, the study was 
significant to my study because it demonstrated how terrorists are most likely to identify 
targets using the principles of E.V.I.L D.O.N. E, and SCP. The eight principles were 
useful to my study in helping identify possible vulnerable targets such as areas with a 
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high concentration of human beings for maximum casualties, and ease targets to avoid 
detection. 
Similarly, Becker (2014) analyzed 84 lone wolf terrorist attacks on the civilian, 
government, and the military targets and found that 61 percent of such cases were 
targeted at the civilians because of the inadequate hardening of the civilian targets. 
Civilian or soft targets such as transit stations, bus terminals, and shopping malls were 
also targeted because of their potentials for causing maximum casualties and inflicting 
fear in the population (Morris, 2015). In the article on maritime security in the wake of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Johnson (2013) pointed to the vulnerability of the United States 
because of globalization and its perception by terrorists as a wealthy country with 
potential for enormous economic losses if attacked. Johnson (2013) further noted in the 
survey study of security at the ports, the relationship between international free trade and 
maritime terrorism and noted the vulnerability of the United States because only five 
percent of over 500 million cargos are inspected at the United States ports yearly. 
 The 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
exemplified the vulnerabilities the United States face and the goals of the terrorists to 
cause maximum fatalities and create fear (Gruenewald & Allison-Gruenewald, 2015; 
Johnson, 2013; White, Porter, & Mazerolle, 2013). In 2014, Ebola reached the United 
States soil, and the manner the epidemic was handled by the various authorities raised 
concerns of unpreparedness among the HCWs and governments (Ganguli et al., 2016; 
Harris, Dadwal, Wu, & Syed, 2015). For instance, Ganguli et al. (2016) discovered in 
their cross-sectional web-based study of 202 respondents out of 462 targeted participants 
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that 75% of the cases referred to CDC were wrongly referenced. Similarly, the varied 
responses from the various governments to the epidemic revealed the unpreparedness of 
HCWs, acute healthcare facilities, including the lack of uniformity heightened the 
vulnerabilities of the United States to bioterrorist attacks (Rickles & Catarious, 2015). 
The inadequate responses occurred despite the Bio-watch Program developed to improve 
the capability of responding agencies to interpret data collected for necessary actions 
(Koenig, 2013). The study further pointed out that bioterrorism preparedness should 
involve an effective surveillance system that can interpret and put into action the outcome 
of the interpretation. The capability of data interpretation is critical for HCWs readiness 
for bioterrorism response and capability to detect and analyze bioagents while responding 
to disasters (Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
Bioterrorism Preparedness in New Jersey and the County. 
Bioterrorism is the emerging public health threat locally, nationally and globally 
(CDC, 2000; Maras and Miranda, 2016). Predicting next terrorist or bioterrorist attacks 
are hard to decipher, although (Bakker, 2012; Navarro & Villaverde, 2014) documented 
that terrorism will continue to exist, the modus operandi may change. Hence, the 
possibility of bioterrorist attacks remains a concern to HCWs (Olsen, 2013). To allay 
these concerns, HCWs should be prepared for biological attacks because they are more 
vulnerable than the population as their emergency response roles require them to attend 
to infected persons (Walker & Whitty, 2015). The Ebola epidemic and the responses to 
the epidemic provided an opportunity to reassess the bioterrorism preparedness of the 
HCWs because as the epidemic demonstrated, HCWs are at a higher risk of infection 
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(Maras & Miranda, 2016) The 2001 anthrax attacks were followed by major bioterrorism 
preparedness programs, legislation and increased bioterrorism preparedness funding 
(Nemane, 2012). The bioterrorism preparedness programs and funding benefited local 
public health authorities in the areas of public health awareness, the collaboration 
between the levels of government, public health infrastructure improvements, and 
improved disaster response readiness and assessment (Staiti, Katz, & Hoadley, 2003). 
Incidentally, both anthrax and Ebola incidents affected New Jersey. 
The 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks revealed flaws in our emergency response, 
and to correct the flaws the Bush Administration in 2002 released $1.1 billion to states, 
territories, and some cities for the development of bioterrorism preparedness plans 
(Markowitz & Rosner, 2004). The cities mentioned were Chicago, New York, and Los 
Angeles. Interestingly, Newark, the largest city in New Jersey with proximity and shared 
critical infrastructures with New York was not mentioned. Also, the City of Camden that 
was actively involved in the 2001 anthrax attacks was equally not part of the fund 
recipients. The fund was also designated to support and enhance bioterrorism 
preparedness readiness against infectious diseases and to create regional acute healthcare 
facilities capable of responding to bioterrorism attacks. 
In New Jersey, the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management coordinates 
emergency preparedness and response including natural and human-made such as the 
intentional acts of terrorism or bioterrorism in collaboration with the federal, state and 
local partners (NJOEM, n.d). In the counties, there are also regional emergency 
management offices. For instance, in the selected county, the County Regional Health 
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Commission (ERHC) is the point agency with the Department of Human and Health 
Services (DHHS) and New Jersey Department of Environment Protection (NJDEP). The 
role of the county regional health commission was to coordinate the county emergency 
preparedness initiatives. However, the operational implementation of emergency 
responses is handled by the County Office of Emergency Management located in the 
County Sherriff’s office. A review of the county emergency mission statement showed 
that preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery were part of the strategy to harden 
HCWs and emergency responders. The goal of the county EOM is to prevent the 
occurrence of natural and human-made disasters and reduce the impact of any such 
disaster. 
In 2015, sequel to the 2008 Plan, the county OEM updated its all-Hazard 
Mitigation Plan (HMP) and reaffirmed its mission statement. The mission statement 
reaffirmed the need for strategic planning, partnership, collaboration to help identify and 
mitigate the vulnerability of HCWs and the community to hazards caused by humans or 
nature in the county.. Bioterrorism preparedness is part of the HMP, but the mission 
statement lacked a clear policy statement towards bioterrorism readiness and response. 
 Incidentally, Newark, the largest city in New Jersey is not part of the 
Commission (ERHC). Also, there is also the New Jersey Medical Reserve Corps (MRCs) 
who assist during emergencies. MRCs are volunteers who assist during medical and non-
medical emergencies, and natural and non-natural disasters including bioterrorism, 
pandemic flu, floods, and blizzards (New Jersey Medical Reserve Corps. (NJMRC), 
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2004). MRCs work under the county and local health systems as part of emergency and 
disaster preparedness programs (NJMRC, 2004). 
The study by Abatemarto et al. (2007) informed that the anthrax attacks showed a 
lack of preparedness for biological attacks especially the knowledge of PPE for 
respiratory protection in New Jersey. The study focused on providing training and 
education on the use and importance of N-100 respiratory-protective face masks against 
biological and chemical attacks. The study was timely given that anthrax and terrorist 
attacks just occurred a few years earlier, and there were few studies that analyzed the first 
responders’ bioterrorism preparedness. The study recommended future studies on the 
state of preparedness of first responders for bioterrorism and knowledge of infectious 
diseases. My study built upon the study by Abatemarto et al. (2007), by examining and 
understanding what has changed since then. My study furthered the knowledge by 
examining the infectious disease and bioterrorism preparedness following the 2014 Ebola 
epidemics in the United States and used EMTs in New Jersey for the study. 
The New Jersey Department of Health, Office of Emergency Medical Services 
(NJDH-OEMS) certifies EMTs and conducts training needs and continuous education in 
New Jersey (New Jersey Office of Emergency Management Services, 2017). The first 
responders that OEMS train included EMT-basic and EMT-paramedics. OEMS also 
licenses the following: ambulances mobile intensive units, mobility assistance vehicles 
and specialty care transport units both hospital-based and non-hospital based (New Jersey 
Office of Emergency Management Services, 2016). Created in 1967, OEMS has over 
27,000 EMT-Bs and EMT-Ps and over 4500 emergency vehicles (NJOEMS, 2016). 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter highlighted the problems and challenges HCWs, especially EMTs 
faced in disaster situations and exposed the lapses in bioterrorism preparedness plans 
since the 2001 anthrax attacks. The literature review also revealed the missed opportunity 
of using the 2014 Ebola epidemic as a tabletop scenario to gauge the bioterrorism 
preparedness programs in place (Taylor, 2015). This missed opportunity was despite the 
challenge of biological threats to health security in the United States (Shelton et al. 2012). 
The chapter began with a presentation of the literature search strategy and the theoretical 
framework for the study: MST. The review of the literature showed the prevalence of 
inadequacy of bioterrorism preparedness practices, increased threats, heightened 
vulnerability of HCWs, the vulnerability of soft targets, and, that the willingness to 
respond to all-hazard emergencies was tied to increased knowledge of bioagents. Other 
studies found that the lack of preparedness increased the risk of secondary infection and 
identified the need for regular training. 
Bioterrorism is of both national and global concerns and threats because of the 
minimal cost involvements and the challenges it poses (Abrol, 2016; Cenciarelli et al. 
2013; Wiwanitkit, 2014). Therefore, preparing national, states and local healthcare 
agencies, and HCWs for possible bioterrorism threats is very important. Preparedness and 
early detection require increased biological and chemical terrorism awareness among 
front-line health-care providers because they are in the best position to report suspicious 
illnesses and injuries (CDC, 2000). Most research on HCWs’ bioterrorism preparedness 
had focused on hospital nurses’ and other first responders’ preparedness, leaving critical 
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gaps in understanding the EMTs’ pre-hospital bioterrorism readiness and knowledge of 
bioagents which are emerging health and terrorism threats. Furthermore, although, there 
are extensive policies and studies on managing patients with infectious diseases (Aghaei 
& Nesami, 2013; Smith & Hewison, 2012; Whetzel, Walker-Cillo, Chan, & Trivett, 
2013), there is little research on specialized transportation of patients with HIDs such as 
Ebola to avoid secondary infection, and on EMTs’ understanding of emergency response 
protocols and in handling HIDs. 
In this chapter, the study identified the need for future studies in the areas of 
EMTs preparedness for cutaneous diseases such as Ebola, smallpox and Ebola pox. 
Before the 2014 Ebola incidents, there was little literature on cutaneous forms of 
bioagents as weapons for terrorism. The Ebola epidemic and the lack of response 
uniformity demonstrated the need to study EMTs and indeed, HCWs’ bioterrorism 
preparedness and practices. 
Also, as the review of the literature showed, much of the literature that existed 
were on bioterrorism preparedness in the pre-Ebola era and after the anthrax attacks of 
2001. Little literature had focused on the possibility of weaponization of pathogens such 
as smallpox and EVD, and the emerging disease: Ebola pox. A study by Kar et al. (2012) 
pointed to this emerging disease - Ebola pox (black pox) as a new biological weapon. Kar 
et al. (2012) noted that the disease, a combination of Ebola and smallpox is considered 
more lethal than Ebola and is resistant to the changes in the environment including 
humidity, cold and heat. This study addressed the gap in EMTs’ post-Ebola bioterrorism 
preparedness, response protocols, and practices. The study also filled the gap in the 
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literature  by examining the problems and challenges confronting EMTs and identified 
the factors for bioterrorism hardening and policy formulation using the theoretical 
framework of MST. The study’s findings would increase knowledge by facilitating an 
increased understanding of the growing field of bioterrorism preparedness and hardening. 
In Chapter 3, the qualitative case study design helped fill the gap in the literature 
by examining the current bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs. The research study 
involved the processes of selecting the 18 EMTs who have theoretical and practical 
experiences and understanding of emergency medical response practices before and after 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The interview format was significant in examining and 




Chapter 3: Research Design 
This qualitative case study was intended to examine and understand how 
knowledgeable and prepared EMTs in New Jersey were for cutaneous forms of biological 
agents, and the policy and political implications of a lack of knowledge or inadequate 
knowledge of and preparedness for bioagents. EMTs were the focus of this study, and the 
study was conducted a few years after the Ebola epidemic that exposed HCWs 
unpreparedness for bioterrorism and bioterrorism policy lapses. This study was embarked 
upon to understand the bioterrorism, and emergency response (BT/ER) preparedness of 
EMTs. This study is important because terrorist groups are exploring and developing 
bioactive programs (Abrol, 2016; Kadlec, 2013). Some studies demonstrated that 
training, education, and uniformity in bioterrorism responses and protocols were 
important for emergency workers’ readiness for biological attacks (Khan, 2011; Waldrop 
et al., 2014). 
The problem of unpreparedness for biological agents or lack of knowledge of 
bioagents’ characteristics was worth examining because such unpreparedness not only 
puts emergency workers at greater risk but also has community-wide health implications 
(Passi et al., 2015). This study, therefore, would be beneficial to HCWs, EMTs, first 
responders, and to local communities’ emergency response practices and bioterrorism 
hardening (BH). The study added to knowledge by highlighting the problems EMTs face 
during emergency response situations and proffered ways to increase EMTs knowledge 




This research method chapter also detailed the rationale for the study, the research 
design, and, the role I played as the researcher. Particularly, I stated how I avoided 
potential researcher biases. The method for the data collection section addressed possible 
replicability, noted the key research protocols and the method of research participants’ 
selection. Other issues this chapter addressed included ethical concerns and the analytical 
data method that enhanced the study’s credibility and trustworthiness. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Research Tradition 
The study provided suggestions for enhanced bioterrorism preparedness as it 
addressed the research questions: Are EMSOs and EMTs in New Jersey prepared for a 
cutaneous form of biological attack such as EVD? What are the policy and political 
implications of lack of preparedness? To answer these research questions, the study used 
the qualitative research design (QRD) to examine the issue of bioterrorism hardening 
(BH) among HCWs with a focus on EMTs. BH is the preemptive preparation for 
protecting HCWs who are deployed to disaster areas; bioterrorism preparedness (BP) 
includes exercises to mitigate the impact of biological attacks (Kabir et al., 2016; Rickles 
& Catarious, 2015). The study also examined the knowledge of cutaneous diseases such 
as Ebola among EMTs, and the emergency response practices if bioagents were 
weaponized for biological attacks (MacIntyre, 2015). This qualitative case research 
examined the bioterrorism (BT) preparedness and emergency response practices (ERPs) 
in New Jersey from the perspective of the county EMTs. Examining and understanding 
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the BT preparedness and ERPs in New Jersey will educate EMTs on the areas that 
require improvements and training for enhanced ERPs. 
A qualitative case study is ideal for the interview of participants in their natural 
settings and provides the researcher the opportunity for an in-depth questioning to 
understand the phenomena: bioterrorism hardening, bioterrorism preparedness, 
emergency response practices, and Ebola. I chose the approach because it is amenable to 
multiple sources of data, which enhanced the study’s internal validity and reliability. 
Finally, case study approaches are flexible and are constructed to suit the cases and the 
research questions (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2014). Qualitative research studies 
ask probing questions for in-depth information to understand the meaning of the central 
issue(s) from the participants’ diverse ideas, experiences, perspective, and the meaning 
they attach to the problem (Creswell, 2014; Kozleski, 2017). The research questions in 
qualitative research establish the foci of the interview procedures and the questions are 
open-ended for the participants to provide detailed information (Creswell, 2014). The 
research questions for this study focused on the nature of potential biological agents and 
EMTs’ knowledge of bioagents. 
QRD was also chosen because of its flexibility, provided a holistic account of the 
phenomenon. It is also a useful method for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data 
from multiple sources to examine and gain an insight of EMTs BT/ER readiness for and 
willingness to respond to cutaneous bioagents (Fusch, & Ness, 2015). Critical elements in 
qualitative research are consistency and dependability that bring about validity which led 
to the studies’ credibility and trustworthiness (Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). The 
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elements for assessing the trustworthiness of a QRD case study suggested by Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) are credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability (Houghton, 
Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013). Credibility means the data mining process is believable; 
dependability involves trustworthiness of the process and data collected; confirmability 
can be achieved using qualitative data analysis software such as in vivo, and 
transferability entails the ability of the study being interpreted and transferred to other 
contexts (Houghton et al., 2013). Unlike a quantitative research design which key 
elements are the validity and reliability of the measuring tools, in qualitative research, the 
trustworthiness of the researcher as a critical research tool is most significant (Tavakol & 
Sandars, 2014). 
A qualitative case study was also chosen over other approaches such as 
quantitative and mixed methods because case studies are constructed to suit the cases and 
for probing research questions (Hyett et al., 2014). The qualitative design uses fewer 
participants; gives an interpretation to the issue and uses an inductive approach to explore 
and attach meaning without predetermined typology, while quantitative approaches use 
larger sample population and provide formal or predetermined attributes for the study 
(Brown, Strickland-Munro, Kobryn, & Moore, 2017). 
Among the qualitative research approaches, I chose the case study approach. The 
qualitative case study approach explores a single case in-depth based on context-
dependent facts and holistically and it aligns with the study’s goal of examining in-depth 
EMTs’ bioterrorism preparedness and emergency response readiness (Collins & Cooper, 
2014). On the other hand, the other approaches deal with the study of individuals 
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(narrative), explores the meaning of experiences towards a phenomenon 
(phenomenology), generates a theory (Grounded theory) and describes and interprets a 
culture-sharing group under study (Creswell, 2013). These other qualitative research 
approaches were not suitable for my study because none of the other methods were bound 
by time and activity (Creswell, 2013). This study was undertaken after the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic that exposed the unpreparedness of HCWs for a cutaneous disease and provided 
the single case inquiry which examined (and to understand) EMTs’ level of bioterrorism 
preparedness. 
Role of the Researcher 
My role as the researcher was important in determining the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the study (Tavakol & Sandars, 2014). I made use of my data collection 
experiences in past academic research including my masters’ degree program and my 
current job as a probation officer without appearing judgmental. Part of the strategies I 
used in getting rich information from the participants was using my sense of humor and 
showing an appreciation for the work EMTs perform (Barratt, 2012). Both strategies 
helped the participants to be at ease and answer the research questions in detail. I 
conducted the interviews using both strategies professionally and objectively without 
showing biases. I ensured that there was no personal bias introduced into the data 
collection process and assured the participants of their privacy and confidentiality. I 
protected the participants’ privacy and confidentiality by not including their names in the 
research findings. I checked any personal bias by adhering to the requirements of the 
institution review board (IRB) of Walden University and the Belmont Report. Although 
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bias exists at every stage of the research and is difficult to eliminate, the goal, however, 
was to minimize the bias (Smith & Noble, 2014). The need to minimize potential biases 
was the reason I conducted the research in another county rather than the County where I 
reside. I also made no assumptions of what the participants said. Rather, I sort 
clarifications when I was not sure of what any participant was saying or meant. Finally, I 
avoided potential personal bias by reviewing government policies and resources from the 
NJOEMS, NJDOH, and NJMRC to familiarize myself with their BT/ER practices and 
policies. 
I acquainted myself with the study participants and the nature of their work to 
build a trusting relationship which helped increase the participants’ willingness to 
provide accurate and rich information (Caretta, 2015). Although the close relationship I 
established with the study participants was important, it posed some challenges for me as 
the researcher both cognitively and emotionally (Postholm & Skrovset, 2013). The 
challenge helped in navigating between my role as the researcher and the familiarity with 
the participants and still maintain neutrality. To overcome these challenges, I exhibited 
emotional maturity and exceptional interpersonal attributes that helped effectively gather 
data and use the data to describe the phenomenon (Collins & Cooper, 2014). Part of the 
interpersonal attributes included maintaining eye contacts and not showing or making 
gestures but skillfully and attentively listening to the participants throughout the 
interview (Collins & Cooper, 2014). 
I took issues of ethical concerns and conflicts seriously and avoided them 
throughout every stage of the study. Ethical concerns vary. Ethical concerns are assessed 
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on the goals of the study, the data collection techniques, and the setting of the study 
(Roberts, 2015). One of the ethical issues was obtaining signed informed consent form 
from the participants. The informed consent form clarified areas of potential conflicts of 
interest, the purpose of the research, the funding of the research (if any), the data 
collection procedure, and the manner of reporting and protecting participants’ 
information and data collected. 
Ethical issues also included avoiding harming the participants (Ahern, 2012). 
According to the Belmont Report, not harming the participants means protecting 
vulnerable research participants. However, I do not foresee my study posing any harm to 
the participants. I informed the participants of their fundamental rights to withdraw or not 
answer any question at any time throughout every stage of the interview. 
Methodology 
This qualitative case study was embarked upon to examine and understand the 
bioterrorism preparedness practices of EMTs especially after the Ebola epidemic of 2014 
that exposed HCWs bioagent unpreparedness and policy lapses (Shultz, Baingana, & 
Neria, 2015). To help the understanding of EMTs’ BT/ER readiness, I used Kingdon’s 
multiple stream theory (MST). The theoretical framework views a window of opportunity 
as critical to initiating new policies and practices, and it is pivotal to the examination of 
the EMTs’ bioterrorism preparedness (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). The theoretical 
framework helped the study understand the problems, the policy options and the politics 
inherent in formulating new bioterrorism preparedness practices and policies. 
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Participants that I selected were those who have at least five years of emergency 
response experience. The major sources of data were interviews (semi-structured), 
observation, and review of emergency response documents. The use of many sources of 
data (data triangulation) helped the trustworthiness of the study. In addition, stating in 
detail the research procedures including participants’ selection, data gathering, 
instrumentation, data analysis techniques, and ethical concerns further enhanced the 
content validity, trustworthiness, and replicability of the study. 
Participant Selection Logic 
I used purposeful, snowball sampling technique in identifying and selecting the 
initial 24 emergency medical technicians (EMTs) from EMSOs in a particular county in 
New Jersey who met the criteria for participation. The technique helped the study get the 
best information from EMTs who are representative of the sample population and had 
adequate theoretical and practical knowledge of the phenomenon studied and facilitated 
the understanding of the problem and the research questions (Creswell, 2014; Frankfort-
Nachmias, 2008; Robinson, 2014). The researcher deciding whom to select and the site 
for the study are critical aspects of the qualitative research (Maxwell, 2013). I was 
introduced to the organizations’ supervisors and managers by a county deputy 
coordinator of  Office of Emergency Management Services (OEMS). The participants’ 
demographic survey forms (Appendix B) were used to identify the participants who met 
the study requirements. First, the organizations’ supervisors used the Form to identify 
potential participants that met the requirements. The identified participants then 
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completed the forms. From the list of the returned completed demographic forms, I 
selected the study 18 participants and two pilot study participants. 
Each organization was limited to four participants but not more than five 
participants. After the participants were identified by the supervisors, I emailed to the 
potential research participants an invitation to participate in the study and attached the 
cover letter (Appendix A) and the participant demographic forms (Appendix B). In the 
email, I thanked them for agreeing to participate in the study. I used the cover letter to 
introduce myself, state the reason for the study, benefits, and summary of the research, 
and assure the participants of their confidentiality which helped maximize data 
generation (Rowley, 2012). The cover letter also indicated that their participation was 
voluntary. I called each participant to explain further the content of the cover letter and 
agree with each participant the date, time and place for the interview. Later, I emailed the 
consent forms to the selected participants and explained the selection criteria to them. 
Before the start of each interview, the participant completed and signed the consent form 
which I collected and gave them copies. 
Although I selected 24 participants, I interviewed 18 research participants. The 18 
participants enriched the study with adequate information until thematic saturation 
occurred. The number was apt, and it ensured that adequate and diverse emergency 
response experiences were gathered from many organizations rather than from one 
organization. However, some studies have recommended a different number of 
participants until thematic saturation occurs. For instance, Creswell (2014) recommended 
between four and five participants while Gentles, Charles, Ploeg, and McKibbon (2015) 
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recommended between 20 and 25 interviewees. For my study, there were an extra six 
participants. Two of the participants were used for the pretest or pilot study. The 
remaining four alternate research participants from the pool of six participants were 
extras for additional recruitment of participants. For instance, the extra participants were 
potential sources of replacement if any participant dropped out of the study. The criteria 
for inclusion in the study included at least 5 years of emergency response experience. 
Other criteria included active emergency medical technician during the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic, at least 25 years old at the time of the interview and involvement in 
transporting patients to HCFs. 
Determining the number of research participants for data saturation was 
important. However, there is no definite number of research participants for a study to 
attain data saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Hennink, Kaiser, & Marconi, 2017). Data 
saturation is attained when no new information or further coding are possible or needed 
(Fusch & Ness, 2015). Burmeister and Aitken (2012) observed that saturation is not 
about sample size rather what constitutes the sample size guides the study in reaching 
data saturation point. Therefore, knowledgeable and experienced study participants with 
rich and thick information selected through purposeful, snowball sampling technique 
aided the study to attain data saturation (Creswell, 2014). Another method I employed to 
attain data saturation was data triangulation. Data triangulation, the process of gathering 
data from multiple sources, also helped the reliability of the study and finding (Fusch & 
Ness, 2015). Therefore, the information from the 18 participants, the field notes, and 




In qualitative research, there is no one way of conducting interviews or 
developing an interview protocol. But because the data collection instruments were 
researcher-developed, there was the need to pretest the instruments to ensure that they 
measured what they intended to measure. The pilot test provided me the opportunity to 
review the interview questions, modify the interview protocols and, provide the data that 
could help improve the conduct of the main interview procedure (Mok, Lau, Lai, & 
Ching, 2012). When conducting a pilot test, whether for a qualitative or quantitative 
study, the goal is to help improve the validity and reliability of the research instruments, 
and, therefore, the study findings (Cope, 2015; Dikko, 2016). 
I selected two participants for the pilot study from the first selected EMSO. The 
two pilot study participants were identified by their respective supervisors using a 
purposeful sampling technique. Participants completed the participants’ demographic 
survey form to ensure that they met the requirements for participation in the study. I 
emailed the cover letter and the informed consent forms to them. My initial contacts with 
the pre-test participants were via emails. I conducted a face-to-face interview for the 
pretest at their workplaces at a time most convenient for them to participate in the 
interview process. I recorded the session with an ICD recorder. The pilot test session also 
helped me assess the functionality of the recording equipment. The data collection 
procedure I used for the pilot study guided me in determining the effectiveness of the 
interview procedure and its efficacy for the main study (Cope, 2015). However, I did not 
include the data collected during this pilot test into the main study data analysis. 
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Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
The research instruments I developed for data collection included participants’ 
demographic information form (Appendix B), cover letter (Appendix A), informed 
consent form, and the interview questions (Appendix C). The 18 EMTs that I selected 
formed the primary source of data gathered through a face-to-face interview. After the 
interview, field notes gathered from my observations during the interview were reviewed 
and included in the research data for analysis. Finally, I analyzed the data collected and 
identified themes using thematic analysis procedure. 
The core of this section centered around data collection methods. Data collection 
was part of the research process that described the research plan, answered the research 
questions that resulted in the research findings for potential practical applications 
(Gelling, 2015). To ensure fair representation of the EMTs and EMSOs in the selected 
county, I selected one EMSO each from six towns. However, only four EMSOs formed 
the core of the unit of analysis while the remaining two EMSOs were alternates if any of 
the initial four EMSOs declined to participate in the study. For the organizations’ privacy 
and confidentiality, I assigned identifiers: Emergency Organization 1; Emergency 
Organization 2; Emergency Organization 3; and Emergency Organization 4. The 
alternate emergency organizations were not be assigned any identifiers. But if any 
participating emergency organization declines, one of the alternate emergency 
organizations would assume that identifying number. 
I met the assisting supervisors in each organization in their offices and gave them 
the permission forms: Gatekeepers Information Form (Appendix D) and Consent and 
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Authorization Form (Appendix E). As the connecting link between the researcher and the 
potential research participants, the supervisors recommended participants who met the 
qualification criteria and, therefore, had a significant influence on who participated or did 
not participate in the study (Eslamian, Moeini, & Soleimani, 2015; Oye, Sorensen, & 
Glasdam, 2016). Although in some cases, supervisors could assist the participants in 
completing the informed consent form and, therefore, protect the interest of the 
organizations they represent, that was not the case about my study (Gallo et al., 2012). 
The study participants completed the consent forms themselves. The supervisors 
identified in my study included operations supervisors or managers. 
The EMSOs chosen for the study had been in operation during the Ebola 
epidemic. The EMSOs were also purposely selected from those who operated in a pre-
hospital environment. My researcher position role allowed me to examine the 
participants’ understanding of reality from their points of view (Edwards, 2017). For the 
actual data collection, I allocated each week to each organization. So, for the EMSO 
organizations I selected and visited for the interview, I allocated between four to six 
weeks for the interview. The additional two weeks was to make room for spillovers. I 
notified each organization and their respective employees ahead of the day, time and 
place for the face-to-face interviews. The study questions were open-ended. I used a 
semi-structured interview technique, and each interview lasted for an average of 30 
minutes. The 30 minutes was enough for the data gathering until no new information 
emerged and data became repetitive (Musheke, Merten, & Bond, 2016).  Rudestam and 
Newton (2015) noted that open-ended interviews could yield high fidelity and little 
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structure when properly recorded. Both the recording and note-taking techniques ensured 
the accuracy of information obtained, enhanced feedbacks, improved survey instrument 
and increased the quality of data collection processes (Thissen, 2014). 
Data Collection 
Interview 
I collected data through the interview of the participants, observation of the 
participants’ mannerism and review of related documents (Creswell, 2013). The multiple 
sources of data helped achieve data saturation because of its rich and thick provision of 
information, reduction of potential bias, allowance for better assessment and applicability 
of the findings; and avoidance of systematic measurement error (Leuffen, Shikano, & 
Walter, 2013). The study interviewed the participants (EMTs) individually rather than as 
a focused group (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). Before starting the data collection process, 
I reviewed the relevant documents on emergency preparedness, responses, and policies 
and that gave me an understanding of what EMTs do. 
I collected the data from participants using a face-to-face interview technique, and 
the process was recorded with two ICD recorders at their workplaces. I took notes as I 
interviewed the participants and was guided by the interview protocol I developed 
(Creswell, 2013). I used the two ICD recorders to ensure that no part of the interview 
session was missed and in the event one recording device malfunctioned, I will have a 
backup. I interviewed the participants at their respective workplaces. The interview 
protocols included preinterview and postinterview activities including completing 
participants’ demographic information sheet; participants signing the informed consent 
108 
 
form; and member checking (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012). Member-checking measured the 
credibility of the study because it gave the participants the opportunity to review the 
accuracy of the recording and information transcribed (Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & 
Murphy, 2013). 
The interview questions were designed to probe and to yield maximum data from 
the participants (Maxwell, 2013). The research questions drew inferences to the 
background of the study, participants’ opinions, feelings, experiences and knowledge of 
the phenomenon under study (Greene & Yu, 2014). For instance, the central research 
questions guided me in formulating the interview questions. I used the interview 
questions in Appendix C to examine and understand EMTs knowledge of cutaneous 
diseases, bioterrorism preparedness and practices, and policies; the participants’ 
experiences, knowledge and training in bioagents; understanding of existing preparedness 
policies and protocols; and the participants’ willingness to respond to biological attacks 
in the aftermath of the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The questions were open-ended, and the 
interview was conducted in a conversational setting. Also, the selected county’s all-
hazard mitigation plan (HMP) of 2015 was useful in understanding EMTs’ levels of 
preparedness for all disasters, and the emergency response protocols were also included 
in the interview questions. 
The flexibility of the research reflected in the choice of the participants’ work 
sites as the venues for the interview which made the participants willing study 
participants; made the interview convenient for them, and easier for me as the researcher 
to reach them (Woith, Jenkins, Astroth, & Kennedy, 2014). I conducted a pilot test that 
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measured the validity of the interview protocol in the field and thus improve the content 
validity of the interview instruments such as the research questions and the coding system 
for the final study (Dikko, 2016). I used the research interview questions for the pilot 
study as well. 
I scheduled and conducted the interviews between Mondays and Fridays during 
office hours between 10.30 am and 9.30 pm. The flexibility of the days and hours 
allowed the participants to choose the most convenient day and time for the interview. 
The flexibility of both the interview days and hours ensured that the interview did not 
interfere with the participants’ work schedule and negatively impacted on the 
organizations’ emergency response functions. 
After each interview, I thanked the participants for their participation and 
conducted a debriefing session with them. I used the debriefing sessions to clarify any 
issue or issues of concern with the participants: concerns that may have arisen in their 
minds after the interview began especially about the aim of the study although this was 
stated earlier (Roche & Hefferon, 2013). I asked them if they have questions about the 
study and the interview. I also used the debriefing to ask if any participant needed 
counseling. I informed them that there would be a follow-up meeting with them in-person 
for a review of the interview transcript to ensure the data reflected their views in the form 
of member-checking. 
The process of member-checking allowed the participants to review the 
transcription of the interview; verify and confirm the accuracy of the transcribed 
interview; and enhance the credibility of the research (Birt, Scott, Cavers, Campbell, & 
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Walter, 2016; Houghton et al., 2013). I did the member-checking by meeting with the 
participants with a copy of the transcribed interview and have them go through it. 
Observation 
An observation was another data collection technique I used in gathering data 
from the participants, and it involved taking field notes on the behavior and body 
expressions of the research participants (Creswell, 2014). I used observation sheet to 
document my observations of the research participants’ mannerism before, during and 
soon after the interview such as the participants’ body language and facial expressions 
(Antin, Constantine, & Hunt, 2015) to avoid missing critical details. The observation 
sheet was a log that I used to document observations that were relevant to the study but 
not captured in the audio recording devices such as body expressions and for further 
inquiries (Edwards, 2017). The triangulation of data from these data collection 
techniques: interview protocols, observations, audio-recording, and observation log 
assisted in giving the study its trustworthiness and credibility (Edwards, 2017). 
The issue of validity in any qualitative research depended on “the ontological and 
epistemological views of the researcher” and the nature of the study (Green, 2015, p. 68). 
Therefore, my role as the researcher involved self-reflexivity that helped me check any 
held personal and potential bias that would have affected the validity of the data 
collection (Berger, 2015; Green, 2015). Another critical issue about validity is 
transformational validity which refers to the outcome of the qualitative research through 
the participation of the respondents and collaboration throughout the research (Thomas, 
2017). Validity is the extent to which the research processes including the data collection 
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tools and data interpretation are presented, devoid of distortion and biases (Leung, 2015; 
Teusner, 2016). 
The researchers’ held views (human cognition) arises from bias, and these views 
have the potentials to distort the findings in any study. As Suter and Suter (2014) 
observed, researcher bias affects the validity of any study because human cognition based 
on bias emanates from faulty reasoning or assumptions. For instance, I held the view that 
EMTs only transport patients to HCFs. When conducting the interview, I was open-
minded and avoided rushing to conclusions as the participants provided answers to the 
interview questions and this mindset help avoid compromising the data and finding. 
Data Analysis Plan 
This qualitative case study approach was used to collect and analyze data and 
examine the issue of bioterrorism preparedness and ensure that the participants’ 
experiences and perception of the phenomenon were accurately captured (Kornbluh, 
2015). Data analysis involves data collection, coding, emerging themes, interpreting the 
findings and determining the validity of the findings (Gaglio, Glasgow, & Bull, 2012). To 
achieve this, I used open-ended interview processes to get answers (data) to the research 
questions from the participants; and I transcribed all the answers to the research questions 
verbatim (Gaglio et al., 2012; Chan, Fung, & Chien, 2013). I also compared the audio 
recording with the notes I took during the interview. 
I began the data analysis with the collection of the data from the various sources: 
recorded interviews, field notes, and documents gathered from NJOEM and a county 
emergency management office. The interviews were tape-recorded using ICD recorder, 
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later transcribed verbatim and finally conducted a qualitative thematic content analysis 
through the coding of the data (Mehraban, Hassanpour, Jamdani, & Ajami, 2013). The 
process of data transcription involves text search, coding queries, and matrix queries 
((Houghton et al., 2013). I listened to the recorded interview many times before 
beginning the process of transcribing the recorded interview, word for word (Zeighami, 
Oskouie, & Joolaee, 2014). I then segmented the collected data question by question for 
each participant using the text search method, reviewed the recorded interview and the 
notes I took and identified the key terms or ideas that formed the primary codes (Vaughn 
& Turner, 2016; Zeighami et al., 2014). The segmentation of the data question by 
question was necessary because of the expected volume of data involved in the process of 
data analysis and for a clearer understanding of the data and the transcription (Vaughn & 
Turner, 2016). Next, I used coding queries to reduce the large segments and labeled them 
into codes which I stored in the nodes for references (Houghton et al., 2013). Later, the 
related codes were reduced into sub-themes, and the sub-themes further categorized into 
themes (Zeighami et al., 2014). Finally, the matrix coding was used to identify and 
compare numerous nodes or themes and confirm findings to ensure the participants’ 
information was accurately reflected (Houghton et al., 2013). Data coding is an important 
procedure in a qualitative study because, in an open-ended interview procedure, coding 
helps show emerging patterns and themes (matrix queries) from the participants’ 
response to the research questions (Rapport, Clement, Doel, & Hutchings, 2015). 
Data analysis requires an understanding of the entire process of data mining, 
organizing data, and developing reflective memos to increase data interpretation 
113 
 
(Finfgeld-Connett, 2014a). Memoing was important to this study because I used it to 
encapsulate concisely, clearly, and transparently my understanding of the generated data 
as to arrive at findings that also reflected the participants’ views of the phenomenon 
(Finfgeld-Connett, 2014b). To develop the themes, the software in vivo coding technique 
was utilized. The usefulness of in vivo as a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software is to assist the researcher in data coding, retrieval and recording, editing, and 
filing of data (Roberts, Breen, & Symes, 2013). Essentially, the software program 
assisted me in data coding and analysis while I remained the major instrument throughout 
the data collection and analysis stages (Habib, Etesam, Ghoddusifar, & Mohajeri, 2012). 
Another critical element in data analysis that I included while reviewing the data 
was the discrepant cases and non-conforming data. These were cases and data that though 
did not fit into the data categorization or emerging theme but were nonetheless 
considered for better thematic data analysis (Waite, 2011). I reflected the discrepant data 
in the study’s finding because they were equally relevant for a clearer understanding of 
the data I collected and the findings of the study. 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness in qualitative research involves the verifiability of the data, 
researcher accounting for or acknowledgment of bias, data triangulation, clear description 
of the data gathering and analysis processes (Noble & Smith, 2015). Trustworthiness was 
measured with the four yardsticks or criteria of dependability, confirmability, 
transferability, and credibility rather than the quantitative measuring tools of reliability 
and validity and generalization (Morse, 2015). White, Oelke, and Friesen (2012) noted 
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that trustworthiness and careful management of data are critical elements in inductive 
qualitative research such as my study. The four criteria for assessing the trustworthiness 
of a qualitative study were developed by Guba and Lincoln in the 1980s replacing such 
terms as generalizability, reliability, and validity (Morse, 2015). 
To ensure the trustworthiness of the study, I adopted an open-ended and iterative 
line of questioning along with data triangulation, participants selection process and 
context of the study clearly stated, and data accurately reflected  participants’ actual 
views (Cope, 2014; Mabuza, Govender, Ogunganjo, & Mash., 2014). 
Credibility (Internal Validity) 
An inductive research such as my study draws its credibility from the 
trustworthiness of the entire gamut of the data analysis process namely, data 
triangulation, participant selection technique, member-checking, peer-review of the 
process (Connelly, 2016; Whyte, Burke, White, & Moran, 2015). Credibility is the 
equivalent of internal validity for quantitative research. Credibility measures how the 
researchers’ interpretation of the data collected meshes with participants’ information 
given during the interview (Munn, Porritt, Lockwood, Aromataris, & Pearson, 2014). In 
assessing the credibility of my study, I made painstaking efforts to ensure that I 
accurately interpreted the data and arrived at findings that reflected the actual data 
collected from the EMTs interviewed. I employed the following techniques: exhaustive 
interview of the participants, keen observation, and note-taking of body language, review 
of journals, member checking, purposeful selection of knowledgeable EMTs for the 
study’s credibility (Connelly, 2016). 
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The study adopted a semi-structured method to conduct the interview. Also, to 
select knowledgeable participants, the snowball purposeful sampling technique was 
utilized to increase the credibility of the finding (Ahern, 2012; Smith, & Herber, 2015). 
The snowball purposeful sampling technique gave the study credibility through the 
sampling of information-rich participants who had deep knowledge, experience, and 
understanding of the phenomenon under study (Palinkas et al., 2015). In applying this 
selection technique, both the gatekeeper (supervisor) and the other research participants 
assisted in identifying individuals who were both knowledgeable and willing to 
participate in the research. The research participants were drawn from EMTs rather than 
from other emergency medical responders such as mobile intensive care nurses, 
paramedics and Advanced EMTs. 
Transferability (External Validity) 
Transferability refers to the application of the findings of a study to another 
setting or other contest (Moon, Brewer, Januchowski-Hartley, Adams, & Blackman, 
2016). I provided a detailed description of the phenomena under study; the participants’ 
recruitment procedure and the inclusion criteria, the data collection processes, data 
triangulation, duration of the interview session, and where and when the interview took 
place. Triangulation of data helped the study achieve transferability. The extent to which 
examining and understanding EMTs bioterrorism preparedness, from a small study 
population in a particular county, could be replicated and extrapolated to other Counties 
was what made the study trustworthy from a positivist perspective (Moon et al., 2016). 
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The transferability of a study to another situation is, however, complex because 
the sample size is measured not only by the number of study participants but also the 
adequacy and usefulness of the data (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013). The transferability of my 
study to another setting might be limited by the sample size and heterogeneity of the 
participants. The transferability (external validity) could, however, be enhanced if the 
nature and process of research inquiry are well defined. Hence I provided detailed 
information about the research method to help future research on the phenomena or 
similar phenomena. 
Dependability (Reliability) 
Dependability in inductive research is the measure of the consistency of the 
research design process throughout data collection, analysis, interpretation, and reporting 
of the findings (Connelly, 2016; Houghton et al., 2013). Dependability also involves a 
detailed audit trail of process log about the research activities including the research 
participants’ selection process and conduct of the interview (Connelly, 2016). I ensured 
the dependability of the study by creating an audit trail for tracking and keeping detailed 
records, approaches and activities involved in the research process (Connelly, 2016; 
White, Oelke, & Friesen, 2012). The audit trail I developed during the interview helped 
me keep track of the relevant activities that happened throughout the study for reference 
purposes. 
Member checking is another technique I used to improve the study’s 
dependability. I utilized member checking to check back with the research participants 
with the transcribed interview to ensure it reflected their views (Houghton et al., 2013; 
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Kornbluh, 2015). I also used member-checking, a validation technique to establish the 
dependability and credibility of the result of my study (Birt, Scott, Cavers, Campbell, & 
Walter, 2016). I did this by returning to the participants several weeks after the interview 
for them to check the accuracy and consistency of the data and information they 
provided. 
Confirmability (Objectivity) 
Confirmability as a measure of the trustworthiness of the study is to find out if 
another researcher who is not privy to the original study can arrive at the same finding 
with the same data rather than the researcher’s assumptions (Rapport et al., 2015). The 
independent replication of the study helps the researcher check for any bias that may have 
been unwittingly introduced into the study. Confirmability should measure the objectivity 
of the study based on the actual data collected from the participants rather than the 
researcher’s preconceived ideas and opinions. Although, as the researcher, I stated my 
beliefs, assumptions, and predispositions towards the phenomenon under study, it may 
not have necessarily eliminated the potential introduction of bias (Moon et al., 2016). 
However, I reduced the possibility bias of prejudgment of EMTs knowledge by 
maintaining unbiased disposition and not make any assumptions of the research findings. 
I also achieved the confirmability criterion of the study by using data triangulation and 
member checking to ensure the accuracy of the data gathered from the participants and 




I conducted this study with IRB Approval No. 02-26-18-0441760. Ethical 
considerations ensure that personal bias is minimized through member-checking because 
the researcher is ethically required to reflect participants’ views and lived experiences 
accurately (Kornbluh, 2015). In every research, the researcher is also required to protect 
the participants’ confidentiality, privacy, and rights throughout the research process 
(Petrova, Dewing, & Camilleri, 2016). Qualitative research involves the interaction 
between the researcher and the research participants. So, I abided by the Belmont Report. 
The Belmont Report emphasized that researchers adhere to three principles: respect for 
persons (informed consent); beneficence (not harm); and justice (protect vulnerable 
subjects) (University of Iowa: Human Subject Office, n.d). Throughout the participants’ 
selection process and interview, I also abided by the Walden University review board 
(IRB) requirements including obtaining signed informed consent form, the protection of 
the participants’ rights, identity and privacy, and confidential and personal information 
(Smith & Herber, 2015). The informed consent form contained the interview procedure, 
the purpose of the study, and the language made clear, comprehensive and readable to 
ensure the participants understood the nature of the study (Foe & Larson, 2016). 
The ethical procedure also requires that I state how the interview will be 
conducted which also included the duration of the interview, audio recording procedure, 
and the participants’ right to terminate the interview or withdraw if feeling uncomfortable 
or unable to continue (Green, Darbyshire, Adams, & Jackson, 2016). In line with the 
Belmont Report, IRB’s requirement, and ethical requirement, the subjects were not be 
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harmed by the study (Ahern, 2012). I made provisions for professional assistance in the 
event the questions and interview process caused some harms or distress to the 
participants as they relieve their emergency response experiences (Hegney & Chan 
2010). I also provided the participants with the toll-free number 800-233-4357 for any 
crisis and 800-999-9999 for depression cases. 
Another aspect of the ethical procedure was research materials protection. 
Interview materials including the recording devices and field notes were stored in a safe 
box, and the information in the computer encrypted and password accessible only by me. 
The data and information protection mechanisms were to avoid a third-party accessing 
them and to protect the participants’ information, maintain their privacy and 
confidentiality. I informed the participants that the research data and materials obtained 
from them would be retained in confidentiality for five years after the study and then 
destroyed. After five years, the recording devices will be destroyed, the data deleted from 
the computer, and the documents shredded. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I discussed the rationale for research design: inductive qualitative 
case study approach. The critical element in a qualitative study is the open-ended 
questions conducted via a semi-structured technique for which my role as the researcher 
was pivotal. My role was the principal instrument for data collection and, therefore, 
critical for the trustworthiness of the study. I discussed the other pertinent issues in 
research method including the pilot test, the recruitment of participants for the study, data 
collection methods, data analysis, and ethical issues. Important in this qualitative study 
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was establishing the study’s validity and credibility through trustworthiness and data 
management (White et al., 2012). 
In the next chapter, the focus is on conducting the actual study beginning with the 
pilot study and data collection including the setting for the interview protocol, and data 
analysis procedures. The chapter addresses how the pivotal issues of trustworthiness: 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability relevant to a qualitative 
study were met. Finally, the study addressed the issues of discrepant data because they 




Chapter 4: Findings 
Introduction 
The 2014 Ebola epidemic that started in the West African subregion reached the 
United States and created hysteria. The response from the medical community and the 
various levels of government revealed apparent disjointed policy towards potential 
biological attacks. The uncoordinated approach towards the epidemic and the fear that 
pathogens such as smallpox, anthrax, and Ebola could be weaponized demonstrated the 
need to examine the preparedness and response readiness of EMTs, who are the first 
medical responders when disasters strike. There was also the need to determine the best 
strategies for bioterrorism hardening.  The study sought to examine and understand the 
nature and level of bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs in New Jersey, for cutaneous 
forms of biological agents such as EVD, and the attendant policy and political 
implications of inadequate preparedness or a lack of preparedness. 
The research questions used for data collection were as follows: Are EMSOs and 
EMTs in the counties prepared for a cutaneous form of biological attack such as EVD? 
What are the policy and political implications of lack of preparedness? They were 
designed to examine the preparedness and emergency response practices of EMTs in a 
particular county and to identify factors New Jersey’s policymakers, and EMSOs would 
consider for bioterrorism preparedness within EMTs operations for community-wide 
bioterrorism hardening. The study examined the bioagent knowledge and preparedness of 
EMTs. I interviewed participants who were active EMTs during the 2014 Ebola epidemic 
to understand their knowledge of bioagents, bioterrorism preparedness, and practices in 
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their respective organizations. Furthermore, the research focused on the obstacles that 
affected EMTs’ readiness and what they believe should be the emergency response 
protocols for effective bioterrorism response practices. 
In this chapter, the participants’ information was transcribed and stored in a 
computer and the following areas were addressed: the pilot study, the participants’ 
recruitment process, data collection process, the participants’ interview response from 
which the themes emerged, data safeguards, data analysis, and the issues of 
trustworthiness. Following the data analysis, these eight themes emerged: adequate 
planning and preparedness, lack of resources, inadequate knowledge and information, 
continuous education, mandatory bioterrorism training, collaboration among agencies and 
safety and job security. 
Description of the Pilot Study 
I conducted a pilot study. I used two EMTs for the pilot study. The EMTs used for 
the pilot study were not included in the subsequent interviews for the actual research. The 
purpose of the pilot study was to help fine-tune the research instruments and determine if 
changes were needed. The two pilot study participants were interviewed in the evening 
between 6.00pm and 9.00pm. After administering the demographic survey information 
sheet, I determined that they met the requirements to participate in the study. I conducted 
face-to-face interviews with the pilot study participants. The pilot study had an impact on 
the substantive interview because it helped me to acquaint myself with how to use the 
data collection instruments: the tape recorder, the information sheet, and the delivery of 
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the interview questions. It turned out that no research instruments changes were needed, 
and the questions were adequate for the study. 
The Setting 
The venue for the interview of the participants was the respective meeting or 
conference rooms of the organizations that participated in the study. None of the research 
participants agreed to participate in the study outside of their respective organizations 
because they wanted the interviews conducted during their work shift hours. The 
organizations’ supervisors also agreed to that arrangement. The interviews were 
conducted in the evening between 4.00pm and 9.00pm. The reason for this was because 
most of the participants were either volunteers or had other daytime jobs and, therefore, 
reported to their respective emergency services assignments in the evening. 
The Demographics 
I used the organizations’ supervisors and managers to gain access to the research 
participants in their organizations. The participants were selected using  purposeful, 
snowball sampling technique. The organization supervisors acted as the point persons in 
each organization and were approved by the Walden University Institution Research 
Board (IRB). The data used in this study emanated from a total of 18 EMTs. I received 
the IRB authorization to use these organizations for the study. Six organizations were 
identified and approved by the IRB. Although six organizations were identified and 
selected for the study, only four EMSOs were used for the study. The additional two 
extra organizations were placed as buffers. In the event any selected organization 
dropped out of the study, one of the two additional organizations would be used as a 
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substitute. A total of 24 participants were also identified through emails but, 20 EMTs 
were accepted for the study. Two of the 20 participants were only used for the pilot study. 
The remaining four participants were not used for the study. 
The 18 participants for the study from the EMSO were selected because of their 
varied experiences in emergency responses, knowledge, and involvement in emergency 
response during the 2014 Ebola epidemic and after the epidemic. The number of 
participants in the youngest age group (25 to 29) was two while the participants in the 
oldest age bracket (42 years and above) were 12. The remainder of the 4 participants’ age 
brackets were in between. The huge number of participants above 42 years was an 
indication that most of the participants were very experienced in emergency medical 
services and they provided useful data for the study. The average age of emergency 
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Data Collection and Organization 
I conducted a face to face interviews of the participants. Four participants each 
were selected from two organizations while five participants each were from the other 
two organizations for a total of 18 participants. The participating organizations were 
located in New Jersey and the interviews were conducted between April 23, 2018, and 
June 25, 2018. I designed the interview questions (see Appendix C) to assist in answering 
the research questions. Data transcription was simultaneously done as the data mining 




The process of data collection began with the internet search for EMSOs. I 
identified about a dozen EMSOs. Next, I identified the community partners who were the 
EMSOs’ supervisors and managers by using the referral technique. I reached out to the 
county emergency medical preparedness coordinator who helped narrow down the 
potential organizations and gave me their respective addresses. He also provided the 
addresses, emails and phone numbers of the contact persons in the organizations. To 
reach to the contacts, I visited the organizations’ supervisors and discussed with them 
how they would assist the study. I later gave them the gatekeeper information form 
(Appendix D), and the Consent and Authorization Form (Appendix E) to review. Some 
of them required multiple visits. However, after reviewing the consent and authorization 
forms, they gave their consent by signing the Authorization Forms. The organizations’ 
conference rooms were the venues of the interviews. 
Some days, couple of interviews sessions were conducted in an organization the 
same day. In some other days, just one interview was conducted. It was practically 
impossible getting all participants at the same time or day. But the interviews were 
scheduled at a time most convenient for the participants and the organizations to avoid 
interrupting their workflow. Although the interview was scheduled to last about one hour, 
the average duration of the interview was about 30 minutes. The table 1 above shows the 
age distribution and average years of experience of the research participants drawn from 
the four research organizations. 
I used a semistructured interview technique for the data collection process. Each 
selected participant was emailed the cover letter (Appendix A) and the participants’ 
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demographic information survey sheet (Appendix B). After a review of the Appendix B, 
the qualified participants were emailed the consent form. However, the informed consent 
form was signed by the study participants before the start of the interview. I welcomed 
the participants and thanked them for agreeing to participate in the study. I also recapped 
in person the nature of the interview, the reason for the study, the benefit of the study, the 
security of the data, and protection of their privacy in accordance by the Belmont Report. 
I audio-taped the interview after obtaining their consent both verbally and in writing as 
contained in the consent form. These issues were covered in both the cover letter and the 
informed consent form. The study participants retained copies of the informed consent 
forms for their records while I took the original copies. 
The participants showed an eagerness to participate in the study. Some of them 
volunteered that the study was useful because it was a way of expressing their views to 
bring about changes in emergency medical preparedness and responses. One participant, 
in particular, stated that he is conducting a near similar study but with emphasis on 
explosives and response readiness of paramedics. 
After the interview, I reviewed and transcribed the information the participant 
provided. After the transcription, I reviewed the transcript with the participants, and they 
acknowledged that the data transcript accurately reflected the information they provided 
during the interview. The interview questions (See Appendix C) addressed the focus of 
the study and the research questions. The research participants were asked the same 
questions, and in some instances, follow-up questions were asked to ensure that the issues 
were properly addressed. 
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To ensure research material protection, interview materials including the 
recording devices and field notes were stored in a safe box and the information in the 
private computer encrypted and made password accessible only to me. This method of 
interview material protection ensured the participants’ privacy and confidentiality. After 
the validation of the interview transcripts with the participants, each participant data 
transcript was saved in word document individually and was later uploaded into the in 
vivo software for qualitative analysis. 
Data Analysis 
The primary data were drawn from the information provided by the EMTs, who 
were EMTs during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The in vivo software coding process was 
used to organize the uploaded external documents (interview transcript) and subsequent 
data analysis. Coding in this qualitative study was used primarily for the retrieval and 
categorization of similar data chunks (Matthew, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). In the 
analysis, I used the participants’ words or phrases to identify codes. The codes 
representing the participants’ words were clustered together to create categories, and the 
categories, in turn, helped show their interconnectivity. Initially, I created five nodes: 
planning and preparedness, lack of resources, continuous education, inadequate 
knowledge and mandatory bioterrorism hardening which were placed in categories. I 
placed matching transcripts into the corresponding nodes. 
Further review established precise patterns that resulted in more concise themes 
and the emergent of two additional themes: collaboration among agencies and safety and 
job security. All the seven themes were later placed in condensed categories. The 
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software in Vivo helped in organizing the unstructured data into a manageable format and 
identifying the themes that resonated with the study participants (Creswell, 2013; 
Creswell, 2015). 
Examples of the responses from the participants in response to the interview 
question (Appendix C) are illustrated here. From the interview question 1 the following 
codes were identified: training, prepared and adequate and standard response leading to 
the theme, planning, and preparedness under the category, understanding emergency 
practices. Some quotes from the participants illustrated the codes. (P4, O2) stated that 
“they are standard” and from (P2, O2) “overall, I will rate them adequate to slightly 
above adequate.” From the interview questions 2, 3, 4 and 9, the following codes were 
pronounced: funding/money, training, information sharing, insufficient knowledge, 
identifying pathogens and universal precautions and the themes, lack of resources, 
inadequate knowledge and information, and continuous education emerged under the 
category: impediments to bioterrorism preparedness. Some of the participants’ responses 
were significant. (P3, P3) responded “it comes down to two things: Money and the will. 
Everything costs money. The political will to do it. The last bioterrorism attack was about 
16 – 17 years ago. I do not know how many EMTs know what it is.” (P4, O2) states “the 
biggest obstacle is numbers. I think we do not have enough people adequately trained and 
prepared versus potentially the number of victims we can be faced with.” and (P1, O2) 
added “I do not see the bioterrorism preparedness resolve or training that l saw about ten 
years ago after the anthrax attacks. I think its declining. Public health, we are preparing 
but not like a decade ago.” 
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From the Interview Questions, 5 and 6 these codes were identified: training, 
awareness of diseases, Universal precautions, and safety leading to the theme, mandatory 
bioterrorism hardening under the category, understanding bioterrorism preparedness. 
Some of the participants’ responses to these questions included those by (P4, 01) “It does 
not prepare us at all. We only rely on what the state and the county tell us to do. If we get 
to a scene and have some sort of biological agent, we will kick it back to the state health 
department” and (P1, 02) added “The main thing is to maintain good universal 
precautions. We in EMS often are in a disadvantage. In my other life, I work in the 
hospital. In the hospital, if you walk to the door, there is a warning of the level of 
precaution you should take.” 
Finally, in response to Questions 7, 8, and 10, the study identified the following 
codes, regular drills, education, interagency coordination, training, funding, PPE, and 
information sharing. The emergent themes were collaboration among agencies and safety 
and job security under the category, enhancing bioterrorism preparedness and practices. 
Participants responses included the following: For Question. 8, (P1, O2) stated “There are 
not a lot of bioterrorism classes anymore. So, bioterrorism classes should be in included 
in the basic courses even if it is 30 minutes training. I know you are focused on 
bioterrorism, why not include chemical and other for forms WMD in the refresher 
courses so that people can maintain a high level of efficiency.” For Question 10, (P3, 02) 
responded “I think EMS, paramedics, fire, and police should be required to have WMD 
policy and procedures that are reviewed by everyone. Maintain their training and 
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maintain their efficiency. More training and maybe more access to more protective 
equipment specific to biological agents type of threats.” 
Discrepant data 
Most of the responses from the participants focused extensively on the questions 
asked, and that helped yield a large amount of relevant data that produced the themes 
discussed. In the few instances where the participants provided information that did not 
fully address the question, their responses, however, helped provide background 
information and knowledge. For instance, while answering the questions, very few 
deviated slightly in the middle of the response. As an illustration, in response to Question 
4: What knowledge do you have about cutaneous forms of pathogens such as Ebola?, (P4, 
03) gave answers that described his student life rather than his knowledge of pathogens. 
He talked a bit about his studies in emergency management at Jackson State University in 
Alabama. Although his studies in emergency management may help him in managing 
emergency responders when he graduates, he did not fully address his knowledge of 
pathogens such as Ebola. The participant’s answer had no relevance to understanding his 
knowledge of cutaneous forms of pathogens. 
The issues of Trustworthiness 
The trustworthiness of the study was reviewed and measured using the yardsticks 
of credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability. 
Credibility 
One major element of ensuring the credibility of a study is accurately reflecting 
the views of the participants. To achieve this, this study recorded the interview session, 
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transcribed the data verbatim, reviewed it with the participants for accurate representation 
of their information and diversity of the participants. Munn, Porritt, Lockwood, 
Aromataris, and Pearson (2014) noted that for a study to be deemed credible, the 
researcher must interpret the data in such a way that the interpretation aligns with the 
information the participants’ provided during the interview. Also, the participants met the 
requirements for participation and were active EMTs during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
The participants were also knowledgeable about the issue of emergency medical response 
and provided useful information. 
Transferability 
Although the study was conducted in one county, to ensure the transferability of 
the study, I provided a detailed description of the phenomena studied, participants’ 
recruitment process, and data collection process to ensure the study’s replicability in 
other settings or county. Part of the process of ensuring the transferability of the study 
was in clearly documenting the research process such as how the participants were 
selected to ensure that they were qualified, and the nature of their participation including 
not being paid. Criteria for participation were documented and reviewed with the 
participants before the interview. 
Dependability 
The processes involved in the study: research participants’ selection, data 
collection techniques, data transcription, data analysis, interpretation, and the reporting of 
the findings were documented as a way of measuring the consistency of the research 
design. The participants’ selection process was carefully done to ensure that the 
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participants were both knowledgeable and met the requirement for participation. A 
detailed audit trail was used to ensure that the study’s findings were dependable 
(Connelly, 2016). Audit trail involved accurate documentation of the process of the 
research process. Also, for the dependability of the findings, I ensured that the research 
questions, the purpose of the study, the research design and the study’s theoretical 
framework meshed. I also adopted the member-checking approach by returning to the 
participants with the transcribed data for data consistency. Only two of the study 
participants requested corrections to certain areas of the data transcript. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability as a measure of the objectivity of the study was ensured by 
accurately reflecting the information provided by the participants devoid of the views and 
biases of the researcher (Rapport et al., 2015). I collected the data and carefully 
documented the research process for independent replicability of the study and conducted 
member-checking with the participants for the accuracy of the data. Data triangulation 
was also used for the confirmability of the study. 
Results 
After the interview, I transcribed, member-checked the transcript and analyzed the 
data. The participants’ information during the interview established the relation between 
the central question and the theoretical framework (MST) from which several codes were 
identified, and the seven themes emerged. For instance, from the perspectives of the 
participants, the codes: training, awareness, personal protection equipment, universal 
precaution, and preparedness were identified as instrumental to understanding 
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bioterrorism preparedness leading to the emergent of the theme: mandatory bioterrorism 
hardening. The interview questions in conjunction with the theoretical framework and the 
literature review also helped in developing the four broad categories: understanding 
emergency responses and practices, barriers to bioterrorism preparedness, understanding 
bioterrorism preparedness and enhancing bioterrorism hardening.  Then I aligned the 
codes, themes and, categories with the research questions and the theoretical framework. 
Table 2 below shows the relationship between the codes (14), the themes (7), the 
categories (4). MST and the research questions. 
Table 2  
 
The relationship between codes, themes, categories and research questions. 
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To buttress the codes and themes, some of the participants’ exact information was 
reproduced along with the emergent themes during the explanation of the findings. Table 
3 showed the codes and their frequency of occurrences and Table 4 depicted study 
participants’ identifiers. 
Table 3 
Graphic Representation of the Themed Responses to the Interview Questions. 
 
S/No Codes Frequency % of 
occurrences 
1 Training 102 25.44 
2 Prepared and adequate  35 8.73 
3 Insufficient Knowledge 34 8.48 
4 Information sharing 32 7.98 
5 Awareness of diseases 29 7.23 
6 Education 27 6.73 
7 Personal protection equipment (PPE) 
maintenance 
23 5.74 
8 Money/Fund/Resources 23 5.74 
9 Regular drills 18 4.49 
10 Safety 18 4.49 
11 Identifying pathogens 17 4.24 
12 Universal precautions 16 3.99 
13 Standard response 15 3.74 
14 Inter-agency coordination 12 2.99 
 Total 401 100% 
 
The responses to the questions were varied, but they pointed to clear directions 
with constant phrases or words that led to the emergent of training, 
preparedness/prepared, knowledge and information as the dominant coded data. Almost 
all the participants were of the view that these codes training, knowledge and information 
sharing were needed for bioterrorism preparedness and hardening. Although the safety 
concern was not as dominant as some other codes, the participants believed that safety 
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issues such as adopting universal precautions were crucial to effective emergency 
response. For instance, on Question 5, Participant 1, Organization 3 (P5, 03) stated: 
“Again, it goes back to our basic training. That our safety is first and foremost in our 
response. So, to know what we are going into is always very important.” P5, O5 shared a 
similar thought when he stated “once you get there, you have to make sure the scene is 
safe. Most importantly, the safety of your crew is most important.” Similarly, despite the 
overall lack of adequate knowledge of bioagents among the participants, four participants 
(P1,O2; P3,O4; P1,O4, and P4, O3) expressed adequate or partial knowledge of bioagents 
because of their other full-time jobs in the hospitals unlike their volunteer or paid 
colleagues who lacked such knowledge. 
Table 4  
The participants identification markers 
S/N Organization 1 (O1) Organization 2 (O2 Organization 3 (O3) Organization 4 (O4) 
1 Participant 1 (P1) Participant 1 (P1) Participant 1 (P1) Participant 1 (P1) 
2 Participant 2 (P2) Participant 2 (P2) Participant 2 (P2) Participant 2 (P2) 
3 Participant 3 (P3) Participant 3 (P3) Participant 3 (P3) Participant 3 (P3) 
4 Participant 4 (P4) Participant 4 (P4) Participant 4 (P4) Participant 4 (P4) 




Illustration of table 4. The organizations and the research participants were not 
identified by name. They were assigned identifiers as Table 4 shows. For instance, the 
first organization was identified as organization 1 and the first participant interviewed in 
organization 1 was identified as participant 1 and abbreviated thus P1, O1. The 
identification followed that trend until the last organization (O4) and the last participant 
of the organization (P5) abbreviated thus (P5, O4). 
Summary of the findings: 
The following are the initial summary of the findings based on the codes, 
emergent themes, the research questions, and the critical aspects of MST: problem 
stream, politics stream, and policy stream. 
1. Despite the 2001 anthrax incidents and the 2014 Ebola epidemic, there was an 
apparent lack of sustained bioterrorism preparedness although the emergency 
organizations were prepared for other emergencies (Problem stream). 
2.  Although the problems existed, there was a heightened level of caution and 
emphasis on universal precaution and safety which are critical to any 
emergency response (Politics stream). 
3. The participants believed that increased funding, inter-agency collaboration, 
drills (training) and continuous bioterrorism awareness and preparedness were 
needed for a new approach towards bioterrorism hardening (Policy stream). 
The presentation of the themes and the responses from a cross-section of the 
participants helped paint a picture of the current emergency medical responses and 




I found that the impediments to bioterrorism preparedness included lack of 
resources, inadequate knowledge, and insufficient information sharing and continuous 
education. In other to address these problems, the finding supported the need for adequate 
funding, increased training and information among emergency medical responders. 
Theme 1: Lack of resources 
Question 2: How would you describe the preparedness practices in your organization for 
biological attacks especially after the 2014 Ebola epidemic? 
Lack of resources emerged from the participants’ references to money/funding, 
and training in the context of lack or inadequate training were mention multiple times 
while responding to the interview Questions 2. Almost all the participants mentioned 
training in some way while responding to most of the questions. Hence, training was 
mentioned most: 102 times representing 25.44 percent of the codes. Lack of funding was 
mentioned 23 times representing 5.74 percent of the entire codes as illustrated in Table 3. 
Lack of or inadequate funding was the seventh most mentioned code. This suggests that it 
was a critical issue among the participants for effective emergency response and their 
safety. On Question 2, P1, O3 stated that “Again, I will say we are above average. Like 
most other agencies of our size, some of it is hampered for monetary reasons. But for the 
most part, I will say that we are above average if not over an average for agencies of our 
size.” I followed up the response with this question: “You said hampered by monetary 
reason, how can you explain that?” He responded, “Just that it is an expensive continual 
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process to make sure we are staffed with particularly up to date PPE that we can find. 
Unfortunately, that stuff expires. So, the need to replace it comes into play.” 
Two participants particularly mentioned “poor” in describing their organizations’ 
bioterrorism preparedness. Pushed further for explanation, P4, O1, stated that lack of 
education was responsible for the inadequate preparedness which was traceable to poor 
funding. Lack of education presupposed poor knowledge of bioagents and bioterrorism 
mitigation protocols. P4, O3 stated “We have fit-tested with N-95 mask. Certain 
members of my organization have been fit-tested for a full CBRNE mask. We were fit-
tested once. We never received training on the equipment. Majority of the people never 
received training on the equipment. There is no annual training to do that. And, I know 
that it is crucial. A lot of that is due to funding and manpower.” Similarly, O4, P3, 
informed that “not every person is trained to the same level for biological response (or) 
has the same level knowledge of the appropriate PPE necessary to respond to a biological 
attack.” Others noted that they neither conducted drills nor trained for bioterrorism or 
bioagents They trained rather for improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 
Similarly, information from the participants noted that the heightened awareness 
and precautionary measures of biological agents during and immediate years after the 
Ebola epidemic but as the threat went down the awareness level dropped. These 
observations were linked to insufficient knowledge of bioagents and inadequate training 
and preparedness for bioterrorism. 
Theme 2: Continuous education 
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Question 3: How will the knowledge of bioagents help you in emergency responses that 
involve cutaneous diseases? 
Question 4: What knowledge do you have about cutaneous forms of pathogens such as 
Ebola? 
Both questions were interrelated, and the responses from the 18 participants led to 
the theme: continuous education. The responses of the participants point to the lack of 
adequate knowledge of pathogens. Although, they recognized the importance of such 
knowledge for their safety and their families. The participants recognized the importance 
of training and regular education to identify and separate pathogens when responding to 
disaster scenes. On Question 3, P4, O1 responded that “I mean, it is not something you 
will suspect immediately you walk to the scene. Ok, this person is exposed to anthrax. I 
mean, effectively identifying it. Obviously, you will need a lot of training in that. Or 
somebody else exposed outside to something that could be airborne, you will know 
immediately, ok, this is what I want to do to effectively treat this patient and then contact 
medical control.” 
P5, O1 stated knowing “how to identify certain biological agents, anthrax versus 
Ebola versus smallpox to normal things that are still contagious. Small things like lice 
that are more common and treatable than biological agents. So, it starts with the simple 
things to the more severe things. So, knowing biological agents and the training will 
enable us to respond, treat and continue treating, and (know) how to prepare, if the 
knowledge is there.” P2, O3 responded, “Well, that was one of the things we learned after 
Ebola outbreak. We were educated on certain things like Ebola, scarlet fever, a lot of 
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highly contagious diseases that we may have passed over were made aware of. We 
focused on re-educating the people. Like it became more apparent that ok, back in the 
day, you get a little vomit, you clean it up. But training and education are not done.” One 
particular participant (P2, O2), alluded to acquiring his knowledge of pathogens from 
fictional books in response to question 4. He stated, “Minimum knowledge. Just what I 
have read in magazines, periodicals. I read about a Tom Clancy novel called Executives 
Orders (A fictional novel). The way they described the disease was interesting and 
similar to what I have read about germs.” Responses to these questions reveal the 
concerns of the participants because as the years pass their acquired knowledge declined, 
and their safety and performance become compromised. 
There was also the concern that effective performance of their job will have a lot 
to do with the public having education and information on what they are reporting. In 
particular, one participant (P1, O3), expressed the need for public education because of 
its pivotal role in information dissemination to responders which will help in effective 
emergency response and the protection of EMTs: “I think better educating the public. 
There are many times that we will only have the information that is giving to our 
dispatchers. I think the more people have a better understanding and education of 
incidents like this; they will be better able to convey that information to our dispatchers 
who will then give us better information. So, the public help end of it is a major 
problem.” So, in this instance, it is not only about educating the emergency responders, 
but it also about educating the public so that EMTs can be better prepared to protect 
themselves and the community. 
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Theme 3: Inadequate knowledge and information 
Question 9: What would you say are the major obstacles for an effective emergency 
response involving infectious diseases? 
This theme emerged out of the general feeling among the participants that in spite 
of the amount of preparedness for bioterrorism immediately after the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic, no concerted effort was made to sustain the level. Now and then the 
participants went back to the issues of inadequate funding, lack of knowledge and 
insufficient information sharing either with the public or among the other emergency 
responders. The major codes that contributed to this theme were knowledge (34) and 
information (32) representing 16.46 percent of the total occurrences. They were among 
the top five occurrences. These occurrences illustrated their importance regarding getting 
the emergency responders prepared. Excerpts from the participants will further support 
this assertion. P3, O2, in response to Question 9 said, “The major obstacle is poor 
communication between departments. Sometimes, the information they relay to the police 
department is not always passed down to emergency medical services because when 
people call 911, the first person they speak to is the police. And as the information gets 
transferred, sometimes you lose some of the information along the way.” P2, O3 
expressed the same sentiment: “I will say the first line is the dispatch. This is very vague. 
You do not know what you are walking into. The first problem starts with the dispatch. 
When the information is not clear, the responders are in the dark about what to expect, 
and that has a great impact on EMTs’ safety and preparedness.” And she added “people 
who are calling in 911, they do not answer all the questions and are not paying attention. 
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They hang up. Also, with the Pro QUA, you cannot rely on. It is like a kind of catch 22 
because you cannot rely on the people at the end of the phone because they are too 
confused to answer.” 
But one common theme by the participants is the lack or at best, minimum 
knowledge of biological agents. P1, O1 stated that “The biggest thing is knowing what 
the disease is” when asked about the obstacles in responding to potential emergencies 
involving infectious disease. The lack of knowledge was pervasive in most of the 
responses from the other participants. P3, 04, in response to Question 9 stated, “Lack of 
support for training. Lack of knowledge.” I then asked a follow-up question: When you 
say lack of knowledge, what do you mean? He offered this clarification: “Lack of 
knowledge on how to protect yourself to that level. And the fear of saying that your 
organization is not prepared to respond to that kind of incident, you do not want to make 
that public.” Other participants, while acknowledging the improved preparedness in many 
areas of emergency responses are concerned that there is laxity in preparedness for 
biological attacks because it is seen as a rarity. However, one participant noted the 
potential weaponization of not just the pathogens, but the wastes derived from patients 
infected with Ebola if they are not properly disposed to avoid secondary infectious. Some 
participants expressed the notion that the issue of bioterrorism is alien to them but noted 
the need to prepare for it. P5, O4 said “I think one of the obstacles is the state not having 
enough classes or courses to keep members sufficiently educated on things that pop-up 
that is new. I think there is enough knowledge about Ebola from the last outbreak. But, 
like you said, if they are inventing Ebola-pox biological agent. I think the state has to 
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look at that and how do we protect EMTs and first responders who will be the first on the 
scene to treat these people. So, I think we really need to push the state for more courses, 
more awareness for EMTs, or classes.” 
Having more classes at regular intervals had a lot to do with funding. And the 
funds appear not there. For example, P1, O4, in response to question 9 echoed the 
sentiment of many participants: “I will say money. It will be the top obstacle there. 
Personnel dedicated to learning how to train people and implementing such training in 
organizations.” One participant (P2, O1) particularly mentioned that the lack of resources 
was responsible for the many emergency organizations making extensive use of 
volunteers. The use of volunteers, he noted has its drawbacks because the volunteers do 
not have as much time as regular paid EMTs to train and acquire more knowledge. 
Of the 18 participants, only four expressed a fair working knowledge of 
pathogens and how to handle them if they have to respond to bioterrorism. These 
assertations were in spite of the county’s all Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2008 and the 
reviewed and revised version in 2015. 
Politics Stream: 
One thing was clear: EMTs were adequately knowledgeable and trained for most 
emergencies besides emergency responses that involve biological agents. But developing 
effective emergency response practices would build bioterrorism hardening among first 
responders. 
Theme 4: Adequate planning and preparedness 




Concerning Question 1, almost, every participant expressed better preparedness 
before and after the Ebola epidemic for general emergency responses. The contributing 
sources were training, prepared and standard response. Prepared and adequate were 
mentioned 35 times (the second highest occurrence: 8.73 percent), and standard response 
represented 3.74 percent (15 occurrences). They noted the increased preparedness for 
infectious diseases responses during and the immediate years after the 2014 epidemic. 
But the bioagent preparedness and awareness level have steadily declined because Ebola 
threat no longer existed. P2, O3 stated “We have learned a lot, especially after the Ebola 
outbreak. They have gotten us more prepared. Before we were dropping the ball. We are 
a lot prepared.” 
P2, O1 expressed a similar sentiment: “everyone had training and awareness was 
heightened at that time.” This concern was a general trend among many participants. It is 
instructive that most of the participants expressed above average or adequate 
preparedness for emergency responses. But the responses changed when the question is 
on preparedness for biological attacks (Question 2), especially after the Ebola epidemic. 
P2, O2, informed that “…since they epidemic disappeared. There has been no refresher 
training. It has not been in the media. It has fallen by the wayside.” P3, O1 spoke in the 
same vein for Q1: “We are adequate. I am a volunteer. We are pretty educated. We have 




Further, P5, O1 echoed the sentiment of P3, O1 when he responded to Q1 this 
way: “Our current emergency response is in accordance with standard operating 
procedure (SOP). We are only trained at awareness level to know how to identify and 
stay safe until the appropriate personal gets there.” P1, O3, when asked to describe their 
preparation for an emergency response said, “it is above average.” 
Theme 5: Mandatory bioterrorism training 
Question 5: How do your emergency response protocols prepare you for potential 
bioagent or biological attacks? 
Question 6: What kind of preparedness and training do you need for disaster response? 
The participants, in general, called for more training in bioterrorism preparedness. 
Their suggestions allied with their responses in Questions 1 and 2 that while EMTs’ 
emergency response, practices, and knowledge were above average in most areas of 
emergency response, they were below average when it came to bioterrorism 
preparedness. The contributing sources for this theme were training, awareness of WMD 
(29 occurrences:7.23 percent), the safety of the responders (18 occurrences: 4.49 percent) 
and universal precaution (16 occurrences: 3.99 percent). The codes operating within the 
politics stream contributed to the theme, mandatory bioterrorism hardening and were 
useful in understanding bioterrorism preparedness. 
Excerpts from the participant: On bioterrorism preparedness P4, O1 emphatically 
stated: “It does not prepare us at all.” In response to Question 5, P4, O2 unequivocally 
stated “Again, it all comes down to training and awareness preparedness.” Similarly, on 
Question 5, P2, O2 provided this response “And, we do need more Hazmat awareness 
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training. It is good to have Hazmat knowledge and the steps you can take to protect 
yourself and not just knowing that it is bad.” Another participant added, “again, it goes 
back to our basic training. That our safety is first and foremost in our response.” On 
Question 6, the participant responded, “again, a lot of it is mostly awareness recognition 
and reaction.” P1, O2 spoke in the same vein when he stated, “You should have WMD 
awareness which I believe is now part of the basic EMT curriculum.” And further added, 
“The main thing is to maintain good universal precautions.” Another participant’s 
response to Question 6 included this response, “we need a mandatory requirement of 
being trained at least, in the minimum, the CBRNE awareness, and operations every two 
years along with Hazmat awareness and operations.” 
Another participant, P2, O3, stated the urgency for “the standard training 
throughout the different agencies in the area. If we have one standardized training, police, 
fire EMS, they all go for the same training.” P4, O3 when asked Question 6 stated “try to 
make people aware of what they may be going into, what kind of pathogens they may 
come upon, what steps they can take to prevent exposures as much as possible. Again, 
paramount is their safety first.” Finally, P4, O1 concluded that “I think we do more 
preparation for mass casualty than we do for anything else per injury-wise.” And that 
‘anything else’ includes, lack of bioterrorism preparedness. 
Policy Stream: 
Participants noted that in addition to other emergency response practices, there is 
a need for increased interagency collaborations and enhanced safety measures when 
responding to emergencies. These measures would increase EMTs’ willingness to 
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respond to emergencies including bioterrorism. However, achieving these measures 
would require political will among policymakers. 
Theme 6: Collaboration Among Agencies 
Question 7: What areas of training or tools do you think you will need for effective 
bioterrorism and emergency response? 
Question 8: What other suggestion would you proffer for adequate bioterrorism and 
infectious disease response by emergency medical responders? 
Some factors that participants suggested will help improve emergency responses 
are intra-and interagency collaboration and training. These are training among emergency 
organizations and training between EMSOs and other first responders such as the Police 
and the fire fighters. Other contributing sources for this theme include drills, PPE and 
information sharing among the agencies. Specifically, drills, PPE, and collaboration had a 
total of 53 sources which amounted to 15.22% of the occurrences. Excerpts from the 
participants illustrated this point. Participant 2, Organization 3 (P2, O3) noted that “we 
will need mass drills, with everybody involved, your police, your fire, your EMS, your 
port authority and mass transit police. Mass training (and) drills spread throughout, 
classroom education you know, throughout the different agencies the same throughout 
the state. So that everybody is on the same page.” Similarly, P3, O4 responded to 
Question 7, “You need hazmat awareness which is required by the state, is also required 
to be refreshed every year. You also need training for a biological response; you 
definitely need PPE training on donning and duffing techniques and need to conduct 
drills to practice doing it.” P2, O3 responded to Question 7 thus in part: “I guess training 
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and drills. If there are new things out there, it should be put together, even if it is a power 
point, whatever. It should be done throughout the multi-agency. Like it got to be the same 
throughout.” P2, O1 gave almost similar responses to Questions 7 and 8. She stated 
“Clearly, training on bioterrorism. Emergency response, you have to practice. Practicing 
(that is drilling) is a big part of emergency response at least yearly to keep up with the 
certification”  (Question 7) and to Question 8 added: “The suggestion I will proffer to 
handle bioterrorism disease responses would be basically training. And not just training 
once. But practicing and keeping everyone up to date with what to do and how to do it.” 
To Question 8, P1, O3 responded “there should be easy access to protective gear, 
to training, education that does not hamper the overall response of the agency because we 
cannot afford it. Definitely, more money to every aspect of the response will be helpful.” 
P4, O3 was even more blunt, “for everybody to be on the same page and have one standard 
throughout the state. Whether you are a volunteer or paid, everybody meets the same 
requirement from one agency to the next. We all have to have the same standard. I know 
some agencies do not even fit-test for N-95 Mask for tuberculosis patients. Other agencies 
bluntly say if it is this kind of patient, we will call another squad.” The responses from the 
participants demonstrated the importance of drills, PPE, training, and collaboration to 
enhance bioterrorism preparedness and practices. 
Theme 7: Safety and Job Security 




Safety was a common decimal among most responders either regarding 
preparedness to help a victim or a patient and in responding to disaster situations. The 
main contributing sources for this theme are training, education and information sharing. 
For instance, Participant 5, Organization 4 (P5, O4) in response to Question 10, was 
particular about the manner many EMTs respond to a disaster situation, often with 
minimal regards to safety on the road. He expressed concern that EMTs when responding 
to calls, drive to the areas without obeying traffic lights, “I think there could be policy 
changes. Based on something as simple as responding to a scene. There has been a lot of 
talk about ambulances speeding, running through red lights, not obeying stop signs.” P1, 
03, was also of the view that information is central to better emergency response and 
suggested policy changes in that area: “The big part is information. We respond to what 
information we are given. So, the better our information, the better it all works out.” P2, 
O2 said the issue of job security could impact on both the response effectiveness and 
retention of experienced staff. He stated: “mandate policy changes that almost place 
EMTs at the same level as the National Guard for public safety. Training times should be 
used without any repercussion.” 
Almost all the participants suggested the need for policy changes in the area of 
continuing training and education for the safety of the EMTs and their families in the event 
of a biological attack. The training will help them to recognize pathogens. P4, O3 stated 
that “not all of them have the same level of equipment. Not all of them meet the same 
mandate. Everybody needs to have the same type of training.” He noted the danger of 
EMTs’ not recognizing pathogens and not being cautious and end up taking the disease to 
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their families. He added “But it should recognize that this a very contagious disease. Let 
me start by contacting the hospital. I have already been home with my family twice. That 
is horrible. We should be able to recognize them.” P5, O1, response to question 10: “there 
needs to be a mandatory level of training in this area as well as many. But this area is 
specific. We do online classes for chemical or what we call CBRNE training. But, I think 
it needs to go another step further on it and have just more scenario-based training in 
person.” P4, O1 similarly responded to the same question this way, “It goes back to training 
and communication between the various health departments as far as, the trickle-down 
effect of getting out information down to the people faster.” He added: “in fact, not just us. 
It has to involve the fire department, police department, health departments. Everybody 
has to be coordinated. That is, dissemination of information.” And P2, O2 in response 
stated, “Grants for training to obtain classes perhaps policies particularly for volunteers; 
policies that allow employees to allow EMTs especially for volunteers to attend 2 week or 
2 years degree program classes and still keep their jobs. Mandate policy changes that 
almost place EMTs at the same level as the National Guard for public safety. Training 
times should be used without any repercussion. It should be a policy.” 
Summary 
One thing most of the participants stated was that before the 2001 anthrax attacks, 
there was next to zero knowledge of pathogens as potential weapons for biological 
attacks. That changed after the anthrax attacks. But they also added that few years 
following the anthrax attacks, training, and preparedness for biological attacks were 
regularly done. But the training declined years later until the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The 
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trend regarding gradual decline for bioterrorism preparedness also manifested and the 
trend continued in the immediate years after the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
This chapter discussed the emergency response preparedness and practices among 
EMTs, the factors that affected effective bioterrorism readiness and response. It also 
described the implications for inadequate preparedness for biological agents if 
weaponized. The research questions were designed to understand the current 
preparedness practices and discover ways to improve their emergency response, 
especially for bioterrorism. Consequently, seven themes emerged based on the outcome 
of the information gathered from the research participants. Two constant themes garnered 
from the data were the inadequate knowledge of biological agents and lack of resources 
(funds and human resources). The implications of lack knowledge and inadequate 
funding for bioterrorism preparedness would be increased vulnerability of EMTs, first 
responders and the public. 
The other five themes were: Continuous education, Adequate planning and 
preparedness, Mandatory bioterrorism training, Collaboration among agencies, and 
Safety and job security. The participants’ responses to the interview questions revealed 
insights into their emergency response practices and the dangers they confront when they 
respond to emergency calls. Also, the participants indicated the need to explore ways to 




In the next chapter, I discuss the research findings, identify the limitations of the 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Introduction: 
The threat of bioterrorism was an issue that captured the attention of policymakers 
and the general public in the United States following the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa and its manifestation in the United States. The apparent unpreparedness for such 
infectious diseases in the United States was seen in the uncoordinated responses from the 
healthcare community and the various levels of government which further created 
hysteria in the population (Olliaro et al., 2015). This study sought to understand the 
bioterrorism preparedness and practices among EMTs who are among the front-line 
health-care providers in the event of emergencies and biological attacks (CDC, 2000). 
The study focused on EMTs within a particular county in New Jersey and their 
bioterrorism preparedness and practices to discover areas of improvement. Data were 
collected via audio recorder in a face-to-face interview and recorded. The research 
participants were asked open-ended questions. The study participants met the 
participation requirement that included a minimum age of 25 and active EMT status 
during the Ebola epidemic. The EMTs were selected from the EMSOs using the 
purposeful sampling technique. 
The data collected were transcribed and coded. Accurate transcription of the data 
and member-checking of the transcribed data ensured the trustworthiness of the findings. 
Two of the study participants identified areas of corrections which were rectified. The 
process of member-checking helped the study in ensuring that the transcript accurately 
reflected the information participants provided during the interview (Houghton et al., 
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2013). After the member-checking process, the data were analyzed and coded. The coded 
and analyzed data showed that the major issues militating against adequate bioterrorism 
preparedness included inadequate funding, lack of adequate knowledge of biological 
agents, and lack of continuous education and training among EMTs. Data analysis 
identified the following themes: planning and preparedness, lack of resources; inadequate 
knowledge & information; continuous education, mandatory bioterrorism hardening, 
collaboration among agencies and safety and job security. The themes aligned with the 
study’s theoretical framework of multiple stream theory (MST) and helped answer the 
research questions. Next, I discuss the purpose and nature of the study, a summary of the 
findings, limitations of the study, interpretation of the study findings, study 
recommendations and the recommendations’ implications for social change. 
Purpose and Nature of the Study 
The study examined bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs in a New Jersey 
county to understand the nature and level of their preparedness for cutaneous forms of 
biological agents such as Ebola and to understand the policy and political implications for 
lack of or inadequate bioterrorism preparedness. The study also sought to identify 
strategies for improving bioterrorism hardening among EMTs and community-wide 
bioterrorism readiness that is different from the current preparedness plans, policies or 
programs. 
Summary of the Findings 
Part of the goal of this study was to understand EMTs’ knowledge and awareness 
level of biological agents. Despite the preparedness strategies in place before and after 
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the 2001 anthrax attacks, including the HMP of 2015, the study found inadequate 
bioterrorism preparedness practices among EMTs interviewed for the study. This 
unpreparedness was evident in the participants’ insufficient knowledge and awareness of 
most infectious diseases, including Ebola. On the other hand, the study found that EMTs 
were more prepared for other emergency medical situations than for bioterrorism or 
infectious disease epidemic. Despite the above findings, the study demonstrated that the 
2014 Ebola epidemic created the awareness and urgency for bioterrorism preparedness 
practices especially in the immediate years after 2014. However, as the study also 
revealed, the heightened awareness of the potential use of bioagents for terrorism and the 
increased bioterrorism preparedness level were not sustained in the subsequent years after 
the Ebola epidemic. Conversely, the study found that despite the inadequate knowledge 
of bioagents and lack of continuous education for bioterrorism preparedness among 
EMTs, there was heightened safety precaution among the EMTs. As a result, EMTs, as a 
rule, applied more stringently the universal precautions, which emphasized personal 
protection to avoid contact with blood, bodily fluid or other potentially infectious 
materials when responding to emergencies (USDOL-OSHA, n.d.). 
Finally, the study showed that interagency collaborations, constant drills 
(training), and biological agents’ knowledge were critical to bioterrorism hardening but 
were hampered by inadequate funding. And, some of the emergency agencies were 
funded by private donations which often were not adequate and regular. Of the 18 study 
participants, 12 participants in response to Questions 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 mentioned 
interagency collaboration in the areas of joint drills, information sharing and interagency 
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coordination as critical to bioterrorism hardening. All the 18 participants mentioned 
regular training in all the interview questions as the most critical element in bioterrorism 
hardening. The four codes (regular training, interagency collaborations, constant drills, 
and insufficient knowledge) out of the 14 codes represented 41.39% of the occurrences 
(198) of the codes. These aligned with the problem and policy streams of the MST that 
affirms the emergence of policies from problematic situations with the influence of the 
politics stream. 
Some of the findings were consistent with some suggestions and scenarios found 
in the literature whether for emergencies or bioterrorism: that regular training and 
continuous knowledge acquisition of bioagents were critical to HCWs’ readiness, 
effectiveness, confidence to work, and avoidance of secondary infections (Aghaei and 
Nesami, 2013; Kabir et al., 2016; MacIntyre, 2015; Taschner et al. 2016). 
Interpretation of the Findings 
In this section, I interpreted the study findings based on the themes that emerged 
and their relationship to the research questions and the theoretical framework of MST. 
The common denominators among the EMTs were the need for continuous education to 
acquire and update knowledge and hands-on training (drills) similar to tabletop scenarios 
that mimic real-life situations for bioterrorism hardening (Aghaei & Nesami, 2013). The 
findings confirmed the influence of clear actions towards bioterrorism preparedness 
necessary for bioterrorism hardening. The study findings affirmed the main tenet of MST 
that windows of opportunity are necessary for the emergence of new solutions to a 
problem. The findings also confirmed previous studies that preparedness is critical to 
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mitigating the effecting of bioterrorism and avoiding secondary infections among 
emergency workers (Eddy & Sase, 2015). But these studies were not specific to 
cutaneous pathogens and did not focus on EMTs. Bioterrorism preparedness actions 
included continuous education, training and drills (Kabir et al., 2016; Olson et al., 2014; 
Waldrop et al., 2014). This study added to knowledge because it was a post-Ebola study 
that recognized the missed opportunity of using the Ebola epidemic to assess EMTs and 
HCWs’ preparedness for HIDs and bioagents (Taylor, 2015). 
The research questions used for data collection were: Are EMSOs and EMTs in 
New Jersey prepared for a cutaneous form of biological attack such as EVD? What are 
the policy and political implications of lack of preparedness? The overwhelming 
revelations that emerged from the research interviews were that a majority of the EMTs 
were not prepared for bioterrorism attacks. The unpreparedness for bioterrorism was 
evident despite the all-Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) and the vulnerability of New 
Jersey to HIDs due to its geographic and demographic characteristics (ECOEM, 2018). 
The study also found that although regular drills and bioagents knowledge were needed 
the county and communities lacked the funds to execute them. For instance, of the 18 
study participants, only two demonstrated adequate knowledge of biological agents 
which they attributed to training. Another two participants demonstrated fair knowledge 
of biological agents. The two participants with adequate knowledge of biological agents 
stated that they took courses and training in bioagents identification and response 
following the 2001 anthrax attacks. 
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The data and revelations from the study aligned with the two broad aspects of the 
research question and the theoretical framework of MST as demonstrated by the four 
broad categories identified in chapter 4. The categories identified were understanding 
emergency practices, impediments to bioterrorism preparedness, understanding 
bioterrorism Preparedness, and enhancing bioterrorism preparedness and practices. The 
themes that emerged also aligned with what the research questions set out to find: To 
understand the bioterrorism readiness of EMTs in New Jersey and the policy implications 
of lack of preparedness. The themes that emerged were discussed below in their order of 
occurrences and categorizations. 
Category 1: Understanding Emergency Practices 
Theme 4: Planning and Preparedness 
The study intended to examine and understand the bioterrorism readiness of 
EMTs. However, the first interview question was about EMTs preparedness for general 
emergencies not necessarily specific to bioterrorism. A majority of the EMTs interviewed 
(16) indicated adequate preparedness for emergencies but not for bioterrorism in response 
to interview Question 1: How would you describe the existing emergency response 
practices in your organization? The remaining two participants stated that they were 
adequately prepared for both bioterrorism and general emergencies responses. The theme 
emerged following the EMTs’ responses to the question, their respective years of 
experience responding to emergencies and the steps taking by their respective 
management teams to equip them as a result of the all-Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMP). 
Part of the goal of the HMP was to create “a more sustainable-resistant community.” 
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(ECOEM, 2015) They used words such as trained, prepared, an adequate and standard 
response to describe their preparedness for medical emergencies but not for bioterrorism 
preparedness. The collateral consequence of preparedness for a medical emergency is the 
willingness to respond to all-hazard emergencies as the study by Barnett et al. (2012) 
found with little or no hesitation. This finding also supported an earlier study that 
established the relationship between preparedness (training, education, and practices) and 
emergency responses (Waldrop et al., 2014). 
This finding is equally significant because it partially agreed with the current 
literature including Cinturati, 2014; Gursky & Bice, 2013; Lall et al., 2017 and Stratton, 
2014) about preparedness among some HCWs for all forms of terrorism preparedness 
including bioterrorism but not within the EMTs population of HCWs. In the literature, 
preparedness or public health emergency preparedness and response (PHEPR) 
presupposed getting ready for the unknown happening, preventing the occurrence of 
emergency situations, and planning to respond appropriately to mitigate the effect of the 
emergency (Hedman, Knutsson, Ansell, Radstrom, & Rasmusson, 2013; Washington 
State Department of Health, 2016). All the study participants expressed their emergencies 
response readiness as NIMS outlined: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. 
This preparedness readiness was lacking when it came to bioterrorism among EMTs 
principally because of their lack of adequate knowledge of biological agents. And, the 
lack of knowledge was a consequence of inadequate training occasioned by insufficient 
funding of EMSOs. 
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 All the 18 participants stated adequate preparedness for their everyday 
emergency responses. But when asked about bioterrorism preparedness, 14 study 
participants expressed inadequacy, two participants stated little knowledge and two 
expressed adequate knowledge of biological agents. However, most study participants 
(16 out of the 18 participants) agreed that during and immediately after the Ebola 
epidemic there was a heightened awareness of the disease and readiness for potential 
epidemics as recommended by the CDC. But that awareness and readiness level declined 
as the years passed by. The decline in readiness and knowledge was due to the 
unavailability of funds to organize regular training, drills and continuous classroom-
based education of EMTs. The collateral consequences of this decline in readiness have 
increased the vulnerability of EMTs, heightened the risk of secondary infections, and 
increased community-wide vulnerability bioterrorism and HIDs. 
Preparedness for an emergency was linked to the frequency of responses to such 
emergencies unlike the rare responses to biological attacks or epidemics from bioagents 
such as the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Overall, from the perspective of the study participants, 
they were ready for emergencies such as medical, fire, natural disasters and accidents and 
that was affirmed by choice of words such as “prepared” and “adequately prepared” to 
describe their comfort level. Both codes were repeated 35 times representing 8.73% of 
the occurrences of the entire codes. Why did the awareness level and preparedness for 
bioterrorism decline in the years following the 2014 Ebola epidemic? The answer is 
found in the findings of the study. EMTs and EMOSs removed from the major cities 
believed that the threat no longer existed after the 2014 Ebola epidemic and that they 
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were remote targets for biological attacks. Although, on the face value, some of the cities 
where these EMSOs and EMTs operated may be unlikely targets, but their proximity to 
major cities such as the City of Newark made them vulnerable to potential biological 
attacks. There is, therefore, the need to adequately prepare against bioterrorism whether 
the EMTs are located in the major cities or the suburbs. 
The problem of inadequate bioterrorism preparedness can be addressed by 
incorporating bioterrorism preparedness as part of regular emergency response readiness 
and recertification programs, and these suggestions correlate with kingdon’s MS theory. 
The theory posits that in certain situations, to solve a problem, policymakers may 
advance urgent decisions from competing proposals to deal with a problem (Kingdon, 
1984). In this instance, the 2014 Ebola epidemic revealed inadequate knowledge of 
bioagents by EMTs and inadequate preparedness for bioterrorism (problem stream). The 
data from the interview showed these problems could be addressed through any or a 
combination of the competing solutions or proposals including regular drills, adequate 
funding, continuous education and regular inter-agency training and collaboration (policy 
stream). 
In the literature, it was clear that the lack of knowledge of bioagents was a 
problem that needed to be addressed for bioterrorism hardening among EMTs. It was also 
part of the problem that the 2008 and 2015 County HMPs intended to solve. The 2015 
HMP is a hazard mitigation program that aligns with the politics stream as well. How 
EMTs understand and incorporate the strategies contained in the HMP will be critical to 
enhancing bioterrorism hardening. The convergence of these two streams (problem and 
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policy streams) opened up the window of opportunity for policymakers and 
administrators to advance proposals as political decisions (politics stream) to harden 
EMTs. The finding furthered knowledge because it demonstrated that the emergency 
response readiness could be replicated in bioterrorism situations if policymakers showed 
willingness and courage to make needed policy changes as the three streams converge 
through the window of opportunity. 
Category 2: Impediments to Bioterrorism Preparedness 
Passi et al. (2015) observed that part of the challenge in containing Ebola included 
lack of knowledge of the virus, institutional failings of the health system, and lack of 
experienced HCWs. These challenges were impediments to bioterrorism preparedness 
which the study findings largely collaborated. In addition, the findings showed that the 
impediments to bioterrorism preparedness also included the lack of adequate resources in 
the areas of funding and manpower development and inadequate information sharing. But 
participants were particularly concerned that there was poor funding for emergency 
responses as a whole and worse for bioterrorism preparedness which in some cases were 
non-existent. Poor funding leads to inadequate preparedness and increases the risk of 
secondary infections through the EMTs and first responders. 
The challenge was also about allocating the available resources. And because 
some of the EMSOs see their organizations as remote targets, more resources were 
channeled to the more common emergency response issues such as medical emergency 
calls and fire hazards. The themes used by the participants to express their level of 
preparedness (inadequate funding, insufficient knowledge, and inadequate information 
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sharing) aligned with Kingdon’s MST’s problem stream. Kingdon’s problem stream 
triggers the need for solutions which are consistent with the policy stream, and 
policymakers’ decisions to advance urgent policies within the political stream to overturn 
the impediments because of pressures from interest groups and political expediency. 
Theme 1: Lack of Resources 
An underlying pattern that was clear across the EMSOs and EMTs was the idea 
that there should be regular training and adequate funding for bioterrorism preparedness 
not just for EMTs but for all first responders. I sensed the urgency among the participants 
for increased bioagent knowledge which would result in an increased willingness to 
respond to bioterrorism (Barnett et al., 2012). Increased willingness to response 
presupposes the ability to mitigate the impact of biological attacks and prevent or reduce 
the possibility of secondary infections (Ahmad et al., 2016). A major goal of this study 
was to understand the emergency response practices that involve biological agents. All 
the participants identified poor funding as a critical factor for the unpreparedness for all 
emergencies especially bioterrorism preparedness. The findings showed that whereas 
there were apparent lapses in bioterrorism preparedness, it was not for the reluctance of 
the EMTs to participate but due to inadequate funding for bioterrorism preparedness 
practices such as continuous education, periodic drills, and hands-on training. Inadequate 
funding as a major barrier for emergency response readiness was responsible for some of 
the cities’ utilization of volunteers for emergency medical services. The volunteers work 
part-time, and in the evenings on the days they are available. Essentially, they provided 
skeletal emergency medical services. 
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And, the use of volunteers for emergence medical services has its peculiar 
problems that would require further study. For instance, using volunteers also had its 
shortcomings which included inadequate volunteers. Some cities lacked enough 
volunteers to cover the various shifts. The shortage of volunteer EMTs in some cities put 
enormous pressure on the neighboring towns with full-time EMTs as they tended to cover 
the neighboring cities with volunteer EMTs. Also, in some towns with volunteer EMTs, 
emergency offices are closed until evening when volunteer EMTs become available. 
Second, critical interagency cooperation is higher between agencies with full-time EMTs 
than between full-time agencies and volunteer agencies. This second problem is traceable 
to the partial availability of volunteer EMTs as noted earlier. Hence, the erosion of trust, 
confidence and effective collaboration. The above problems led to the third problem 
namely, non-retention of experienced EMTs. The higher than normal volunteer EMTs’ 
turnovers as they relocate to other places in search of employment opportunities does not 
encourage the retention of experienced EMTs. As a result, the meager available resources 
are utilized in training new volunteers. 
The importance of adequate funding for the execution of needed activities for 
bioterrorism preparedness such as continuous education, regular drills and the 
procurement of PPE has been documented (Maras & Miranda, 2016 & Waldrop et al., 
2014). The lack of adequate funding was identified as responsible for the non-
procurement of essential equipment such as the PPE for some agencies, and maintenance 
of existing equipment when due. The data from the interview showed that PPE was 
procured by emergency organizations following the Ebola epidemic, but no plans were 
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made for their maintenance or replacement. As the years went by, some of the equipment 
expired and needed replacement and others needed refurbishment, but there were 
inadequate funds to refurbish or replace them - inability to replace aging PPE because of 
inadequate funding was a critical issue in bioterrorism unpreparedness. Even if the funds 
were available, there was the added challenge of acquiring knowledge of bioagents and 
identifying their characteristics in emergencies. This is because each biological agent 
presents different symptoms and characteristics. 
This problem of funding correlates with the problem stream of Kingdon’s 
multiple stream theory. The inadequate funding showed the existence of a problem which 
in the MST’s problem stream can appear after a disaster as was evident during and after 
the Ebola epidemic (Hayle, 2015). To overcome the funding problems, policymakers and 
emergency managers may pool resources and consolidate emergency services for 
efficiency and effectiveness especially among smaller towns whose meager resources 
were stretched thin during the Ebola epidemic. According to the Kingdon’s model, policy 
makers and organizational managers can pursue a careful review of proposals that would 
address the problem issues which for the study are bioterrorism response plans. 
Theme 2: Continuous Education 
The EMTs in the towns where the interviews were conducted did not have regular 
and continuous education on bioterrorism preparedness despite the HMP of 2015. A 
major aim of the HMP 2015 was to ensure that HCWs in the county are adequately and 
continuously trained to effectively and efficiently respond to emergencies. Regularly 
updating EMTs’ knowledge of biological agents is critical for effective emergency 
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responses to bioterrorism (Plough et al., 2013). The manner and urgency of emergency 
responses would not allow for laboratory testing of the disease before helping victims. 
The need for continuous education cannot be overstated. The importance of continuous 
education is encapsulated in continuous training to acquire and update knowledge and 
identify pathogens, and these ideas agree with the study by Aghaei and Nesami (2013). 
However, the problems of inadequate funding and lack of uniformity in staffing in some 
of the organizations were impediments to achieving the goal of increasing the knowledge 
base of HCWs including EMTs. 
Although the problem of inadequate training was partly a result of inadequate 
funding, there is also the added problem of scheduling training especially in the 
organizations with volunteer EMTs. Volunteer EMTs have other jobs with different 
schedules and demands. As a result, the volunteer EMTs operated at different times based 
on their respective regular jobs, and that made it difficult to schedule training that 
required most of the EMTs at the same time. And, joint drills, training, and education in 
collaboration with other emergency organizations are needed to build interagency 
cooperation, collaboration, and coordination, for the synergy of ideas and comradery. To 
achieve policy changes regarding increased knowledge of HIDs through continuous 
education, policymakers must be ready to make the hard decisions as the politics stream 
of Kingdon’s MST recommends. 
Theme 3: Inadequate Knowledge and Information 
As the data from the participants indicated, information sharing and knowledge of 
pathogen are critical elements in bioterrorism preparedness, and this finding supports the 
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existing literature (Passi et al., 2015). When asked about their knowledge of pathogens, 
only two of the 18 study participants expressed adequate knowledge of most HIDs. Lack 
of knowledge was identified as a major barrier to an effective emergency response 
involving infectious diseases. This finding was not surprising given that EMTs do not 
deal with pathogens on their daily emergency response activities. For example, except for 
four EMTs who were around during the 2001 anthrax attacks, the other EMTs 
interviewed would hardly recognize anthrax attacks if they occur now. 
Information sharing and communication with both the public and other 
emergency agents are also critical to the effectiveness of EMTS. Information sharing 
with 911 callers who most often do not give adequate information to emergency 
dispatchers posed safety concerns to EMTs because they have inadequate information of 
what they are responding to. Despite the 2014 Ebola epidemic, the training and drills that 
followed and the policy recommendations contained in the 2015 HMP, there was still 
apparent inadequate knowledge of biological agents. This is because there has been no 
refresher training on bioterrorism preparedness for most EMTs even as new EMTs were 
either employed or have volunteered and that further increases the risk of secondary 
infections 
 When the question was asked about bioterrorism preparedness, 16 of the study 
participants expressed a poor level of preparedness because they lacked adequate 
knowledge of biological agents. For instance, insufficient knowledge of biological agents 
had 34 frequencies representing 8.48% of the occurrences of the codes. These responses 
aligned with a similar study in Nigeria by Oladimeji et al., 2015. Oladimeji et al., (2015) 
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found that most HCWs lacked adequate knowledge of biological agents and that 
demonstrated an existential problem in line with the problem stream of MST. When you 
add the lack of information (32 frequencies), the cumulative percentage of the 
frequencies for both codes represented almost one-sixth (16.46%) of the total 
occurrences. 
The findings revealed that the impediments to bioterrorism preparedness practices 
were lack of funds, lack of continuous education and insufficient knowledge of biological 
agents and inadequate information sharing. These impediments to bioterrorism 
preparedness aligned with Kingdon’s multiple stream theory that required the existence 
of certain conditions which policymakers and citizens must address for the desired policy 
and political changes to occur (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The problems having been 
identified, it is then for policymakers to identify the most appropriate proposals or policy 
options to solve the problems. The 2014 Ebola epidemic and the attendant poor responses 
provided the windows of opportunity for bioterrorism hardening among EMTs. Interview 
questions that addressed this category and from which the themes emerged were 
Questions 2, 3, 4 and 9. The responses and findings aligned with earlier studies that 
utilized the MST and demonstrated that the existence of the window of opportunity was a 
prerequisite for the three streams to achieve desired goals (Brunner, 2008; Walhart, 
2013). To overcome these barriers, improvements in funding, inter-governmental and 
inter-agency collaboration and better information sharing between the public and the 
EMTs through the emergency dispatchers are required. The window of opportunity is 
there for bioterrorism hardening among EMTs. 
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Category 3: Understanding Bioterrorism Preparedness 
Critical to bioterrorism hardening is understanding what is required for 
bioterrorism readiness. This category formed the core of the study given the research 
question. Regardless of where one is located, any city, town, structure or school can be 
targeted. The study finding showed the lack of adequate knowledge of biological agents 
among EMTs has implications for their safety, the safety of their families and the 
community they serve. The overwhelming theme identified in this category was 
mandatory bioterrorism hardening when the study participants were asked about how best 
to achieve bioterrorism preparedness. Instituting preparedness practices that would bring 
about mandatory bioterrorism hardening will require political will from policymakers that 
Kingdon’s multiple stream stresses. 
Theme 5: Mandatory Bioterrorism Hardening 
Over eighty percent of the study participants acknowledged the efforts of the 
various governments in the aftermath of the 2014 Ebola that increased the awareness 
level of infectious diseases such as Ebola among EMTs and the readiness strategies 
initiated to handle infected persons. Fifteen of the participants acknowledged the 
satisfactory initiatives to educate HCWs including EMTs about Ebola in the immediate 
years after the Ebola epidemic. The politics stream of MST helped explain this theme and 
the participant’s data. The codes: training; awareness of WMD; universal precautions; 
and safety were derived from Interview Questions 5 and 6. The politics stream of 
Kingdon’s MST and the findings were consistent with the literature which affirmed that 
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bioterrorism preparedness practices reduce the casualty rate among HCWs by about 75 
percent in the event of bioterrorism (Jansen et al., 2014). 
In line with the main elements of the MST, the 2014 Ebola epidemic provided the 
window of opportunity to address the issues of bioterrorism preparedness and hardening 
through the creation of awareness of WMD, strict application of the universal 
precautions, regular training, and safety of the responders (Abrol, 2016). The safety and 
protection of EMTs were assessed by how responders approach disaster situations with 
caution, don of PPE when attending to patients, and ask critical questions such as travel 
history (Decker et al., 2014). As a result of the Ebola epidemic and the lessons learned, 
EMTs became more stringent in asking leading questions such as: Did you travel outside 
the United States? Do you have a fever? Are you vomiting? This theme demonstrated that 
EMTs should, as a matter of urgency, be prepared to handle any disaster through more 
training, regular drills, continuous education, and inter-agency collaboration and 
information sharing for their safety and those of their communities. These are 
bioterrorism hardening practices. Unfortunately, these suggestions were in some agencies 
non-existent, and where existent, they were either not implemented, or their 
implementations were not sustained. 
From this finding and the current literature, it was evident that the 2002 
Bioterrorism Act, the 2004 NRF, 2006 Pandemic and all-Hazards Preparedness Act 
(PAHPA), the National Health Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(NHSS), PAHPRA of 2013 and the 2008 and 2015 all Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMPs) 
did not achieve the common objective of building community-wide resilience emergency 
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responses practices (DHS, 2016; Eddy & Sase, 2015; Shelton et al., 2012;). The problems 
in the past gave rise to proposals from which policies were created including the 
Bioterrorism Act of 2002 following the 2001 anthrax attacks. In 2014, the Ebola 
epidemic and the responses to it revealed new problems that required policy changes 
from many competing proposals. Incidentally, the 2015 HMP was in a review when the 
Ebola epidemic occurred. According to the MST, policymakers must advance decisions 
to address them. Part of the policies made was the designation of some facilities as acute 
healthcare facilities for medical treatments without putting EMTs, their families, and 
their immediate communities at further risks. This policy should be followed with regular 
education and drills across emergency response organizations for efficiency and 
effectiveness when responding to disaster areas especially if biological agents are 
involved. 
Category 4: Enhancing Bioterrorism Preparedness and Practices 
Theme 6: Collaboration Among Agencies  
An integral goal of the all-Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) was to have a mutually 
beneficial document that would be used throughout the county and reduce duplication of 
emergency response or mitigation initiatives. This goal presupposes strategic joint 
training and sharing of knowledge. The HMP mission statement also included the goals 
of partnership and collaboration to reduce vulnerability. Other bioterrorism preparedness 
programs and policies also aimed to achieve similar objectives. However, these goals of 
partnership, joint drills, HazMat Awareness and Operation and interagency collaboration 
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among first responders within the county have not been fully achieved as the data from 
the study indicated. 
Following the 2001 anthrax attacks, there was an increased need for inter-
governmental collaborations (Gamboa-Maldonado et al., 2012). What also appeared to be 
lacking as the study data showed was effective interagency collaboration during the 2014 
Ebola epidemic response. There was overwhelming concern about the insufficient 
interagency collaborations and sharing of knowledge and information among EMTs. 
Interagency collaboration is critical given that EMTs and other emergency responders are 
mostly at risk of secondary infections in the course of performing their duties. Therefore, 
the HMP needs to be revamped and implemented for effective interagency collaboration 
and joint drills in emergency responses. This process could start with creating uniformity 
in the staffing of EMSOs. 
The study found that the differences in the staffing of the emergency 
organizations across the county were considered a problem in interagency collaboration. 
Some EMSOs were staffed by full-time EMTs while some others were staffed by 
volunteers or part-time EMTs. Some other agencies’ staff was a combination of both full-
time and volunteers. The lack of uniformity in the staffing of EMTs in the county was a 
hindrance in interagency collaboration and information sharing. One study participant 
told me that some full-time EMTs do not feel comfortable sharing information or 
collaborating with the agencies staffed by volunteers. Some emergency medical agencies 
staffed by volunteers were not available at certain times of the day. Of the agencies in 
which I conducted the study, two of the agencies were staffed by full-time EMTs; one 
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agency was staffed by volunteer EMTs, and the other agency was a mixture of both full-
time and volunteer EMTs. Some of the volunteer EMTs themselves acknowledged that it 
was a problem especially in attending training, continuous education programs, and drills 
because the EMS activities often conflict with their regular jobs. 
In spite of the problem of the low level of collaboration among EMSOs and 
EMTs, there is the urgent need to engage with other emergency response agencies, share 
information with first responders, train together and conduct joint drills. These 
collaborative initiatives are prerequisites for effective real-time joint responses to actual 
disaster situations by EMTs. Also, inter-agency coordination, cooperation, and 
collaboration reduce the cost of running EMSOs and increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of emergency response practices. The need for effective inter-agency 
collaboration programs or policies as prerequisites for bioterrorism preparedness aligns 
with Kingdon’s MST politics stream. Such a program would facilitate a careful review of 
the preparedness policies by policymakers to address the problems of lack of uniformity 
and effective collaboration. The policymakers in this instance will include the 
management of EMSOs who handle the day to day affairs of emergency response 
practices and policymakers. The study contributes to the existing body of knowledge on 
bioterrorism preparedness by highlighting the urgency for all-hazard inter-agency 
collaboration, cooperation, and coordination. 
Theme 7: Safety and Job Security 
Other issues that EMTs considered critical to an effective emergency response 
were safety and job security. These issues were of concern to ten of the EMTs 
175 
 
interviewed. The issues of safety and job security align with Kingdon’s MST’s politics 
stream. Politics stream of MST stresses the roles policymakers must play to address the 
issues within the problem stream from the competing solutions or proposals (Kingdon, 
1984). Participants’ answers to interview Questions 7, 8, and 10 provided policy choices 
that may be considered for the overall safety of both the emergency medical responders 
and the general population. The vulnerability of EMTs can be far-reaching and are not 
restricted by age or gender as the study findings showed with the distribution of the 
participants’ age, gender, and educational status. The vulnerability of EMTs was 
recognized in the revised all-Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2015, given the geographic and 
demographic characteristics of the county in which the study was conducted. 
If EMTs are well trained, have uniformity in staffing, and have adequate 
knowledge of bioagents they will have a multiplier effect of protecting EMTs and their 
families and ensuring a safe and protected community (Hunger, 2014; Taylor, 2015). For 
instance, one participant said that it is a huge problem if EMTs will have to wait for about 
48 hours before knowing what diseases they may have been exposed to when “we would 
have been with our families the past 24 hours.” Data revealed that although the study 
participants made use of the triage system when approaching a disaster scene, the 
inadequate and, sometimes the lack of knowledge of bioagents still made EMTs 
vulnerable to bioagents infection. As a precaution, there is a need for stricter application 
of the triage system and by extension ask certain routine but important questions when 
responding to disaster or emergencies. At the minimum, the benefit of this finding is that 
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EMTs will look for and identify physical signs of diseases such as chicken pox, smallpox, 
Ebola and anthrax when responding to disaster scenes. 
Experience of the EMTs was an issue that revealed itself during data collection. 
As the study data showed, the average years of experience of the study participants were 
14.63 years. The implication of this average age of the study participants is that many of 
the EMTs became EMTs after the 2001 anthrax attacks. So, the 2014 Ebola epidemic was 
to some of the study participants and other EMTs, their real-time experience with 
emergency medical preparedness and responses that involved biological agents. 
Another issue that participants raised was emergency agencies proximity or 
distance from what they perceived as high threat cities. For instance, big cities like 
Newark, Jersey City and Elizabeth (all in New Jersey) are considered more vulnerable 
than the participating emergency organizations’ cities. The high threat is particularly 
more so for Newark City. And not much attention was devoted to bioterrorism prevention 
and mitigation in the HMP despite the high-profile targets including Newark Liberty 
International Airport, Newark Penn Station and the New Jersey Port Authority located in 
Newark and Elizabeth. 
All four organizations involved in the study participated in the 2015 HMP review. 
And, the HMP also sort to make frontline-responders including EMTs safe by updating 
the strategies to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities including “natural and human-caused 
hazards in order to protect the health, safety, …, and all communities” in the  county. 
Yet, EMTs are vulnerable to and ill-prepared for biological attacks. 
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In spite of the participating cities’ less vulnerability to biological attacks, 
bioterrorism preparedness practices should be considered critical because any group of 
EMTs could be called upon to assist in disaster-hit cities or when biological agents are 
weaponized. This is because of their proximity to the high threat cities. The participating 
four organizations are within 10 miles of Newark City. And the City of Newark is 
considered the most vulnerable city in New Jersey, and these organizations may be called 
upon to help out if Newark is attacked with biological agents. The City of Elizabeth is 
about 15 miles from the cities involved in this study and about 21 miles from the City of 
Jersey City. It was, therefore, imperative that EMTs in as many cities as possible have 
bioterrorism hardening strategies namely, training, education and regular drills for the 
safety of the participants. 
Another concern to EMTs was jobs security. A great number of EMTs are not 
career positions. Data showed that standardized training and uniformity in emergency 
response is critical to emergency response (Taylor, 2015). Data gathered during the study 
showed that various EMTs had different levels of education. There is a need to mandate 
uniformity in hiring and a standardized higher-level of educational qualification. 
Responses from five of the participants pointed to at least an associate (two-year) degree 
as the minimum educational level for EMTs. This policy should bring about a stronger 
professional bond among EMTs across cities. The themes of safety and job security 
emanated from the Interview Questions of 7, 8 and 10 and they coincide with the politics 
stream of Kingdon’s MST which emphasizes policy formulation from the many 
competing solutions to deal with a problem (Kingdon, 1984). The formulation of job 
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security and safety policies are within the control of EMSOs, emergency response 
managers and government officials who make laws and policies. They constitute the 
policy-making body within the Kingdon’s multiple streams, and they must incorporate 
policies or proposals that will guarantee the safety of EMTs and increase the retention of 
EMTs and, therefore, enhance bioterrorism hardening. 
Limitations of the Study 
The first limitation of the study was that none of the EMSOs and EMTs involved 
in the study was located in any of the three largest cities in New Jersey namely, Newark, 
Jersey City, and Camden. Efforts to involve some of them in Newark failed due to time 
constraint despite repeated requests. This limitation implies that the data from the study 
participants did not emanate from the EMTs whose cities are most likely to be attacked. 
The second limitation is the unwillingness of the participants to share certain 
information that would have helped the study gain a better understanding of the critical 
elements involved in their current response strategies and how they may contribute to 
future bioterrorism preparedness and hardening. Aside from the prepared interview 
questions, I asked for existing bioterrorism preparedness strategies in each of the 
emergency organizations, if any. Most of the organizations refused to divulge such 
information. They stated they were not allowed to share such information with the public 
as precautionary measures. Also, they would not reveal the nature of their funding. Only 
one agency volunteered the information that all of its funding comes from donations from 
members of the community. That agency is made up of volunteer EMTs, and the 
community funds the agency’s activities. 
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The third limitation was the underrepresentation of female EMTs and other racial 
groups such as the African Americans and Hispanic EMTs. This limitation had to do with 
the organizations that agreed to participate in the study. Efforts were made to ensure 
broader representation from EMTs in areas with a higher mixture of races, but the 
emergency agencies in those areas did not show interest to participate in the study. 
However, the under-representation of female EMTs in the agencies interviewed was 
because of the low number of female EMTs relative to their male counterparts and a 
reflection of the nature of the diversity of the EMTs in the participating organizations. 
Recommendations for Future Study 
This qualitative case study aimed to understand the nature of bioterrorism 
preparedness among EMTs in New Jersey. The study, therefore, focused on weaponized 
biological agents to the exclusion of other forms of terrorism: explosives, radiological, 
chemical and nuclear. While the study focused on biological agents, it was not clear how 
prepared EMTs are for these other potential forms of terrorism. The study recommends 
future studies is conducted on the readiness of EMTs for weaponized WMD: chemical, 
radiological and nuclear. In this age of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), any of them can be weaponized and first responders and HCWs should be 
prepared to respond to them. 
Furthermore, I recommend that future study is conducted on the readiness of 
EMTs in the larger cities for a clearer understanding of their bioterrorism response 
readiness given that terrorists appear to target densely populated areas and cities. 
Previous studies showed that terrorists target areas with a high population for cause 
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societal disruption, panic and maximum human casualties (Jensen et. al., 2014; Green, 
LeDuc, Cohen, & Franz, 2019). The current study’s inability to involve EMTs and 
EMSOs in the large cities was a limitation. 
Some of the study participants during the interview noted the educational 
disparity among the EMTs. There was concern about the low educational requirements 
for becoming EMTs. Further study is recommended on the impact of higher education on 
the effectiveness of EMTs and how widespread this concern is among EMTs. 
As the data from the interview revealed, collaborations should not only be among 
EMTs across cities but also among all first responders: EMTs, AEMTs, the firefighters, 
the police, MICNs, and the paramedics. The first responders have often jointly responded 
in disaster situations. Joint responses by first responders have the potentials to increase 
the risk of secondary infections if there are no joint preparedness programs. Therefore, 
there should be periodic collaborative training and joint drills so that everyone knows 
what do at any given time and stage of the response without increasing the risk of 
secondary infections. The themes that resulted from the data analysis will help in the 
bioterrorism hardening of all first responders and other healthcare practitioners. 
Therefore, I recommend for future studies on the readiness and preparedness of the other 
first responders for bioterrorism and weaponized WMD. 
Implications for Change 
The positive social change inherent in this study is in bringing about attitudinal 
change. The findings will create awareness among EMTs to always take precautionary 
steps when responding to emergencies especially in this age of the proliferation of 
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biological agents and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the interview 
progressed, EMTs became more aware that recognizing the symptoms of biological 
agents was a prerequisite for bioterrorism hardening. The knowledge will galvanize 
EMTs and healthcare workers to agitate for more training, drills and regular education 
which are necessary for building community resilience to biological agents (Plough et al., 
2013). 
Second, the study findings will create awareness and urgency for collaborative 
initiatives, coordination, and cooperation among EMTs and between emergency agencies, 
and public awareness of bioagents. The threat posed by terrorists for potential 
weaponization of biological agents necessitated the need to share information, 
knowledge, and ideas, maximize scarce funds, and engage in joint training and drills for 
bioterrorism hardening. 
Third, the study will bring about and encourage the mass education of citizens on 
the symptoms and effects of bioagents and how to control the spread. When citizens 
become knowledgeable of bioagents and the several symptoms, they will be able to 
communicate with 911 dispatchers and relay effectively what is happening and what 
symptoms they are experiencing. The collateral consequence and benefits are that EMTs 
will be better prepared to respond to such emergencies because of better knowledge of 
the emergency or disaster. The increased knowledge of bioagents among EMTs and the 
public will also make for community-wide safety and security and prevent or reduce 
secondary infections, contamination, and risk. This recommendation aligns with the 
recommendations of the HMP to prepare citizens and agencies for effective disaster 
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responses. But in this regards, greater efforts should be placed on preparing citizens and 
emergency responders for an effective and efficient bioterrorism response preparedness. 
Throughout data collection, it was apparent that the EMTs interviewed lacked 
clear bioterrorism preparedness training and drills because the participants operated in 
smaller cities. Some EMTs alluded to that and remarked that they were less likely to be 
attacked. The study revealed the need to make EMTs in the smaller cities as prepared for 
bioterrorism as EMTs in the larger cities. EMTs in smaller cities have often been called 
upon to help neighboring larger cities during severe emergency situations. Therefore, 
they also need to acquaint themselves of bioagents that could be weaponized. The 
increased knowledge would equip EMTs with the knowledge base to make critical 
decisions within the limited time they have to attend to patients and avoid secondary 
infection of themselves and their colleagues (Ahmad et al., 2016). 
Though the participants did not allude to it, it may be necessary for smaller cities 
to pull resources and merge their emergency response services to maximize resources and 
emergency response practices and readiness. Small cities do not have adequate resources 
to fund full-time emergency organizations. This study recommends that towns merge 
services to help maximize resources. The merging of emergency responses between or 
among cities can also be done between bigger towns and smaller cities. 
Finally, improvements in the bioterrorism preparedness and practices have 
practical implications for positive social change through policy formulation and policy 
changes. Policy changes in the area of increased funding would help enhance 
community-level bioterrorism preparedness programs that cater to unique local needs and 
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increase interagency collaboration in the county. The collateral benefit of a community-
wide bioterrorism preparedness program or policy is the hardening of not only EMTs but 
the entire first responders which include: EMTs, AEMTs, Fire Fighters, the Police, 
mobile intensive care nurses (MICNs) and the paramedics. As a result, all New Jersey 
regional emergency management plans such as the selected county’s HMP need to be 
reviewed given the lessons learned from the responses to the 2014 Ebola epidemic and 
the data from the study. 
Conclusion 
I embarked on this qualitative research study to understand the bioterrorism 
readiness of EMTs in New Jersey. These non-hospital-based EMS organizations were 
purposefully chosen because of their proximity to the general population. Non-hospital-
based EMS organizations are more likely to respond quicker than hospital-based EMTs 
because of their closeness to the general population. The study was also conducted to 
understand the policy implications for lack of bioterrorism hardening which can be 
measured in terms of bioterrorism preparedness programs and knowledge of biological 
agents. The study’s 18 participants discussed their knowledge of biological agents that 
was less than adequate before the 2014 Ebola epidemic and in some cases non-existent. 
Preparedness and disease management should not only be for HCWs and those exposed 
to the disease but should also include those who fear that they have been exposed to the 
bioagent or the “worried well” and not just the exposed (Evans & Lawrence, 2006). A 
large number of the worried well put enormous pressure on the EMTs and the entire 
HCWs and affect their effectiveness. 
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The study participants’ responses addressed the research questions that led to the 
emergence of seven major themes from 14 codes based on 401 total occurrences of the 
codes. The study found that the participants’ bioagent knowledge and awareness 
increased during the Ebola epidemic and the immediate years after the epidemic. 
However, the increased knowledge and awareness level were not sustained because of the 
lack of continuous training as the years went by. Nevertheless, the participants 
recognized that preparedness programs and practices such as training, regular joint drills, 
continuous education, and interagency collaboration were essential to bioterrorism 
hardening. Conversely, the study identified the lack of adequate funding as the major 
barrier to the building of intra and interagency bioterrorism hardening among EMTs and 
implementing bioterrorism preparedness programs. 
The threat of bioterrorism is real because terrorist groups are exploring ways to 
inflict maximum casualty, which is one of their main objectives (Green et al., 2019) 
There are various biological agents that terrorists and terrorist organizations can use to 
cause maximum damage and harm. These bioagents include Ebola, anthrax, and smallpox 
among others that the CDC identified and categorized based on their degrees of potency. 
The need to develop bioterrorism hardening strategies and programs has been urgent 
before and following the 2001 anthrax attacks. As a result, it was believed that the United 
States governments and the healthcare community were prepared for biological attacks. 
But the uncoordinated responses to the 2014 Ebola epidemic revealed inadequate 
preparedness and practices within the healthcare community for biological attacks despite 
the programs and policies put in place after the 2001 anthrax attacks and, therefore, a 
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policy failure on bioterrorism preparedness. And policy failure occurs when it fails to 
achieve the desired goals in certain aspects of the policy objectives (McConnell, 2016). 
There is, therefore, the urgent need to consider other approaches to bioterrorism 
preparedness and hardening. 
However, the Ebola epidemic helped in creating awareness both within the 
medical community and among the general population. With the epidemic came the 
public knowledge of such terminologies as personal protection equipment (PPE), 
gasmasks, hazmat suits and donning and duffing. As the interview showed, there were 
deliberate attempts by the members of the medical community to maintain a high level of 
preparedness for infectious diseases and biological agents in the immediate years 
following the Ebola epidemic. However, as the years went by, many medical 
organizations and medical professionals including EMTs let down their guards. Thus, 
making them less prepared and more vulnerable should bioterrorism occur. The major 
factors responsible for this was the lack of funding and the feeling of less vulnerability 
among the EMTs in the organizations I conducted the study. The EMTs I interviewed 
attributed their feeling of less vulnerability to their “remote” locations. Other factors 
responsible for this lack of preparedness among EMTs include lack of training and lack 
of interagency collaborations. The study participants were either full-time, part-time or 
volunteers and the lack of uniformity in the constitution of EMTs were identified as one 
factor among others responsible for the lack of effective inter-agency collaboration. 
The study findings have implications for social change because it will aid in 
policy formulation for bioterrorism hardening among EMTs and other emergency 
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medical responders through the procurement and servicing of preparedness equipment 
and allocation of adequate funding. The study findings will also help sensitize both the 
medical community and the general population in identifying bioagents and, therefore, 
help prevent and mitigate secondary infections, which are critical to bioterrorism 
hardening. The public knowledge and awareness will also bring about better information 
sharing among the public, emergency dispatchers and the EMTs and other first 
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Policy and Administration (PPA) at Walden University. My area of concentration is 
Terrorism, Mediation, and Peace (TMP). My dissertation topic is Bioterrorism 
Hardening: An Exploratory Study of EMTs Preparedness and Practices. The purpose of 
the research is to examine and understand the bioterrorism preparedness and emergency 
response practices (BT/ERPs) among emergency medical technicians (EMTs). The study 
has the approval of the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
I am inviting you to participate in the study because you met the selection criteria 
that include a minimum of five-year work experience as an EMT and employment since 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Although there is no benefit for participating in the interview, 
your participation will help improve the bioterrorism preparedness and emergency 
readiness of EMTs in your county and community-wide readiness practices during 
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in a public library conference or any other available secured room or space for your 
safety and privacy. You may choose any time during library hours between 10.30 am and 
7.30 pm during workdays and at a time most suitable for you that will not disrupt your 
work schedule. The interview will be audio-recorded. 
I appreciate your taking the time to assist me in this research. The information 
you provide will be used only for the study and destroyed five years after the conclusion 
of the study and graduation as required by the University IRB. In addition, all personal 
information collected will be treated with utmost confidentiality, and I will destroy them 




Ndubuisi C. Ejike (Researcher) 
 
Prof. George Kieh (Dissertation committee chairman) 
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Appendix B: Participants’ Demographic Information 
I will administer the demographic survey orally to each research participant. The survey 
is to ensure that participants meet the requirements to be eligible for participation in the 
interview. The requirements include a minimum age of 25, minimum of five years of 
professional experience, and employment during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. This survey 
will help me collect data about bioterrorism and emergency readiness (BT/ER) in your 
county vis-a-vis bioagent knowledge and training. The information gathered will be for 
this study only.  
1. Please indicate what area of emergency response you specialize on.  
(a) Emergency medical technicians  
(b) Paramedics  
(c) Mobile intensive care nurses  
(d) Advanced emergency medical technician 
(e) Others (please indicate) 
2. How long have you been employed in emergency medical response? 
(a) Under 4 years  
(b)  4 -10 years  
(c) 10 - 15 years  
(d) 15 - 15 years  
3. Were you actively employed during the 2014 Ebola epidemic? 
Circle one: Yes or No 
4. In what category is your age?  
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(a) Under 24  
(b) 24 - 29  
(c) 30 - 35  
(d) 36 - 41  
(e) Above 42 
5. Please specify your race.  
(a) African American 
(b) Caucasian  
(c) Hispanic  
(d) Other. Please indicate: 
6. Indicate your educational attainment. 
(a) Certificate 
(b) GED 
(c) University Education: Bachelors 
(d) University Education: Above Bachelors  
7. Indicate your gender. 
(a) Male  




Appendix C: Interview Questions 
Research Topic: Interview Guide on Bioterrorism Hardening: An Exploratory Study of 
EMTs Preparedness and Practices. 
Introduction: The following questions will be used to examine and understand the 
emergency preparedness and practices among emergency medical workers especially 
when it involved bioterrorism. The findings should help increase EMTs’ knowledge of 
biological agents, their characteristics, and their overall bioterrorism preparedness 
readiness and response practices. This proposed study is germane following the 





City,     state:    zip: 
Telephone: home (  ) _________   Work (  ) _________  
Sex: Female or Male (circle) 
What is your current position in your organization?  
Research Questions: 
1.  How would you describe the existing emergency response practices in your 
organization? 
2. How would you describe the preparedness practices in your organization for 
biological attacks especially after the 2014 Ebola epidemic? 
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3. How will the knowledge of bioagents help you in emergency responses that 
involve cutaneous diseases? 
4. What knowledge do you have about cutaneous forms of pathogens such as Ebola? 
5. How do your emergency response protocols prepare you for potential bioagent or 
biological attacks? 
6. What kind of preparedness and training do you need for disaster response? 
7. What areas of training or tools do you think you will need for effective 
bioterrorism and emergency response? 
8. What other suggestion would you proffer for adequate bioterrorism and infectious 
disease response by emergency medical response?  
9. What would you say are the major obstacles for an effective emergency response 
involving infectious diseases?  




Appendix D: Gatekeeper Information Form 
Topic: Bioterrorism Harding: An Exploratory Study of Emergency Medical Technicians 
Bioterrorism preparedness practices and policies  
Introduction: 
I am Ndubuisi Ejike. I am a student at the Walden University and conducting a 
study in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The 
research is on the bioterrorism preparedness and practices of emergency medical 
technicians (EMTs). I am requesting your permission to interview emergency medical 
workers in your organization. With your permission, I will interview them in your 
organization to avoid interrupting your organizational workflow. 
I am requesting your assistance in identifying and selecting emergency workers 
who have theoretical and practical experiences in emergency response for the study. I 
have itemized some information about the study that will help you in the selection 
process. They include the reason for the study, eligibility requirement, and how the study 
will be conducted. 
 The rationale for the Study:  
The purpose of the study is to examine the bioterrorism and emergency response 
practices (BT/ERPs) in your organization and help increase EMTs bioagent knowledge 
and improve EMTs BT/ERPs’ readiness given the heightened terrorism threats and the 
higher risk EMTs face. The study’s findings will help in identifying the areas of 
improvement in EMTs response and patients’ handling during cutaneous disease 
epidemic and/or bioterrorism incidents. 
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How and Where I need your assistance  
I will need your assistance in identifying and selecting participants who met the 
selection criteria. I will need five research participants. The criteria for eligibility for 
participation in the study are a minimum age of 25; minimum work experience of five; 
and the participant must have been employed/volunteered during the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic. Please provide me the names, phone numbers and email addresses of the 
participants who meet the requirements for me to contact them. You will also assist me in 
identifying the areas the interview might take place with the least disruption to your daily 
workflow. 
The Role of the Research Participant 
I will give the selected participants the informed consent form that will the state 
the purpose of the study. The interview is estimated to last one hour. The interview will 
take place during office hours from 10.30 pm to 4.30 pm. Participation will be voluntary, 
and they will not be paid. There is no known risk participating in this study. However, 
participants have the right to withdraw at any time throughout the interview stages. The 
research questions will center on EMTs’ knowledge of bioagents; knowledge of 
bioterrorism preparedness and practices; willingness to respond in the event of infectious 
diseases epidemic and/or bioterrorism. 
Safeguarding Confidential Information 
All research materials and data collected will be treated with utmost 
confidentiality. Participants name and your organization name and information will be 
protected and not identified by actual names. Each participant will be assigned identities 
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using alphabets. For instance: participant A; participant B; participant C and so on. 
Similarly, your organization will not be identified by name. I will categorize participating 
organizations as follows: Emergency Agency 1; Emergency Agency 2; Emergency 
Agency 3 and so on. Besides me, the other persons who will access to the data are two 
members of my dissertation committee. Please find the names of my dissertation 
committee members: 
Prof. George Kieh 
Dr. Michael Brewer 
After the study, I will make available a copy of the findings to your organization. 
Please provide me with your contact information for follow up calls and future assistance. 
I truly appreciate your assistance. Feel free to contact me at any time if you have any 
question or need further clarification. 






Appendix E: Consent and Authorization Form 
1. I ______________________________ voluntarily give my consent to assist the 
execution of this research study. 
2. I have read and retained a copy of the cover letter detailing the purpose of the 
study and areas I will be required to assist the researcher: Mr. Ndubuisi Ejike. 
3. As stated I the cover letter, my roles will be to facilitate Mr. Ejike gaining access 
to both the organization and the research participants; assist in identifying those 
EMTs who are more knowledgeable and experienced and were employed during 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic; and assist in locating a conducive area in the work place 
that will not negatively impact the work activities. 
4. Despite my signing of this agreement, I reserve the right to withdraw my 
assistance at any time throughout the duration of the research study without any 
consequences. 
5. All information gathered through the participants or observed by the Mr. Ejike 
will treated with utmost confidentiality and all participants names and the name of 
the organization kept anonymous. 
6. I understand that the research participants will be given the informed consent 
form before participating in the study. 
7. I have the right to, at any time, seek clarifications and ask questions if necessary 




Signature of Gatekeeper & Date:  
_____________________________________________ 
 
Name and Signature of Researcher & Date: 
______________________________________ 
 
